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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that study public service delivery,
nutrition and agricultural productivity in developing countries.
The first chapter investigates whether imposing price-caps on frontline
service delivery agents enhances welfare. I implement a field experiment in
which I randomize whether public extension agents are subject to a price-cap
or not. I find that while price-caps are effective in enhancing the affordability
of extension services and increasing recipients’ surplus, they also reduce
the geographic coverage of services. This suggests that price-cap regulation
creates a tension between making services affordable and providing incentives
for agents to serve remote recipients. I then show that the marginal welfare
effect of reducing discretion over prices can be expressed as a function of two
sufficient statistics: the elasticity of geographic service coverage with respect
to the price-cap and the price elasticity of demand. Calculating the welfare
effects, I find that any reduction of agents’ discretion reduces social welfare.
The second chapter is concerned with contract design in public service
delivery when delivery agents are boundedly rational. A theoretically
efficient contract that minimizes moral hazard costs and avoids behavioural
distortions charges agents a fixed fee for the usage of public assets and
makes them residual claimants on its returns. I investigate whether such
contracts are indeed efficient in practice by investigating whether imposing
lump-sum fees on livestock extension agents distorts their choices. Using
a field experiment, I first show that, contrary to classic economic theory,
levying a fixed fee on agents leads them to increase user fees for a livestock
vaccine and induces demand effects that reduce quantities. To understand
the mechanisms underlying this result, I implement a series of lab-in-the-field
experiments with a subset of the field-experimental participants. The results
suggest that instead of setting prices for user fees as mark-ups over marginal
costs agents use simplified rules-of-thumb that anchor pricing decisions on
aggregate profits. The results highlight that boundedly rational behavior can
reduce the effectiveness of adopting fixed fee contracts.
The third chapter investigates whether improvements to agricultural
production technology, a common response to undernutrition, can enhance
food security and improve nutrition. In India, groundwater irrigation using
tube wells has long been promoted as a means to reduce rainfall-dependence
and enhance food security. The merits of adopting tube wells have, however,
been debated widely, with opponents fearing a deprivation of smaller farmers
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and impoverishment of rural laborers. To evaluate the causal effects of tube
well adoption on nutrition, I employ an instrumental variable framework
that exploits variation in land suitability for deep groundwater irrigation
caused by differences in hydrogeological structures. I find that groundwater
irrigation significantly improves nutrition across the income spectrum: a one
standard deviation increase in the proportion of cropped area irrigated with
tube wells increases calorie intake by 770 to 915 calories per day. In addition,
groundwater irrigation generates positive spillovers on the calorie intake of
urban populations and households not employed in agriculture. I present
additional evidence which suggests that these effects are driven by increases
in agricultural productivity that reduce staple prices and raise wage rates.
The findings thus highlight the value of groundwater irrigation in fighting
undernutrition and promoting agricultural development.
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Chapter 1
The Value of Discretion -
Price-Caps and Public Service
Delivery
It is often argued that price-caps – a ceiling on prices charged by monopolistic
suppliers - are necessary to redistribute surplus and make essential goods and services
affordable. I explore whether price-caps lead to welfare improvements through a field
experiment in which I randomize whether public livestock extension agents are subject
to a price-cap or not. This intervention has three effects. First, conditional on being
served, the treatment increases the consumer surplus available to recipients: the price-
cap reduces average prices by 17% and the within-agent standard deviation of prices
by 42%. Second, the intervention increases the affordability of extension services:
the price-cap increases the share of previously unserved and needy customers in
the beneficiary pool by 15% and 9%, respectively. Third, the price-cap reduces the
geographic coverage of services by decreasing the likelihood that agents will serve
remote villages by 25%. This suggests that price-cap regulation creates a tension
between making services affordable and providing incentives for agents to serve remote
recipients. In light of this trade-off, I show that the marginal welfare effect of reducing
discretion over prices can be expressed as a function of two sufficient statistics: the
elasticity of geographic service coverage with respect to the price-cap and the price
elasticity of demand. Calculating the welfare effects, I find that any reduction of
agents’ discretion reduces social welfare.
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1.1 Introduction
A key function of governments is to assure that citizens are provided with
essential services for welfare and economic development. When agents
responsible for supplying these services have market power, decentralized
market outcomes can generate an inefficient allocation of services and allow
agents to extract surplus from recipients.1 These undesirable outcomes
threaten the ability of governments to provide for their citizens. Government
imposed price-caps, which aim to reduce agents’ discretion over prices,
are one commonly proposed solution to this challenge.2 Theoretical work
suggests that such interventions may be welfare-enhancing, as they can
redistribute surplus and improve aggregate efficiency (Laffont and Tirole,
1993; Laffont, 2005). In addition, there is evidence that charging for
essential services in a developing country setting can adversely affect peoples’
willingness to use these services (Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Ashraf, Berry,
and Shapiro, 2010). Those findings highlight a potential value of low price-
caps and suggest that using price-caps as an instrument to reduce agents’
discretion over prices may be welfare-enhancing.
In many situations, unregulated monopolistic agents responsible for
supplying public services do not, however, only hold decision power over
prices. Rather, these agents also have discretion over which and how
many recipients to serve.3 In such situations, a theoretical literature argues
that allocating discretion over pricing to agents can be welfare-enhancing
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Aghion and Tirole, 1997). In particular, when
governments are unable to impose and enforce universal service obligations,
discretion over prices allows agents to extract surplus, creating an incentive
for them to extend service coverage.4 Price-caps reduce agents’ discretion
and, by limiting their ability to extract surplus, can reduce incentives to extend
1For example, Sappington and Weisman (2010) in their review of evidence on regulatory
policy state: "When competition is unable to impose meaningful discipline on incumbent suppliers
of essential services, regulation can be employed as an imperfect substitute for the missing market
discipline."
2Recent newspaper headlines include: "Hillary Clinton Proposes Cap on Patients’ Drug
Costs" (New York Times, 2015); "FCA proposes price-cap for payday lenders" (Financial Conduct
Authority, 2014); "Kenya to cap interest rates on bank loans" (Financial Times, 2016).
3Chaudhury et al. (2006), for example, document an inability of governments to limit
absenteeism among teachers and health workers in developing countries.
4In Tanzania, the setting of this study, the government cites the binding fiscal constraints
and high monitoring costs to explain the absence of universal service obligations.
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service coverage.5 Capping prices for essential services can therefore also
reduce welfare. The question of whether to cap prices or not hence has to
solve a trade-off between making services affordable and providing incentives
for agents to extend service coverage.
In light of this trade-off, evaluating whether reducing agents’ discretion
over prices improves welfare requires knowledge of two parameters: the price
elasticity of demand ("intensive margin elasticity") and the impact of price-
cap regulation on the number of markets served ("extensive margin elasticity").
While empirical estimates of demand elasticities are available for many goods
and services, empirical evidence on the latter parameter is limited. As a
result, little is known about whether price-cap regulation enhances or reduces
welfare.
This paper provides experimental evidence to address this gap. In particu-
lar, I estimate the intensive and extensive margin elasticities and examine the
trade-off between discretion and price-cap regulation for an essential public
service provided in developing countries: agricultural extension.6 As the
basis of this investigation, I focus on the provision of I-2 poultry vaccines that
protect against Newcastle Disease (ND). ND is highly prevalent in East Africa
and is lethal for infected birds, therefore posing a substantial economic risk for
populations dependent on agriculture.7 I-2 is the primary ND vaccine used by
rural farmers in Tanzania. It is exclusively produced by the government and
distributed directly to farmers by specialized government service delivery
agents. These agents receive the vaccine at a subsidized price from the
government and distribute it by travelling to farmers in a geographically
defined service area, where they perform veterinary examinations and apply
the vaccine.8 Each service area has exactly one agent tasked with providing
5The incentive value of discretion provides a possible explanation for an observed
correlation between worker autonomy and project completion in the public sector (Rasul
and Rogger, 2016). Duflo, Greenstone, et al. (2014) also study how agents’ discretion affect
the effectiveness of public operations but, instead of focusing on incentives, highlight that
discretion allows public agents to use private information.
6On average, African countries spend 5% of their budget on agricultural extension,
compared to 8% spent on primary health services.
7Poor farmers are particularly affected by ND, as their livelihoods and asset holdings are
especially dependent on livestock.
8Private provision is widely viewed as sub-optimal to public provision, as effective ND
vaccination requires adequate handling and application of the vaccine as well as the ability
to detect preexisting poultry infections. A central concern is that private market provision
would compromise service quality which risks reducing the acceptance and adoption of I-2
vaccinations. For example, the formal instruction sheet for I-2 reads: Never vaccinate chickens
which are already unhealthy. If they die, the owner will blame you.
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vaccines.9 Agents collect user charges from farmers in order to finance
the vaccine delivery and application.10 While there exist privately supplied
imperfect substitutes for I-2, access to them is limited to urban areas and
larger scale farmers, and trust in the effectiveness of privately supplied
vaccines is low.11 There is no formal service charge schedule in place that
regulates prices for vaccinations. This lack of competition and price regulation
thus gives substantial price discretion to agents.
To investigate whether capping prices for ND vaccinations enhances
welfare, I collaborate with the Tanzanian government. Working with the
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, I allocate 550 wards, the
main administrative units at which agents are organized, to one of two
experimental groups.12 274 of these wards are assigned to the control group
that mirrors the Tanzanian status quo. Agents assigned to these wards
have full discretion over pricing and typically charge recipients either 50
or 100 Shillings ($0.023 or $0.046) per vaccination. In contrast, 276 wards
are assigned to the treatment group, in which agents face a price-cap of 80
Tanzanian Shillings ($0.035) per vaccination. Agents in both experimental
groups have full discretion over which and how many recipients are served
and which geographic areas are targeted.
The evaluation of this intervention yields three main results. First, the
price-cap is effective in reducing agents’ discretion over prices. I find that
the intervention reduces average prices charged by agents by 17% and the
within-agent standard deviation of these prices by 42%. I also show that
farmers whose main source of livelihood is agriculture and smallholders were
paying higher prices in the status quo and benefit particularly from the price-
cap. Second, the price-cap affects the composition of the beneficiary pool:
I find that the cap increases the share of previously unserved recipients in
the beneficiary pool by 14%. In addition, the price-cap increases the share of
farmers whose livelihood depends on agriculture and smallholders in the
9Agents are, on average, responsible for 4 villages. The government’s ability to introduce
competition within the current system is constrained by a lack of qualified extension staff.
10Financing service delivery agents through user charges is common in developed and
developing countries. See section 1.2.2 for an overview.
1111% of recipients in my sample report having access to an imperfect substitute. Such
recipients are predominantly located in urban areas. The absence of a quality control system
for privately provided vaccines makes I-2 delivery through public agents the only available
option to obtain access to a certified ND vaccine.
12While the Newcastle Disease program covers most of Tanzania, this study focuses on
four regions: Dodoma, Iringa, Morogoro and Tanga. The sample includes all wards in those
regions that were assigned a public service delivery agent at the time of the study.
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recipient pool by 8% and 9%, respectively. Third, the price-cap reduces
the geographic coverage of services by reducing the proportion of villages
that are served in each service area by 12%. This reduction is driven by a
reduced likelihood of agents visiting remote villages: Agents are 25% less
likely to visit the furthest half of villages and 26% less likely to visit the most
remote village in their area of responsibility. Taken together, the evaluation
suggests that the price-cap induces agents to shift towards comparatively
closer but previously unserved recipients. These results therefore present
direct evidence in support of the trade-off discussed previously: On the
one hand, price-caps can enhance welfare by making services affordable for
previously unserved recipients in markets that are comparatively cheaper
to serve. In addition, price-caps can redistribute surplus to recipients. On
the other hand, price-caps can adversely affect welfare by reducing agents’
incentive to extend services to remote markets that are costlier to serve.
Given the countervailing effects induced by the price-cap, it is not clear
whether it is welfare-enhancing for the government to restrict the agents’
discretion over prices and, if so, to what extent. To assess this, I develop a
model of monopoly regulation that is consistent with the empirical results.
Assuming that the government maximizes a weighted sum of consumer
and producer surplus, this model allows me to express the aggregate social
welfare effect of marginally reducing prices below the full discretion level as
a function of two sufficient statistics: First, the elasticity of the proportion of
villages served with respect to the price-cap, which acts as a sufficient statistic
for the welfare loss incurred through the reduced number of markets served.
Second, the price elasticity of demand, which captures the welfare benefits
associated with reducing prices.
The relationship between price-caps and service allocation evaluated as
part of the field experiment is sufficient to estimate the elasticity of the
proportion of villages served with respect to the price-cap. However, the
price-cap treatment is insufficient to estimate the elasticity of demand for I-2
vaccinations.13 To address this, I induce additional experimental variation in
costs. In particular, I independently assign agents in 273 wards to a second
treatment that requires them to contribute a fixed fee of 25,000 Tanzanian
Shillings (approximately $11.40) to cover the cost of the vaccine if they agree
13This is because disentangling supply and demand responses using one source of
variation is difficult.
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to participate in the program.14 Agents in the remaining 277 wards receive
the vaccine for free. This intervention generates variation in prices because, as
I show in a lab-in-the-field experiment, agents choose prices based on average
instead of marginal costs.15 Using this variation, I obtain an estimate of the
aggregate elasticity of demand of -1.22.
I then combine these estimates to evaluate the effect of marginally
reducing agents’ discretion over prices using the sufficient statistics formula.
I find that marginally reducing prices below the monopoly level induces a
social welfare loss of between 3% and 12% of total sales revenue per agent. In
contrast, a counterfactual scenario that ignores the supply effects induced by
the intervention suggests that price-cap regulation would lead to moderate
welfare increases of between 0.5% to 2.5% of total sales revenue per agent
on the margin. Taken together, this result highlights the importance of
studying the effect of price-interventions on service coverage: While price-
caps can increase welfare by making services more affordable, reducing
agents’ discretion over prices can be counterproductive when agents also have
discretion over which markets to serve.
This paper provides evidence on the welfare effects induced by imposing
price-caps on monopolistically supplied services. By doing this, it com-
plements a literature on pricing for public services. Theoretical work in
this area has investigated how to optimally regulate providers of public
services. Laffont and Tirole (1986), show that optimal level of regulation
creates a tension between rent-extraction and efficiency. In deriving the
optimal regulation mechanism, they show that price-caps can be optimal for
highly efficient firms. While they also show that price-caps might allocate
excessive rents to less efficient firms compared to alternative contracts, both
Laffont (2005) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) argue that in the absence
of transfers and verifiable information on costs, price-caps remain the optimal
regulatory policy.16 This paper provides direct and causally identified
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of price-cap regulation and the rent-
extraction versus efficiency trade-off.
14To avoid challenges associated with liquidity constraints, this fee was collected after the
vaccination campaign had ended.
15The intervention and the lab-in-the-field experiment are explained and evaluated in
chapter 2.
16Empirical evidence that tests those theories to date has primarily focused on the
comparison of various regulatory mechanisms with each other. For example, the review by
Abel (2000) highlights that incentive regulation through price-caps in the telecommunication
market reduces prices and provides incentives to invest in infrastructure compared to rate of
return regulation.
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Empirical evidence on pricing for essential services in developing coun-
tries has focused primarily on demand effects induced by prices. For example,
Cohen and Dupas (2010) investigate how charging for insecticide treated bed
nets affects demand and use. Similarly, Ashraf, Berry, and Shapiro (2010)
show that prices for water-purifies can act as a screening device for high-use
customers. This paper complements this work by highlighting the importance
of considering the interaction between supply and demand decisions as the
basis of setting prices for public service provision.
More broadly, this paper provides field-experimental evidence on the
welfare effects induced by allocating discretion to agents. Thereby it
complements a new and rapidly growing literature that investigates the
organization of the public sector in developing countries.17 While previous
empirical work has focused on understanding how contracts for public agents
can be designed to encourage effort (e.g. Khan, Khwaja, and Olken, 2016b;
Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011 and Olken, Onishi, and Wong, 2014),
a more recent stream of theoretical literature has begun to take into account
that contracts in practice are rarely complete.18 This poses a central question
as to who should have decision rights in cases not covered by the employment
contract. While theoretical work highlights that allocating discretion to
agents in situations not covered by contracts can act as an incentive (Aghion
and Tirole, 1997), empirical evidence on this mechanism is rare. Previous
empirical work has primarily focused on documenting a correlation between
employee autonomy and public project completion (Rasul and Rogger, 2016)
as well as improved information use as a result of regulatory discretion
(Duflo, Greenstone, et al., 2014). This paper is, to the extent of my knowledge,
the first to show the existence of incentive effects as a result of discretion.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes
the relevant features of the setting in which the study takes place. Section 1.3
outlines the experimental design and section 1.4 presents the results. Section
1.5 theoretically conceptualizes the effects of the price-cap intervention and
derives a sufficient statistics formula to evaluate the welfare impact of capping
prices. Section 1.6 presents the welfare analysis. Section 1.8 concludes.
17The review by Finan, Olken, and Pande (2015) provides a comprehensive overview of
this literature.
18See Grossman and Hart (1986) for the theoretical foundations of this argument.
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1.2 Setting
This project explores the effect of price-caps in the context of agricultural and
livestock extension services in Tanzania, which is a public service delivery
program administered by local governments and coordinated nationally by
the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries.19 The service aims
to subsidize animal health and production services to make them available
to small-scale rural farmers who are excluded from private input markets.
It hence provides crucial economic infrastructure in an economy in which
over 60% of households depend on livestock for their livelihoods, and where
livestock is the primary asset held by rural households.
In light of their importance, livestock and agricultural extension services
are one of the key services provided in developing countries (Swanson,
Farner, and Bahal, 1989; Feder, Willett, and Zijp, 1999). According to
the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, governments in
Africa spend on average 5% of their total annual expenditure on agricultural
services, which is only slightly lower than their expenditure on health (8%),
with a total global spending on extension services estimated at $31 billion
in 2008. In total, 10,891 extension agents were employed in Tanzania in
2012, comprising approximately 5% of local government staff. This leaves
extension workers as the third highest proportion of government employees,
after education and health services.20
1.2.1 Agents
The agents responsible for delivering livestock extension services in Tanzania
are para-veterinarians, who are employed by local governments. Agents
have advanced professional qualifications and typically hold a diploma from
specialized training institutes in animal health, animal production or general
agriculture. They are responsible for 1 to 12 villages, averaging 4 villages per
agent, and typically operate in areas where the private coverage of livestock
services is low. Agents work by themselves and have their own geographically
defined area of responsibility, in which they face no competition from other
public providers. The main organizational unit of agents at the local level are
wards, which are accumulations of roughly 8 villages. There are, on average,
two agents per ward. Agents in the same ward interact on a daily basis
19This division of responsibilities is the common organizational form for extension in
Africa (Crowder et al., 2002) and Latin America (Wilson, 1991).
20Total numbers of local government staff in 2007 were 224’114, with 148’607 being teachers
and 39’217 being health workers.
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and, while maintaining their own geographic areas, typically coordinate their
work.21 There was no entry or exit of agents during my study period.
Agents’ primary task is to travel to farmers in order to provide services.
Around 25% of agents have access to a government motorcycle, whereas the
remainder travels by foot and uses public motorcycle taxis and buses to reach
farmers.22 The government does not provide any reimbursements of travel
costs. Instead, service delivery is completely funded through user fees.
1.2.2 User Fees
A key component of agents’ contracts is their compensation structure.
Delivery agents are compensated through a mix between government wages
and user fees. Specifically, agents receive a flat compensation of around $200
per month.23 In addition, agents can collect user fees from farmers, which
cover delivery costs and act as performance pay. In the status quo local
governments have allocated full discretion over pricing to the agents.
Existing evidence shows that the rationale for employing user fees in
extension is threefold. First, user fees are equivalent to commissions
for private sellers, which provide high-powered incentives for agents to
exert effort. This addresses one of the key challenges in public provision
of extension services, which have traditionally suffered from a lack of
mechanisms to induce providers to exert effort (Howell, 1986; Farrington et
al., 2002). Second, high monitoring costs make performance pay schemes, in
which payments from the government are linked to output, infeasible. User
fees reduce monitoring costs as they delegate monitoring responsibilities to
the recipients of services, who can directly observe output (J. R. Anderson and
Feder, 2007; Kidd et al., 2000). In the presence of high monitoring costs, the
alternative to user fees are therefore fixed wages, which provide no incentives
to agents. Third, user fees are a cost-sharing device that reduce pressure on
local governments’ budgets to fund service delivery (e.g. Cary, 1998).
While cost-sharing schemes are common for agricultural and livestock ex-
tension programs (Rivera and Gustafson, 1991; Dancey, 1993), compensation
schemes that partially rely on user payments are also present for other public
21To avoid spillovers and interaction, treatments are assigned at the ward level. See also
section 1.3.1.
22This process of service delivery is the modus operandi for a number of key service
delivery programs in developing countries. For example, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2016)
study community health workers in Zambia. Community health workers are expected to
devote 80% of their time to household visits and are hence required to incur similar costs as
the agents in my setting.
23Wages vary across local government administrations.
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service delivery schemes, such as health services and food distribution.24 On
the one hand, there is a substantial amount of evidence documenting bribes
paid to public service delivery agents, which, while illicit, play a similar role
to a user fee.25 More formally, a number of countries and organizations have,
either temporarily or permanently, switched to a system that relies on user
fees to cover expenditure of health facilities.26 For example, Deserranno (2016)
studies community health workers recruited by BRAC, an international NGO,
in Uganda. Those workers are tasked with providing basic health services
to local residents and are compensated through medication sales to service
recipients. Similarly, food distribution systems such as Solidaridad in the
Dominican Republic and Raskin in Indonesia rely on co-payments to finance
distributors and local government agents, respectively (Busso and Galiani,
2014; Banerjee, Hanna, Kyle, et al., 2015).
1.2.3 Services
Agents provide a range of services to recipients. This includes preventive
animal health treatments such as vaccinations, deworming procedures and
reactive treatment to address common livestock diseases. Unregulated user
fees are charged for all animal health services.27 As part of this project I
focus on the provision of I-2 vaccines as one dimension of service provision.28
I-2 is a thermotolarent vaccine for poultry that protects against Newcastle
Disease (ND), a viral disease that is transmitted between birds and leads
to almost 100% mortality in affected and unvaccinated chicken. Estimates
from Tanzania suggest that more than 30% of chicken die from ND every
year, leading to an annual cost of up to $78 Million (Msami, 2007). As part
of an I-2 vaccination program, agents receive subsidized vaccines from the
24Countries that have, among others, implemented such schemes include Cameroon,
Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, India, Kenya, Nicaragua, China, New Zealand,
the Netherlands, Chile, Australia as well as most OECD countries. See the comprehensive
reviews by Haan et al. (2001) and J. R. Anderson and Feder (2007) for details.
25See, for example, Deininger and Mpuga (2005) for an overview from Uganda.
26Examples include Burkina Faso, Kenya, Papua New Guinea , Uganda, South Africa,
Colombia, Sudan and Lesotho. For an overview of those experiences, see the review paper
by Lagarde and Palmer (2008).
27The program also aims to provide recipients with traditional extension services, such as
advice regarding animal husbandry practices and information on optimal feed composition.
As the extent to which agents engage in providing those services and the prevalence of user
fees for such services is more heterogeneous, the main focus of this investigation is on animal
health services.
28By focusing only on I-2, I ignore possibly compounded adverse effects of the intervention
induced by an additional reduction in other services provided to remote villages. Estimates
are therefore a lower bound.
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government and then travel to recipients in order to apply vaccinations to
farmers’ livestock.
Four characteristics of I-2 service provision make it particularly suitable for
my study. First, the Tanzanian government is the only producer and provider
of I-2 vaccinations. This gives delivery agents market power and allows them
to extract surplus from recipients.29 In addition, this characteristic, together
with the fact that there is no competition between public providers, simplifies
the interpretation of my results as it alleviates concerns that the treatment
shifts market shares between different providers. Second, the public provision
of I-2 is based on a vaccination calendar which requires a coordinated
vaccination effort on a four-monthly basis.30 During such campaigns, agents’
primary task is the provision of vaccinations. As this study focuses on
vaccination periods, this reduces the concern that the intervention might
affect the effort agents exert on alternative tasks. Third, in order to eradicate
ND, vaccination levels in the poultry population need to be maintained at at
least 85% (Boven et al., 2008). Given high turnover rates of flocks, the fact
that an important transmission channel of ND is through non-domesticated
birds, and the low coverage of vaccination programs, Tanzania’s system is
unlikely to eradicate ND in the near future. In light of this argument, I
simplify the analysis by abstracting from externalities and focus on consumer
surplus in my welfare analysis.31 Finally, I-2 is the only public animal health
service provided to poultry keepers. Although I do not observe prices for
other services provided by agents to I-2 recipients, this property allows me to
investigate potential cross-price effects by investigating whether the treatment
induces agents to target more non-poultry farmers.
1.3 Experimental Design and Data
The experiment discussed in this paper examines how price-cap regulation
affects public service delivery in the context of the public provision of I-2
29Private provision is widely viewed as sub-optimal to public provision, as effective ND
vaccination requires adequate handling and application of the vaccine as well as the ability
to detect preexisting poultry infections. A central concern is that private market provision
would compromise service quality which risks reducing the acceptance and adoption of I-2
vaccinations.
30Vaccination campaigns follow regional rainfall patterns and typically take place in
January, May and September. Campaigns last three weeks before the lack of cooling renders
the vaccine unusable.
31A complementary argument in favor of focussing on I-2 relates to the common criticism
of public extension services in Africa that the services provided are largely ineffective and
add little to farmer productivity (e.g. Dejene, 1989; Gautam, 2000). Focusing on a vaccine for
which effectiveness has been medically proven alleviates this concern.
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Newcastle Disease vaccination. This section explains the experimental design
before describing the data used as the basis of this evaluation.
1.3.1 Experimental Design
This paper examines the welfare effect of an intervention that imposes
and enforces a maximum price (“price-cap treatment”) for I-2 vaccinations.
To avoid spillovers resulting from coincidental interactions between agents,
treatment assignment was performed at the ward instead of at the individual
level. I randomly and independently assign each of the 550 wards in the
study to either the control or the treatment group. Table 1.1 displays the
basic experimental design. Group allocation was stratified by 108 strata,
where each stratum was defined by a district identifier and two binary
variables, indicating whether all agents in the ward had specialized in general
agriculture and whether only one agent was assigned to the ward.
This intervention was carried out during the first I-2 vaccination campaign
of 2016.32 The study covers the time period between January and February
2016 and enumerated the universe of agents in four of Tanzania’s 30 regions
(Dodoma, Iringa, Morogoro and Tanga). Figure 1.1 shows a map of the study
regions and the wards included in this study. All 27 districts in the four
regions were included in the study. The study area was chosen to include
a wide variety of agricultural environments while assuring geographic
proximity to the ministry headquarter in Dar Es Salaam. From each study
district, I obtained administrative records of all employed agents, detailing
their name, specialization, ward of responsibility and telephone number. In
total, I collected this information for all 990 agents registered in the four
regions, which forms the provisional sample of this study. 832 of those agents
attended the training and participated in the vaccination campaign.
1.3.2 Implementation Procedures
All participants were invited to attend a 90-minute meeting at the district
headquarter at the beginning of the campaign to collect the vaccine and
receive instructions. Agents who attended this meeting received a show-up
fee to cover their transport expenditure. Payments varied between 10,000
and 50,000 Tanzanian Shillings ($4.50 to $22), depending on the distance and
available transport methods. The specific instructions were announced to
participants only after they had arrived for vaccine collection at the district
headquarters but before they departed to the field again. Thus the decision
32The timing is described in detail in the appendix to this paper.
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whether to attend the vaccine collection should be viewed as exogenous
with respect to the experiments. Trainings and surveys were conducted on
different days for the different experimental groups and districts to avoid
spillovers.
During this meeting, agents in the control group were reassured that
they were allowed to collect fees from farmers which they could keep for
themselves. Agents were specifically encouraged to profit financially from the
transaction, stating that the government viewed user fees as a way to motivate
employees and compensate them for good performance. In addition, the
instructions reiterated that agents were allowed to charge farmers any price
they chose and that it was acceptable to charge different prices to different
farmers.
Agents were then informed that the ministry wanted to keep better
records of how many chickens were vaccinated and that therefore reporting
procedures during this campaign would differ slightly from the status quo.
In particular, a condition of participation in the vaccination campaign was
that agents would issue formal receipts to every farmer served and submit
the receipt information directly to a central headquarter using a phone
based reporting system. Agents were specifically told that the ministry
would contact farmers to verify that the information provided on receipts
was correct. In order to assure compliance with this reporting system and
encourage effort, the ministry offered a bonus payment of 60 Tanzanian
Shillings (approximately $0.025) for every verified vaccination.
After the instructions, training staff collected data on demographics, work
history and workplace characteristics of participants. Ministry staff then
distributed the vaccines to agents, supplying agents with as many doses as
they requested for their area of responsibility and informing them that more
doses would be stored at the district headquarter where they could be picked
up in case of additional demand.
1.3.3 Price-Cap Treatment
Compared to the control group, the instructions given to agents in the price-
cap treatment differed only with regards to the rules on pricing. In particular,
ministry officials informed participants that they were free to set any price
up to 80 Tanzanian Shillings (approximately $0.035) per vaccination. This cap
was calibrated to balance two considerations. On the one hand, it had to be
sufficiently low to be binding in order to affect agents’ pricing and allocation
behavior. On the other hand, it had to be sufficiently high to allow agents to
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cover their marginal costs. To achieve this balance, the maximum price of 80
Tanzanian Shillings was chosen after careful consultations with experts from
the Tanzanian Veterinary Laboratory Agency (the vaccine’s main producer),
MALF, local governments and international academics. In addition, this
decision was also based on a mixed methods pilot study conducted by the
author that analyzed pricing behavior during previous I-2 campaigns. To
avoid setting a price-cap that would not allow agents to recover their marginal
costs of applying the vaccine, the cap was conservatively set to bind only for
comparatively high prices.
As price-caps are only effective if they can be enforced, I took the following
measures to ensure compliance with the price-cap: First, the receipts that
are normally employed during campaigns were amended to contain the
national emblem of the United Republic of Tanzania, transforming them into
official government documents. As receipts require the delivering agent’s
signature, forging them is equivalent to tempering with official government
documents which is punishable by law and can lead to dismissal. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that this incentive mechanism was taken seriously: local
government level supervisors requested detailed information on verified
compliance behavior by their employees in the aftermath of the intervention
to discipline non-compliant employees.
Second, MALF conditioned the bonus payment of 60 Tanzanian Shillings
per vaccination on compliance with the price-cap. This scheme makes it
incentive compatible to comply with the price-cap as long as deviation yields
a price lower or equal to 140 Tanzanian Shillings per vaccination and the
detection probability is sufficiently high. Given that 99% of transactions
in the control group were conducted at user charges below this threshold,
compliance was incentive compatible for the vast majority of transactions.
1.3.4 Data
Data used as the basis of this paper was collected from two different sources:
administrative government receipts and a survey of service recipients. I
designed and conducted the recipient survey specifically as part of this
project. In addition, I implemented a new procedure of reporting service
provision receipts via text message to increase accuracy and usability of the
administrative data. I complement this data using information from a baseline
survey of agents, described in detail in the appendix.
The information provided on official government receipts and the number
of receipts issued constitutes my provisional outcome data. The receipts
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detail each recipient’s name, contact number, village, the date of the visit,
the total user fee collected and the number of vaccinations applied. After
issuing the receipt, agents electronically transmitted the receipt information
to a government database using a text-message template.33
Using the receipt data, I construct two unverified, and therefore provi-
sional, outcome measures. First, the total user fee collected divided by the
number of vaccinations applied gives a direct measure of the per unit price
charged to farmers. Second, the total number of farmers served can be
measured through the total number of receipts submitted.
After the end of the vaccination campaign, I administered a survey to
service recipients. The survey was conducted over a period of six weeks
between March and April 2016 and sampled a randomly selected fraction
of 15% of all receipts submitted, selected randomly and stratified by agent.
This led to a total sample of 4’516 receipts selected for surveying and
verification,34 80% of which were successfully contacted.35 The farmer survey
collected detailed information on the service provision and on recipient
characteristics, thereby verifying that the service was actually provided and
collecting verified information on user fees.
I use the information obtained from this survey to construct my main
outcome measures. In order to arrive at a measure of the total number
of farmers served, I multiply the number of verifiable receipts per agent
by the agent-specific sampling weight of each receipt. I repeat the same
procedure for the average price, total revenue collected and the total number
of chickens vaccinated. In order to analyze outcome measures related to
service allocation, I use farmer survey data on farmer demographics, asset
holdings distance between farmers’ home and the agent’s headquarter and
farmers’ sources of livelihoods.36
33In total, agents issued 31,657 valid receipts, accounting for 702,762 animals vaccinated.
34Rounding errors induced by the stratification led to a sample that is slightly smaller than
15% of 31657.
35The procedures to contact farmers are described in detail in the appendix. Among the
farmers not reached, enumerators were unable to reach 42% because of incorrect or invalid
contact details. In total, phone survey procedures therefore were able to assess the validity
of almost 90% of receipts sampled. I treat the remaining receipts as unverifiable and hence
incorrect.
36While it would have been optimal to conduct a detailed consumption survey as part
of this exercise in order to obtain a more precise measure of farmers’ livelihoods, budget
limitations rendered this option infeasible.
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1.4 Results
This section presents the empirical methodology and results from the eval-
uation of the price-cap treatment. Table 1.2 presents summary statistics and
a balance check using baseline characteristics of agents participating in the
campaign. All characteristics in the table were chosen prior to estimating
the balance checks. These results suggest that experiment participants are
similar across the treatment and the control group. Panel A considers agent
level characteristics while panel B investigates differences in workstation
characteristics. None of the 28 differences are statistically significant at the
5% level, which confirms balance at baseline.
The presentation of the results proceeds in two steps. Subsections 1.4.1
and 1.4.2 present results that investigate how the price-cap affects transaction
prices. Subsection 1.4.3 then focuses on the allocation and extension of
services to show the central trade-off between affordability and coverage
necessary for welfare analysis.
1.4.1 Impact of the Price-Cap on Prices
I begin the evaluation by estimating the impact of the price-cap treatment on
user fees charged over the course of the vaccination campaign. As treatment
assignment was randomized, the empirical methodology is straightforward.
I estimate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equations of the following form:
yiwd = β0 + β1PriceCapwd + β2Xwd + γd + eiwd
where yiwd is the outcome of interest for participant i in ward w and district
d, PriceCap is a binary variable that indicates whether agents’ wards were
assigned to the price-cap treatment, and Xwd denotes a vector of ward-level
stratification variables.37 The coefficient of interest is β1. I also include district
level fixed-effects (γd), as the assignment lottery was stratified by these strata.
As the treatment is perfectly correlated within wards, every specification
reports robust standard errors clustered at the ward level.
37Xwd also contains an indicator for whether a ward was assigned to a cross-cutting
treatment (’Fixed Fee Treatment’) explained in more detail in section 1.6 and in chapter 2.
Note that, as I find no evidence of interaction effects between the price-cap and the cross-
cutting treatment, I treat both as separate experiments. Given that the two treatments were
assigned as part of a cross-cutting design, treatment effects of the price-cap intervention
should therefore be interpreted conditional on 50% of the sample being assigned to the cross-
cutting treatment.
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I first investigate the effect of the price-cap treatment on the distribution of
prices. Panel A in figure 1.2 plots a histogram that visualizes the distribution
of prices in the status quo, using farmer survey data from the control group.38
Prices follow a bimodal distribution with peaks at 50 and 100.39 Panel B
overlays the distribution of prices in the treatment group over the histogram
from the control group. Significant bunching at 80 suggests that the price-
cap was binding and effectively reduced the level of prices.40 Columns 1 and
2 in table 1.3 confirms this finding by showing that the price-cap reduced
average prices by approximately 17%, which is statistically significant at the
1% level.41 Column 5 confirms the visual impression of bunching at 80 by
showing that this intervention increased the fraction of transactions per agent
where a price of 80 Shillings was charged by a factor four, from around 5% to
20%.
I then investigate the impact of the price-cap on the within-agent variation
of prices. To do this, I calculate the residuals of a regression of prices on
agent fixed effects. Figure 1.3 presents a box-plot of the residuals, separated
between treatment and control group, to visualize the effect of the treatment
on price variation. The height of the box corresponds to the difference
between the 25th and 75th percentile of residuals, and the whiskers correspond
to the 10th and 90th percentile, respectively. I find that the intervention
reduced price disparities between recipients. In particular, the figure shows
that within-agent price variation is substantially lower in the treatment group
than in the control group.
Columns 3 and 4 in table 1.3 show that this reduction in variation is also
statistically significant. Column 3 reports the estimate of the treatment effect
on the within-agent standard deviation of prices using farmer survey data,
whereas column 4 repeats the same analysis using receipt data. The results
suggest that the treatment reduced the within agent variation of prices by 42
38To improve the visualization, the histograms are truncated at 200 Tanzanian Shillings,
which excludes less than 1% of all observed transactions.
39As expected when designing the intervention, the price-cap hence only binds for a subset
of transactions. The histogram also shows that less than 1% of transactions in the control
group occur at prices above 140 Tanzanian Shillings, which assures that complying with the
price-cap is incentive compatible.
40Figure 1.2 also suggests that the price-cap intervention increased the mass of the price
distribution for prices significantly below the cap. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is
driven by difficulties with calculating multiples of 80 and a tendency to round down to the
nearest 1000 for the total price.
41The estimate using the farmer survey data is slightly lower than the estimate obtained
from the receipt data, which is partially driven by (detected) under-reporting of prices on the
receipts.
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to 44%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results do not
differ substantially between the receipt and the farmer survey data.
1.4.2 Who benefits from the Price-Cap?
The bimodal distribution of prices in the control group and the evidence of
within-agent price variation suggest that different farmers, even if they are
served by the same agent, pay different prices. To gain an understanding of
the impact of the price-cap on welfare, it is important to understand which
farmers pay higher prices and thus are more likely to be affected by the cap.
To do this, I present two pieces of evidence.
First, table 1.4 presents the correlates of unit prices in the control group.
Column 2 shows that agents offer lower per-unit prices for larger flocks. In
particular, every additional vaccination applied by the agent is associated with
a quantity discount of 0.12 Shillings. In addition, indicators of education
and asset holdings suggest that more disadvantaged recipients also, ceteris
paribus, pay higher vaccination prices. Column 4 shows that recipients who
have more than primary education pay 9 Shillings less per vaccination, and
columns 5 to 7 suggest that increased holdings of non-poultry livestock assets
are associated with lower per vaccination prices. The estimates of the partial
correlations remain significant even after controlling for self-reported travel
time to the recipient. Finally, while there is some evidence that prices are
related to travel and application costs, it is unlikely that this variation can
conclusively explain the observed variation in prices. Column 1 in table 1.4
first shows that, while not statistically significant, an additional minute of
walking to the recipient’s village, as measured through self reported walking
distance, is associated with marginally higher vaccination prices. I then
investigate the extent to which measures of cost, in particular walking and
motorcycle travel times and the number of vaccinations applied, can explain
the within-agent price variation. I find that while individually the indicators
show associations with prices, controlling for cost measures only explains 7%
of the within-agent price variation. Taken together, this is suggestive that
agents use discretion over prices in the status quo to extract surplus.
Second, in light of the previous results, it is instructive to investigate who
benefits most from the price-cap. To investigate this, I run regressions at the
transaction level that take the following form:
Price f wd = β0 + β1PriceCapwd + β2K f wd + β4PriceCapwd×K f wd + β5Z f wd + β6Xwd +γd + e f wd
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where Price f wd denotes outcome variables for recipient f in ward w and
district d, K f wd denotes a characteristic of the recipient and Z f wd denotes
control variables at the recipient level and Xwd controls at the agent level.
Control variables at the farmer level include measures of travel distance.
Control variables at the agent level contain stratification variables and
indicators for the fixed fee treatment. Farmer level regressions are weighted
to obtain equal weights for each service delivery agent. Standard errors are
again clustered at the ward level.
Table 1.5 presents the results of this exercise. In column 1 I estimate
the effect of the intervention on transaction prices and allow the treatment
effect to vary depending on whether the recipients’ livelihoods depend
on agriculture. Approximately 80% of households in the control group
match this definition. The results show that while the point estimate for
the treatment effect on prices is negative for all farmers, it is small in
absolute terms and statistically insignificant for non-agricultural households
but approximately 50% larger and statistically significant at the 10% level for
households whose main livelihood is derived from agriculture.
Column 2 shows that agents price differentially based on not only farmers’
livelihood characteristics, but also on the number of chickens vaccinated per
farmer. In particular, agents offer lower per-unit prices for larger flocks.
Table 1.5, column 3 shows that farmers who own fewer than 11 chickens
on average pay 14 Tanzanian Shillings (or 18%) more per vaccination than
farmers with larger flocks.42 Implementing a price-cap not only reduces
average prices for all recipients by 12% but also eliminates this quantity
discount. Taken together, the price-cap intervention appears to particularly
benefit agriculturally dependent households and smallholders, who are likely
to be poorer and hence more susceptible to shocks to livestock holdings.
1.4.3 Impact on Service Allocation
The previous section has shown that price-caps affect prices. While this
directly affects the distribution of surplus, price-caps’ primary welfare
implications operate through their effect on the allocation of services. This
section highlights two channels through which reducing discretion over
prices affects service allocation. First, price-caps increase the affordability
of services. This increases the likelihood of agents extending services to
42When asked about the motivation for this pricing strategy, agents mentioned that
quantity discounts were needed to convince larger flock holders to bear the higher total
cost of the service.
29
previously unserved recipients and, in light of the evidence on differential
pricing presented in the previous section, to agricultural households and
smallholders. Second, price-caps reduce agents’ expected profits from serving
a given village, which in turn reduces their incentives to incur the travel costs
associated with travelling to remote villages.
Impact of Price-Cap on Composition of Beneficiary Pool
I first investigate how price-caps affect the composition of the beneficiary
pool. As the previous section has shown, price-caps reduce prices on average
and do so in particular for agricultural households and smallholders. Price-
caps therefore not only redistribute surplus but also increases the affordability
of services. The intervention therefore should increase the share of previously
unserved beneficiaries in the recipient pool. Consistent with this, columns 1
and 2 in table 1.6 show that the price-cap indeed increases the proportion of
previously unserved recipients in the beneficiary pool by 12% to 15%.
I then investigate how this price-cap affects the share of farmers in the
recipient pool who benefited particularly from the price-cap, namely those
whose main source of income is derived from agricultural production and
those with comparatively small chicken flocks. As discussed in section 1.4.2
and shown in table 1.5, the price-cap reduces transaction prices more for such
recipients. Columns 3 and 4 in table 1.6 suggest that this price-adjustment
indeed leads to a positive demand effect, as households whose main source
of income stems from agriculture are 6% more likely to be served in response
to the price-cap treatment, conditional on the size of the recipient pool. While
not statistically significant, the point estimate in columns 5 and 6 in table 1.6
suggest that smallholders are 9% more likely to be served in the price-cap
group.
Taken together, the results presented in this section suggest that in
the absence of price-caps agents use their discretion to extract rents from
service recipients. Capping prices redistributes surplus to recipients, crowds
in previously unserved farmers and makes services more affordable for
recipients in need.
Price-Caps reduce Geographic Coverage
While the previous sections have shown that price-caps reduce prices and
increase the proportion of new recipients and recipients with a high need for
the service in the beneficiary pool, it is unclear how capping prices affects the
aggregate coverage of services. In particular, it is possible that implementing
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a price-cap reduces agents’ incentives to extend services to markets that are
more costly to serve. For the setting studied in this paper, capping prices
might reduce their incentives to extend services to remote villages. Price-
caps can therefore reduce welfare by discretely eliminating aggregate surplus
obtained from serving a given market.
This section provides evidence in support of this mechanism. To do this, I
merge information on villages and travel distances with the farmer survey and
the receipt data. In particular, a list of all villages in their area of responsibility
and the approximate travel time by foot from their headquarter to each village
was collected from agents during the baseline survey. I use the data on travel
times to rank the villages by their distance to the agent’s headquarter. I then
match the village information provided during the farmer survey and on
the receipts to the village list collected during the baseline survey, to obtain
information on whether agents visited a given village.43
Table 1.7 shows how capping prices affects which villages agents visit.
Column 1 shows that while agents in the status quo visit approximately 37%
of villages that they are assigned to, the price-cap reduces this proportion
by 4.5 percentage points. Columns 2 and 3 confirm that this reduction is
driven by a reduced likelihood of agents visiting remote villages: they are
25% less likely to visit villages whose distance from their headquarter is
above median, and 26% less likely to visit the furthest village in their area of
responsibility. Taken together, this suggests that price-cap regulation reduces
agents’ incentives to serve more remote markets.44
Impact on Total Number Served
Given the countervailing forces discussed previously, it is unclear whether
the price-cap will increase or decrease the total number of farmers served.
Figure 1.4 investigates this question and shows little evidence of the price-
cap affecting the total number of farmers served. The figure separately plots
the daily number of farmers served for the treatment and the control group
using receipt data. This shows that the difference between the daily number
of farmers served is statistically indistinguishable from zero for 18 out of the
21 days of the campaign. Column 1 in table 1.8 confirms this impression:
43Approximately 11% of receipts were unmatchable to villages. This can either be because
the information provided in the surveys or on the receipts was incorrect or because recipients
live outside of the formal villages. Reassuringly, the likelihood of an agent visiting an
"unmatched" recipient is uncorrelated with the treatment.
44In the appendix to this paper I present additional evidence on the trade-offs generated
by price-caps by focusing on availability of I-2 substitutes.
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agents in the price-cap treatment serve an average of 3.6 fewer farmers than
agents in the control group. This difference is statistically insignificant.
I conduct two robustness checks to verify this result. First, a possible
concern is that the result is a composite effect between a participation
response on the extensive margin and an effort response on the intensive
margin. To address this, I restrict the sample to agents who verifiably served
at least one farmer, therefore ruling out responses on the extensive margin.
Column 2 in table 1.8 confirms that the result is robust to this restriction:
ruling out extensive margin responses, agents in the treatment group serve
on average 5 fewer farmers than agents in the control group, which remains
statistically insignificant. Second, I consider the impact of the treatment on
the total number of vaccines applied. Column 3 in table 1.8 shows that
while the point estimate for the treatment effect is negative for the number of
farmers served, it flips sign for the total number of chickens vaccinated while
remaining insignificant. Taken together, those results suggest that while the
price-cap affected the types of farmers served, I do not detect an effect on the
total number of recipients served.
1.5 Sufficient Statistics Model for Welfare Analysis
The previous section has shown that price-caps have three key effects on
service provision. First, they reduce average prices and the within-agent
variation of prices. Second, they increase the proportion of new recipients and
recipients who were paying higher prices in the status quo in the recipient
pool. Third, they reduce the likelihood of agents visiting remote villages.
To conceptualize these effects, and to understand their effect on welfare,
this section develops a model that is consistent with the empirical results
and allows for the estimation of welfare effects through a sufficient statistics
formula.
I model I-2 provision as a slot assignment problem in which slots are
assigned through two allocation mechanisms. First, suppliers choose which
villages to visit. While agents are responsible for a given service area, the
model takes into account that visiting a given village requires agents to pay a
travel cost. Agents’ willingness to pay this travel cost then determines service
allocation between villages in a given service area. Second, agents choose
prices that determine which recipients are served within a village, conditional
on the agent visiting their village.
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1.5.1 Model Setup
This model considers a situation in which a monopolistic agent is supplying
services to a population of potential customers, the size of which is normal-
ized to 1. Customers are defined by their valuation of the service, which is
denoted by vi. I assume that vi is a continuous random variable drawn from
a distribution F (v). I further assume that recipients’ elasticity of demand is
given by eiD which can either be high or low: e
i
D ∈ {eLD; eHD}. Suppose that
a fraction µ of recipients has eLD, whereas everyone else has e
H
D . Customers
do not only differ with regard to their valuation, but also in their location.
Specifically, I assume that recipients live in a continuum of villages with
differing travel distances to their agent’s headquarter. I further assume that
the distribution of valuations is the same for every village.
Agents in this model face two sequential choices. First, they decide which
markets to serve by determining the allocation of services between villages. I
assume that travelling to village j requires paying a cost of cj which agents can
choose to either pay or not. I assume that cj is drawn from a distribution with
c.d.f. M (c) defined over [0; cmax] with cmax < ∞. Second, agents decide on
prices, which determine service allocation within a village, conditional on the
village being served.45 For simplicity, I model this by assuming that agents
offer a take-it-or-leave-it price based on observable recipient characteristics.
While I allow for price-discrimination, I assume that agents do not observe vi
and instead only learn about eiD.
46 If customers accept the agent’s offer, the
agent receives the agreed sum and delivers the service at a constant cost τ. If
the recipient rejects the price offer, no transaction takes place, but the agent
still has to pay the travel cost to the village.
1.5.2 Theoretical Effect of Price-Cap on Observables
To aid the interpretation of the empirical results, this section shows that the
implications of the model are consistent with the three main empirical results.
In particular, I show how agents’ pricing decisions as well as the allocation of
services in the model are affected by the price-cap intervention. Section 1.5.3
45This implicitly assumes that travel costs within a village are 0. It is straightforward to
relax this making travel costs farmer specific.
46Anecdotal evidence is consistent with this assumption. Agents report that negotiations
with farmers regularly break down and that they are unable to charge similar farmers
different prices. They do, however, mention that it is possible for them to give discounts
based on observable characteristics, such as household wealth and on the number of chickens
held by the household. While this description is in line with my model, it is inconsistent with
alternative bargaining models, such as uniform pricing, first-degree price-discrimination and
Nash bargaining.
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then uses the empirical estimates to evaluate the marginal welfare effect of
the price-cap.
Effect of Price-Cap on Prices
To begin the analysis of the model, note first that travel costs to villages are
sunk at the time of price setting. This allows me to investigate the agent’s two
decisions separately. To understand the effect on prices, notice that agents
face a monopoly trade-off: raising prices increases profit from a transaction
but reduces the likelihood that farmers will accept the price. Formally, visiting




















Agents set prices based on a mark-up over marginal costs, with a low-
elasticity of demand leading to high mark-ups. This model therefore gives
rise to a bimodal price distribution in which the price-cap is more likely to
bind for recipients with a low elasticity of demand. To explore the effect of
the cap, assume that, consistent with the empirical design, the price-cap only
binds for recipients with a low elasticity of demand. Prices under a price-cap














This directly implies that the price-cap mechanically reduces the agent’s
ability to price-discriminate between recipients with a high and low elasticity
of demand. Price-caps hence reduce the standard deviation and average of
prices in equilibrium and particularly benefit recipients with a low demand
elasticity.
Effect of Price-Cap on Beneficiary Pool
In order to understand how price-caps affect service allocation, I now
investigate how price-caps affect the distribution of the different elasticity
types in the recipient pool. This requires me to investigate recipients’
acceptance decisions, conditional on their village being served. After
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receiving a price offer, recipients decide whether to accept or reject it.
In equilibrium, recipients accept every offer that does not exceed their























) |eiD) denotes the demand for customers of type i.
Note also that here the demand curve is downward sloping. If the price-
cap binds only for recipients with a low elasticity of demand, it is hence
straightforward to see that price-cap regulation will increase their demand.
This increases the likelihood of serving previously unserved recipients and
shifts the distribution of types in the direction of recipients with a low
elasticity of demand.
Effect of Price-Cap on Village Choices
To understand the agent’s coverage decision, I investigate the effect of the
price-cap on the choice of villages conditional on a price vector p. In the
status quo, agents decide to visit village j if the expected profit exceeds the
associated costs:
µpieLD
(p) + (1− µ)pieHD (p) ≥ cj
where pieiD (p) denotes the expected profit obtained from recipients with
elasticity equal to eiD. This defines a cut-off value for cj, denoted by c
∗ (p),
which is the highest cost village visited by the agent. The proportion of
villages visited in the status quo is hence given by:
σ = M (c∗ (p)) (1.3)
Regarding allocation between villages, agents are hence more likely to serve
a larger proportion of villages when (i) the expected profit is higher and (ii)
the proportion of recipients with a high elasticity of demand in each village
is lower.
To understand how price-caps affect the allocation of services between
villages, denote by piDecj and pi
Reg
j the agent’s expected profit from visiting
village j in the status quo and under the price-cap, respectively. As agents
maximize their profits with respect to prices in the status quo, it follows that:
piDecj ≥ piRegj
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Profits play a dual role in this model. First, profits allow agents to extract
surplus. Second, however, profits also compensate agents for the travel costs
to remote villages incurred. This is necessary because travel costs are sunk
when price offers are made. Pricing decisions therefore do not ensure that the
agent breaks even in remote areas. Differentiating equation 1.3 with respect
to prices shows how a price-cap affects the targeting of remote areas:
∂σ
∂peLD




This implies that the price-cap reduces the proportion of villages visited.
This is because reducing discretion reduces the amount of surplus agents
can extract from remote villages, which lowers the highest travel cost they
can pay and still break even. Taken together, the model shows that price-
cap regulation generates a tension between preventing surplus extraction to
make services affordable for recipients with a low elasticity of demand and
providing incentives to serve remote villages.
1.5.3 Effect of Price-Cap on Welfare
The previous section has shown that price-caps crowd in previously unserved
recipients and redistribute surplus at the expense of remote farmers. Given
those countervailing forces, it is not clear whether it is welfare improving for
the government to cap prices, and, if so, to what extent. To address this,
this section first investigates the government’s policy decision to motivate
the choice of price-caps as a regulatory instrument. It then solves the
government’s objective function to derive an expression for the marginal effect
of capping prices as a function of empirically estimatable sufficient statistics.
Regulatory Policy
The government’s objective is to maximize social welfare. Denoting by gcH ,
gcL and ga the government’s welfare weight on high elasticity customers, low




























































Social welfare therefore consists of a weighted sum between consumer surplus
and the agent’s profit. To build intuition, it is instructive to define the first best
regulatory policy for when the government cares equally about producers and
consumers (gcH = gcL = ga = 1). Suppose that in the first best the government
can make costless transfers to the agent and enforce which villages the agent
serves. Denoting transfers by t, it is straightforward to see that the optimal







As denoted above, the optimal regulatory policy in the first best scenario sets
prices equal to marginal costs, mandates the agent to serve all villages and
uses transfers to reimburse the agent’s travel costs.
In reality, fiscal constraints prevent governments from paying transfers to
the agents.47 In addition, governments are constrained by moral hazard,
which limits their ability to mandate which villages the agent visits. Under
those circumstances, Laffont (2005) notes that the optimal regulatory policy
includes price-caps that rule out agents’ most opportunistic choices.
47In the absence of costless transfers the government will choose a transfer level that
equates the marginal social welfare gain of raising transfers to the marginal cost of public
funds.
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Sufficient Statistics Formula for Uniform Pricing
The central objective of this paper is to understand the effect of the price-
cap on welfare. To achieve this, I take a sufficient statistics approach to
determine the welfare effect of marginally lowering prices below the full
discretion level. This approach has three key advantages. First, by expressing
welfare effects as a function of reduced form parameters, it allows me to
use the empirical results to evaluate the optimal price-cap for the service I
study. Second, my approach requires me to make no structural assumptions
on agents’ and recipients’ behavior. Third, it uses estimates from the non-
marginal experimental intervention to investigate the effect of marginally
lowering prices below the full discretion level. This makes the welfare results
less dependent on the chosen value of the price-cap.
For tractability, this section will derive the sufficient statistics formula for
the case of uniform pricing and then postulate the appropriate extension
to third-degree price-discrimination discussed previously. I present the
derivation for this extension in the appendix. Governments choose the price-
cap to maximize social welfare. Analogous to equation 1.4, social welfare for
the uniform price case is given by a weighted sum between consumer and
producer surplus:
SWF (p) = M (c∗ (p))
[∫ ∞
p
vi − pdF (vi)
]




where g denotes the welfare weight on agents relative to recipients. This
formulation allows me to consider the welfare effect for scenarios in which
governments value only consumer surplus (g = 0) and in which governments
take into account aggregate surplus (g = 1).
Starting from unregulated prices, the marginal welfare effect of lowering
prices has three first order effects on welfare. First, on the extensive margin,
marginally lowering prices reduces the fraction of villages served, which leads
to a discrete loss in consumer surplus. Second, on the intensive margin,
lowering prices reduces the monopoly distortions within a village, as it
closes the gap between prices and marginal costs τ. Third, reducing prices
redistributes surplus from agents to consumers, which has a direct effect on
social welfare if the government values surplus accruing to recipients more
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than surplus accruing to agents.48 Taking derivatives of equation 1.5 and








vi − pdF (vi)
− M (c∗ (p)) g (p− τ) ∂D (p)
∂p
− M (c∗ (p))D (p) (1− g)
The first and second term capture the extensive and intensive margin effects,
respectively. The third term captures the redistributive effect. To derive a
formula based on sufficient statistics, it is useful to define two parameters.
First, I denote by θ the extensive margin elasticity of village visits with respect


















vi − pdF (vi) (1.8)
The above definitions, together with the fact that total number of farmers
served is given by N (p) = M (c∗ (p))D (p), yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The welfare effect of marginally reducing prices below the uniform









− (1− g) N (p) (1.9)
To understand the intuition behind this formula, consider two scenarios.
First, suppose there are no distortions associated with the exploitation of
48In addition to those effects, there are also two second-order effects. First, reducing prices
increases demand, which has a second order effect on welfare because buyers on the margin
were indifferent between purchasing and not-purchasing in the first place. Second, reducing
prices reduces providers’ profit from the villages that are no longer visited. This effect is
second order because the expected profit from the marginal village was 0 in expectation
during the status quo.
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market power. In this case p = τ and the intensive margin benefit of capping
prices disappears. Second, suppose the government puts equal weight on
surplus accruing to agents and customers. In this case g = 1 and the last
term, which captures the redistributive effect of the price-cap, disappears.
It is straightforward to extend this analysis to price-discrimination when
there are two types of buyers in the market: One for whom the elasticity
of demand is high and one for whom it is low. I denote by εLD and ε
H
D the
demand elasticities of the low and high elasticity customers, respectively. In
addition, I denote by µ the share of low elasticity customers in the market.
The following proposition then describes the sufficient statistics formula that
allows for the estimation of welfare effects:
Proposition 2. The welfare effect of marginally capping prices for consumers with a





















− (gc1 − gA) NL(p)µ (1.10)
Here N (p) denotes the total number of services provided and NL (p) the
number of services provided for recipients with a low elasticity of demand.
Further, gcL , gcH and ga denote the government’s welfare weights on low
elasticity customers, high elasticity customers and the agent, respectively.
1.6 Welfare Analysis
The previous discussion has shown that estimating the marginal welfare
effect of price-cap regulation requires knowledge of two parameters: The
extensive margin elasticity of village visits with respect to the price-cap and
the intensive margin elasticity of demand. This section first discusses the
estimation of the elasticity of demand before using those estimates to evaluate
the welfare effect of capping prices.
1.6.1 Estimation
While the price-cap treatment allows me to estimate the extensive margin
elasticity of village visits with respect to the price-cap,49 I require additional
49Alternatively, one could allow travel costs to vary at the farmer level. In this case,
the responses would not be calculatable directly from the price-cap treatment, but could be
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variation in prices to estimate the price elasticity of demand. This is
because the variation induced by the price-cap generates responses both
on the extensive and the intensive margin. Estimating demand elasticities
traditionally would require experimental variation in marginal costs. In my
case, this would imply generating variation in vaccination costs. Introducing
such variation in the context I study is challenging as it generates incentives
for agents to report fewer vaccinations than were actually conducted.50 To
overcome this challenge, I leverage the findings from a another paper. In
chapter 2 I present evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment which shows
that agents choose prices based on a simplified heuristic that is affected by
average costs. Furthermore, chapter 2 shows that this behavior makes it
possible to induce price variation through a treatment that varies fixed fees,
which does not generate any incentives to incorrectly report vaccination. This
allows me to consistently estimate the elasticity of demand.
Fixed Fee Treatment and Elasticity Estimates
While the main results and design are discussed in chapter 2, I briefly
describe the induction of additional experimental variation in costs here for
convenience.
As part of the fixed fee variation, I assign agents in 273 wards to
a cross-cutting treatment that requires them to contribute a fixed fee of
25,000 Tanzanian Shillings (approximately $11.40) to cover a portion of the
vaccine cost if they agree to participate in the program. To avoid concerns
about liquidity constraints, the fee was collected after the completion of
the vaccination campaign. Agents in the remaining 277 wards received the
vaccine for free. The randomization was designed so that the probability that
each ward received a given treatment was always held constant, regardless
of what stratum the village was in and whether the price-cap treatment had
been cross-randomized. The probability of being in the price-cap group is
therefore orthogonal to having to pay a fixed fee.
The fixed fee treatment successfully induced variation in prices. Table
1.9 presents the treatment effect estimates from the intervention. Column
1 shows that imposing a fixed fee raises average prices charged by around
backed out using the elasticity of total recipients served with respect to the price-cap and the
price elasticity of demand. My results are qualitatively robust to this alternative.
50As vaccines expire after 3 weeks without cooling, there is no formal system in place that
requires agents to return unused vaccines to the headquarter.
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11%.51 Column 2 in table 1.9 shows that this increase in prices reduced the
average number of farmers served by around 12%. As column 3 shows, the
fixed fee treatment therefore only reduced collected revenue by 3%, which
is statistically insignificant. I then use this variation to estimate the price
elasticity of demand. To do this, I run agent level instrumental variable
regressions in which I regress the log of the total number of farmers served on
log prices. I instrument for prices using an indicator for an agent’s assignment
to the fixed fee treatment. Column 4 in table 1.9 presents the results from this
exercise. The estimate of the price elasticity of demand is −1.223, making
ND vaccinations a fairly elastic good. This estimate is consistent with the
literature, which has estimated demand elasticities around −1.5 for Newcastle
Disease Control products (Fisher, 2014).
Welfare Wedges
In addition to knowledge of the two sufficient statistics, θ and εD, which
were estimated through the field experiment, the welfare analysis requires
estimates of the welfare wedges CS(p)pD(p) , which depends on consumer surplus,
and p−τp , which depends on marginal application costs.
To estimate consumer surplus, I assume that demand follows a constant






which can be calculated directly.
Regarding estimates of p−τp , I take two approaches. First, I obtain an
estimate of τ from the monopolists’ pricing problem. In particular, when
profit maximizing monopolists set uniform prices, they maximize pi =







The evidence obtained in chapter 2 suggests, however, that agents do not set
prices optimally. In light of this, I also bound the estimates by setting τ = 0.
One additional complication arises, as the price-cap reduces the prices
per vaccination and recipients typically purchase more than one vaccination.
51In chapter 2 I show that this is not a selection effect, as the fixed fee treatment did not
affect participation in the vaccination campaign.
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Assuming, for simplicity, a constant number of vaccinations per recipient,
N (p) then refers to the total number of vaccinations applied.
For the case of price-discrimination, calibration of the sufficient statistics
formula requires three further parameters. First, I require separate estimates
of demand elasticities for recipients with a high and a low elasticity of
demand. To estimate those, I define smallholders, farmers in areas without
private providers and households whose livelihood depends on agriculture
as low-elasticity households. I then obtain demand elasticities by separately
estimating demand functions for the two populations, using the fixed fee
treatment as an instrumental variable. The results of this estimation are
presented in column 5 and 6 in table 1.9. The estimated elasticities of demand
are −0.41 for the low elasticity types and −3.83 for the high elasticity types.
Second, I require knowledge of µ, the share of low elasticity households. As
I cannot obtain this directly from the data, I bound my estimates by setting µ
to either 0, 0.5, or 1.
1.6.2 Results
Table 1.10 presents the results from the calibration of the sufficient statistics
formula. Panel A shows the calibrated marginal welfare effects, whereas
panel B shows the welfare effects for a counter factual scenario in which
extensive margin effects are absent. Three results are worth noting. First,
the calibrated marginal welfare effects are negative across the board. Panel A
shows that marginally reducing prices below the full discretion level leads to
a welfare loss to the magnitude of between 3% and 11% of total sales revenue
per agent. This suggests that the adverse effects of price-cap regulation on
the extensive margin are so strong that any deviation from full discretion
leads to a welfare loss. This directly implies that, for the setting I study,
any form of price-cap regulation will cause welfare to decrease. Second,
the implied welfare losses are substantially larger for the price-discrimination
case as compared to the no price-discrimination case. This is natural, because
the benefits of price-cap regulation under price-discrimination only accrue
to a subset of a given village market compared to uniform pricing, whereas
the adverse extensive margin effects affect the whole village market. Finally,
panel B shows that, in the absence of extensive margin responses, price-cap
regulation can lead to moderate welfare increases ranging from 0.4% to 2.5%
of total sales revenue per agent on the margin. Taken together, the results
therefore conclusively show that price-cap regulation generates a tension
between intensive margin demand effects that increase welfare, and extensive
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margin effects that reduce welfare. For ND vaccinations in Tanzania, extensive
margin effects are sufficiently strong to lead to a net-welfare loss, making
price-cap regulation counter-productive.
1.7 Caveats
While the experiment and data collection procedures were designed to
estimate the channel of interest, some caveats to the analysis exist that make
alternative explanations possible. First, while all available agents in the
enumeration region were assigned the vaccination task, some of them failed
to attend the necessary training. There were several reasons for this: some
were on annual leave, sick, on professional training, or were assigned other
long-term duties. This attendance gap poses a challenge to experimental
validity if attendance rates differ between treatment and control groups. In
the appendix I alleviate this concern by showing that on average 83% of agents
attended training. This result does not differ significantly between treatment
and control groups.
Similarly, while all agents who attended training also collected vaccines,
some of them failed to serve any farmers. A concern is that this failure to
participate is a response to the treatment. In the appendix I again alleviate
this concern by showing that the treatment did not affect the participation
decisions: among the 832 agents who attended training, 82% submitted
receipts in the control group, compared to 84% in the price-cap group and
82% in the fixed fee group. This difference is not statistically significant. I
therefore conclude that the treatments did not induce any response on the
participation margin.
Second, a concern is that the price-cap generated incentives for selective
reporting. In particular, agents might be tempted to report only transactions
that comply with the price-cap, while not reporting transactions whose
value exceeds the price-cap. The experimental design addresses this concern
through the bonus payment, which assures that it is always incentive com-
patible to report transactions, as only formal reporting generates eligibility
for the bonus of 60 Tanzanian Shillings per vaccination. Consistent with
this assertion, the farmer survey detected limited non-compliance with the
price-cap: for only 4.5% of participants in the treatment group did farmers
report paying prices that exceed 80 Tanzanian Shillings per vaccination.52 To
52While this figure is small, it is still key to notice that, even under lower compliance levels,
rules can still improve outcomes by assuring that those with a high-cost of non-compliance
comply (see also Banerjee, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2013) for a discussion of this).
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further validate this point, I investigate whether vaccine loss differs between
the experimental groups. While the logistics of the vaccine distribution and
storage render it infeasible to track every dose, I can proxy for leakage
using the ratio between confirmed number of vaccinations and the initially
distributed amount of vaccine doses.53 Evaluating this proxy suggests that
leakage rates were generally low, as the average proxy value is 96% in the
control group. More importantly, this figure does not differ systematically
between treatment and control. It is therefore unlikely that systematic leakage
and misreporting is influential enough to drive my results.
Third, it is possible that the treatment induced agents to report receipts
for which no service was provided in order to receive the bonus payment.
To investigate this possibility, the appendix shows that on average 69% of
transactions reported by agents could be verified. This figure does not differ
significantly between treatment arms.54
Fourth, although the data verification procedures are reassuring in inter-
preting the observed price effects as a real transfer of surplus, one potential
concern is that these impacts might be due to undetected misreporting. A
particular concern is collusion between the agent and the farmer in generating
inaccurate receipts. While it is not possible to conclusively rule out this
possibility, the experimental design requires a high level of trust to make
collusion profitable. To see this, notice that if agents decide to misreport, they
face a lottery which pays the unconstrained revenue plus the bonus payment
if they remain undetected and only the unconstrained revenue if the fraud
is detected. If agents choose to report correctly, they receive the constrained
revenue plus the bonus payment in every state of the world. Assuming risk-
neutrality to obtain an upper bound, the largest possible detection probability
agents are willing to accept is given by the expected increase in revenue from
misreporting divided by the bonus payment. The experimental data suggests
that non-compliance on average yields an additional revenue of around 11,000
Tanzanian Shillings (Table 1.8, column 5) while detection would lead to the
loss of approximately 70,000 Tanzanian Shillings in bonus payments. Agents
therefore decide to misreport if their detection probability is lower than 15%
53Notice that this measure allows for fractions that exceed 1, as agents might have collected
additional vaccines from the storage locations at later stages of the vaccination campaign.
54A similar concern is that misreporting is distributed unevenly across agents, implying
a heterogeneity between honest reporters and employees who misreport their performance.
The appendix addresses this possibility by investigating how the fraction of verifiable receipts
varies across individuals and showing that the inability to verify receipts is evenly distributed
between respondents.
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for all farmers. With 50 farmers served on average, this implies that collusion
is profitable if the probability that every farmer honors the agreement is
above 99%. Taken together, the experimental design therefore generates very
small incentives for non-compliance that are unlikely to justify large-scale
misreporting.
Fifth, while agents complied with the price-cap for the vaccination service,
they might have increased prices on other services in response to the
treatment. While data on prices for such transactions is not available, two
factors make it unlikely that this mechanism is driving my results. First, fewer
than 1% of respondents in the farmer survey reported paying a transport and
consultancy fee in addition to the vaccination charge, which suggests that
transactions on top of the user fees are rare. Most importantly, this figure
does not differ systematically between treatment and control group. Second,
I-2 vaccinations are the only large-scale profitable service that agents provide
for poultry farmers. Instead, their main profit raising activities accrue from
services for large ruminants, especially cattle. Any cross-price effects would
therefore have to raise prices for cattle-related services. On the one hand,
this implies that in the presence of cross-price effects agents in the price-cap
treatment should be more likely to serve poultry farmers that also hold cattle,
as this allows them to mitigate the effect of the price-cap. Data from this
study rejects this hypothesis. While 29% of service recipients report owning
at least one cow, this does not differ between treatment and control group.
Having ruled out selection effects, I also investigate whether excluding cattle
owners, and therefore potential cross-price effects, qualitatively changes my
main results. This is not the case. The treatment still reduced average prices,
and the aforementioned composition effects in the recipient pool remain even
when excluding cattle owners, although the reduced sample size has made
the estimates less precise. Taken together, this evidence makes it unlikely that
cross-price effects substantially challenge the presented interpretation of the
results.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper I evaluate whether capping prices for public services increases
or reduces welfare. I combine administrative government data with survey
data to evaluate a field experiment which investigates how capping prices
for public livestock vaccinations in Tanzania affects service delivery. The
evaluation yields three main results. First, the price-cap reduces average
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prices charged by agents. Second, the price-cap affects the composition of
the beneficiary pool by increasing the proportion of previously unserved
recipients. Third, price-caps reduce the proportion of remote villages served.
I then employ a model of monopoly regulation to derive a sufficient
statistics formula which allows me to evaluate and decompose the welfare
effect of the intervention. This analysis yields two findings. The first finding
is that the decision whether to introduce price-caps has to address a trade-off
between demand and supply considerations. On the one hand, price-caps can
enhance the provision of services by making services more affordable. This
redistributes surplus to recipients and crowds in new recipients in markets
that are comparatively cheaper to serve. On the other hand, price-caps can
also harm social welfare, as such interventions reduce agents’ incentive to
extend service to markets that are costlier to serve. The second finding is that
for public livestock vaccine service provision in Tanzania, the introduction of
any form of price-cap regulation reduces welfare compared to the status quo.
A central contribution of the paper is to highlight the importance of
incentive effects induced by capping prices. One implication of this finding
is that public regulation which mandates that essential services should be
provided for free or at very low prices can be suboptimal when governments
cannot control or incentivize the agent to maintain a sufficient coverage of
services. More broadly, this paper shows that it can be optimal to allocate
discretion over prices to agents when contracts are incomplete, even though
this allows agents to extract surplus. In addition to being informative about
pricing policies for public services, this findings therefore also has broader
implications for organizational design.
One limitation of this paper is that the experimental setting does not
allow me to study long-term effects of the price-cap, such as possible
dynamic effects induced by changes to the competitive structure and demand
responses. Another limitation is that the experimental design does not allow
for the comparison between alternative regulatory contracts. I hope to address
those shortcomings in future work.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Treatment Groups
Price-Cap
No Yes
274 wards (410 agents) 276 wards (422 agents)
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics and Balance Table
Price-Cap Experiment
Panel A: Agent Level Control Treatment P-Value of Difference
Tenure 12.466 12.198 0.743
(0.602) (0.556)
Ward Level agent 0.663 0.642 0.531
(0.127) (0.144)
Number of Villages 4.022 3.974 0.804
0.040 0.019
Animal Health Specialist 0.434 0.476 0.241
(0.025) (0.025)
Main Income Earner 0.866 0.864 0.938
(0.017) (0.018)
Uses Motorcycle 0.446 0.400 0.204
(0.024) (0.027)
Secondary Income Source 0.659 0.604 0.129
(0.026) (0.025)
Acting Village Leader 0.144 0.152 0.753
(0.017) (0.018)
Raises Livestock 0.798 0.796 0.934
(0.021) (0.020)
Panel B: Work Station
Rural 0.844 0.820 0.443
(0.021) (0.023)
Average Travel Time 80.015 90.842 0.366
(4.757) (10.990)
Private Veterinarian 0.156 0.197 0.176
(0.020) (0.022)
Private Drug Seller 0.029 0.033 0.763
(0.008) (0.010)
Poultry Area 0.076 0.062 0.433
(0.013) (0.012)
Observations 410 422
Notes: The sample includes all agents who agreed to participate in the experiment. Standard
errors (clustered at the ward level) are reported in brackets. Travel time is reported in walking
minutes.
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Table 1.3: Effect of Price-Cap on Price Variation and Levels
Outcome: Mean Price Within Agent Price Variation % at Price-Cap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price-Cap Treatment -12.82*** -14.95*** -8.848*** -8.706*** 0.200***
(3.148) (2.177) (2.027) (1.896) (0.0212)
Observations 679 769 679 768 679
Data Source Farmer Survey Receipts Farmer Survey Receipts Farmer Survey
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 76.28 73.01 20.53 20.80 0.051
Control St. Dev. 50.29 39.16 31.96 35.96 0.16
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level.
All specifications control for stratification variables and district fixed-effects. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient
estimates of a regression of the within-agent standard deviation of prices on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Columns 3 and 4 present coefficient
estimates of a regression of average price per chicken charged per agent on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. The outcome variable for columns 3
and 4 is the average price charged by participants. Column 5 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the
fraction of all transaction at 80 Tanzanian Shillings on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects
as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Columns 1, 3, and 5 employ farmer survey data whereas
columns 2 and 4 use the receipt data.
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Table 1.4: Recipient level correlates of prices in the control group
Outcome Variable: Price per vaccination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




Main livelihood is agriculture 5.386
(4.689)
More than primary education -9.033*
(4.607)
# Cattle owned -0.176*
(0.0907)
# Sheep owned -0.283***
(0.0976)
# Goats owned -0.196**
(0.0970)
Observations 1,556 1,562 1,554 1,552 1,549 1,551 1,550
Data Source Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level.
All specifications control for district fixed-effects and employ farmer survey data from the control group. Column
1 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the price per vaccination on a continuous variable measuring
the walking distance from the agent’s headquarter to the farmer’s home. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates
of a regression of the price per vaccination on the number of vaccinations applied. Column 3 presents coefficient
estimates of a regression of the price per vaccination on a binary variable indicating whether a household’s main
livelihood is derived from agriculture. Column 4 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the price per
vaccination on a binary variable indicating whether the household head has received more than primary education.
Column 5 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the price per vaccination on a continuous variable for
the number of cattle owned by the farmer. Column 6 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the price per
vaccination on a continuous variable for the number of sheep owned by the farmer. Column 7 presents coefficient
estimates of a regression of the price per vaccination on a continuous variable for the number of goats owned by
the farmer.
51
Table 1.5: Heterogeneous Effects on Prices by Elasticity
Interaction Variable: Main Livelihood Farmer is a
is Agriculture Smallholder
Outcome: Price (1) (2)
Price-Cap Treatment -6.347 -10.27***
(4.223) (3.589)
Interaction Var. 5.978 13.82***
(4.414) (5.008)
Price-Cap × Interaction Var. -9.382* -13.61**
(5.546) (5.690)
Observations 3,043 3,045
Data Source Farmer Survey Farmer Survey
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Agent Controls Yes Yes
Farmer Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at
the 1 (5) (10) percent level. All columns present regressions of transaction level prices on an
indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects, ward-level stratification and control
variables, a proxy for farmers’ elasticity of demand and the interaction of this proxy with the
treatment indicator. The proxy variables are binary variables indicating whether the recipient’s
main source of income is agriculture and whether households are smallholders who own fewer
than 11 chickens.
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Table 1.6: Effect of Treatment on Composition of Recipients, by Elasticity
Recipient Characteristic: Not served Main Livelihood Farmer is a
before is Agriculture Smallholder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price-Cap Treatment 0.0565** 0.0612** 0.0543** 0.0470** 0.0150 0.0248
(0.0250) (0.0260) (0.0272) (0.0215) (0.0137) (0.0205)
Observations 832 3,095 832 3,096 832 3,098
Observation Level Officer Transaction Officer Transaction Officer Transaction
Data Source Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey Survey
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Farmer Controls N.A. Yes N.A. Yes N.A. Yes
Control Mean 0.38 0.51 0.59 0.79 0.14 0.28
Control St. Dev. 0.38 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.19 0.45
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10)
percent level. Columns 1 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the proportion of farmers who have
not received services before on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-
level stratification and control variables. Columns 2 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of a binary
variable indicating whether a farmer has received services before on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Columns 3 presents coefficient
estimates of a regression of the fraction of farmers served per agent whose main livelihood comes from
agriculture on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification
and control variables. Columns 4 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of a binary variable indicating
whether a recipient’s main source of income is from agriculture on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Columns 5 presents coefficient
estimates of a regression of the fraction of farmers served that own fewer than 11 chickens on an indicator
variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables.
Columns 2 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of a binary variable indicating whether a farmer
owns fewer than 11 chickens on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-
level stratification and control variables.
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Table 1.7: Effect of Treatment on Village Choices
Village Level Outcome: Proportion Above Furthest
Visited Median Distance Village
(1) (2) (3)
Price-Cap -0.0445** -0.0966*** -0.0598**
(0.0219) (0.0292) (0.0303)
Observations 832 832 832
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 0.37 0.37 0.23
Control St. Dev. 0.25 0.48 0.42
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance
at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Column 1 presents coefficient estimates of the proportion
of villages visited in the agent’s area of responsibility on an indicator variable for the
treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables.
Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of a binary variable indicating
whether agents visited a village that was further than the median distance of all villages
to their headquarter on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well
as ward-level stratification and control variables. Column 3 presents coefficient estimates
of a regression of a binary variable indicating whether agents visited the furthest away
village in their area of responsibility on an indicator variable for the treatment, district
fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables.
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Table 1.8: Effect of Price-Cap on Quantities and Revenue
Outcome: # Farmers Served # Vaccinations Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price-Cap Treatment -3.450 -4.759 13.54 -11,675*
(3.708) (4.209) (121.6) (6,372)
Observations 832 679 832 832
Data Source Farmer Survey Farmer Survey Farmer Survey Farmer Survey
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cond. on Participation No Yes No No
Control Mean 50.66 62.62 1’154.47 76’118.21
Control St. Dev. 56.27 56.21 1’614.46 96’206.8
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent
level. All specifications control for stratification variables and district fixed-effects. Columns 1 and 2 present
coefficient estimates of a regression of the number of farmers served on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Columns 3 presents coefficient
estimates of a regression of the number of vaccinations applied on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Columns 4 presents coefficient
estimates of a regression of total revenue collected on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed
effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. All specifications employ farmer survey data.
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Table 1.9: Fixed Fee Treatment Effects on Prices, Quantities and Revenue
Outcome: Price # Farmers Participation Log(Q) Log(Q) Log(Q)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed Fee 7.155** -6.693* -0.00405
(3.106) (4.009) (0.0267)
Log(Price) -1.223 -0.413 -3.834
(0.907) (0.607) (38.663)
Observations 679 679 832 679 594 395
Recipients All All All All Low eD High eD
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1
(5) (10) percent level. Column 1 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the average price
per vaccination on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-
level stratification and control variables. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of a regression
of the total number of farmers served on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed
effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Column 3 presents coefficient
estimates of a regression of the revenue collected on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Columns 4 to 6
presents coefficient estimates of an instrumental variable regression of the log number of farmers
served on the log of average prices charged, using the fixed fee treatment as an instrument.
Column 4 presents the coefficient estimates for the whole sample, whereas columns 5 and 6
present the results separately for high and low elasticity recipients.
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Table 1.10: Estimates of Welfare Effect of Marginally Reducing Prices
Uniform Pricing Price Discrimination
g = 0 g = 1 ga = 0, gc1 = gc2 = 1 ga = gc1 = gc2 = 1
µ = 0 µ = 0.5 µ = 1 µ = 0 µ = 0.5 µ = 1
Panel A: Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
τ = − 1eD -4.62% -4.62% -3.33% -10.55% -17.77% -3.33% -11.57% -19.82%
τ = 0 -4.62% -4.17% -3.33% -10.47% -17.62% -3.33% -11.50% -19.67%
Panel B: Counterfactual
τ = − 1eD 2.05% 2.05% 0% 1.37% 2.74% 0% 0.34% 0.69%
τ = 0 2.05% 2.50% 0% 1.45% 2.89% 0% 0.42% 0.84%
Notes: This table presents the results from the calibration of the sufficient statistics formulas.
All estimates are expressed as percent of total sales revenue per agent. Columns 1 and 2 show
the results for uniform pricing. Columns 3 to 8 show the welfare estimates measured using the
sufficient statistics formula extended to third-degree price-discrimination. Panel A considers the




Figure 1.1: Map of Study Area
Notes: The figure shows a map of Tanzania. The study area, including the 550 sample wards,
are shaded in darker grey.
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Notes: The figure shows box plots of residuals of a regression of prices on agent fixed
effects. The regressions are estimated using receipt data. The box denotes the distribution of
observations between the 25th and 75th percentile. The whiskers denote the length between
the 10th and the 90th percentile of the price distribution. The vertical bar denotes the mean
which, by construction of residuals, is at 0.
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Notes: The figure shows the daily number of farmers served for every day of vaccination
campaign, separated by treatment and control group. The error bars denote 95% confidence
intervals. The figure uses receipt data.
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Chapter 2
Are Fixed Fees Distortionary?
Experimental Evidence
A theoretically efficient contract for public service delivery agents that minimizes
moral hazard costs and avoids behavioral distortions charges agents a fixed fee for
the usage of public assets and makes them residual claimants on its returns. I
investigate whether such contracts are indeed efficient in practice by investigating
whether imposing lump-sum fees on livestock extension agents distorts their choices.
Using a field experiment, I first show that, contrary to classic economic theory, levying
a fixed fee on agents leads them to increase user fees for a livestock vaccine and induces
demand effects that reduce quantities. To understand the mechanisms underlying this
result, I implement a series of lab-in-the-field experiments with a subset of the field-
experimental participants. The results suggest that instead of setting prices for user
fees as mark-ups over marginal costs agents use simplified rules-of-thumb that anchor
pricing decisions on aggregate profits. The results highlight that boundedly rational
behavior can reduce the effectiveness of adopting fixed fee contracts.
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2.1 Introduction
In many contexts, principals delegate the use of their assets to an agent.
Such relationships are particularly common in the public sector, where
governments hire agents (such as bureaucrats and frontline workers), task
them with the delivery of public services and supply them with the assets
necessary to carry out this task.1 A central challenge when designing
contracts to govern such relationships is moral hazard: when the principal
cannot observe effort, agents might shirk on the job and fail to use assets
efficiently.
To overcome this problem, fixed fee contracts are often employed in
practice. As part of such contracts, agents pay a fixed fee to the principals
who in turn makes agents residual claimants on their assets’ returns. For
example, in many instances public service delivery agents in developing
countries receive supplies (such as vaccines or bed nets) from governments
in exchange for a fixed fee, and are then allowed to sell the goods to service
recipients.2 Such arrangements are attractive because they provide strong
incentives to agents and thus reduce moral hazard costs.
A central assumption underlying the effectiveness of such contracts is that
agents treat the fixed fee that is used to extract rents from them as sunk when
deciding how to use the asset. Under this assumption, variation in the fixed
fee does not distort agents’ choices, so that asset returns are maximized. This
feature is particularly attractive for public service delivery as it minimizes
moral hazard costs and thus implies that tax revenue is used effectively and
aggregate returns to public investment are maximized.
It is, however, not clear whether agents really treat the fixed fee com-
ponent of such contracts as sunk. For example, Liebman and Zeckhauser
(2004) suggest that individuals might either treat average as marginal prices
1The separation between ownership and usage of assets is also common in other contexts.
For example, in sharecropping relationships land-owning principals delegate cropping and
harvesting to tenants.
2Arrangements that rely on user fees that accrue private benefits for service delivery
agents are common in agricultural and livestock extension (e.g. Rivera and Gustafson, 1991,
Dancey, 1993). Fixed fee contracts are also increasingly used for health service provision.
For example, Deserranno (2016) studies community health workers recruited by BRAC,
an international NGO, in Uganda. Those workers are compensated by allowing them to
sell medication, supplied by BRAC, to service recipients. Similarly, distributors and local
government agents in public food distribution systems, such as Solidaridad in the Dominican
Republic and Raskin in Indonesia, receive public supplies and are residual claimants on their
sales (Busso and Galiani, 2014, Banerjee, Hanna, Kyle, et al., 2015.) Fixed fee contracts are
also common in other contexts, such as land tenancy arrangements and in the taxi industry.
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("ironing") or focus on local prices and ignore full price schedules ("spotlight").
In addition, the work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and the behavioral
economics literature building on it, points out that people might resort
to simplified heuristics, or rules-of-thumb, instead of identifying optimal
solutions.3 If agents fail to perfectly optimize their choices and instead rely on
heuristics that are affected by sunk fees, employing theoretically optimal fixed
fee contracts can induce distortions that reduce their effectiveness in practice.
This paper investigates empirically whether agents treat fixed fees as sunk.
I study the behavior of public livestock extension workers in Tanzania who
are tasked with delivering poultry vaccines and focus on understanding
whether introducing a fixed fee component to their contracts affects user
fees charged by agents and the equilibrium number of recipients served. As
the basis of this study, I investigate the publicly subsidized provision of I-2
poultry vaccines that protect against Newcastle Disease (ND). ND is highly
prevalent in East Africa and is lethal for infected birds, therefore posing a
substantial economic risk for populations dependent on agriculture. I-2 is
the primary ND vaccine used by rural farmers in Tanzania. It is exclusively
produced by the government and distributed to farmers by public livestock
extension agents. In the status quo, agents receive the vaccine for free from
the government and distribute it by travelling to farmers in a geographically
defined service area, where they perform veterinary examinations and apply
the vaccine. Agents have a local monopoly over the provision of the I-2
vaccine, which they are allowed to exploit by collecting user charges from
farmers. They are thus residual claimants on the returns to the vaccine sales.
To identify whether agents treat fixed fees as sunk, I collaborate with the
Tanzanian government. I first provide evidence from a field experiment which
shows that adding a fixed fee component to agents’ contracts in order to
extract rents from them affects equilibrium prices and quantities. Working
with the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MALF), I allocate
550 wards, the main administrative units at which agents are organized, to
one of two experimental groups. 277 of these wards are assigned to the control
group in which agents receive the vaccine for free from the government.
This group is designed to mirror the status quo. In contrast, 273 wards
3This notion is similar to the idea by Baumol and Quandt (1964), who point out that
"the more refined a decision-making process, the more expensive it is likely to be, and therefore [...]
no more than an approximate solution may be justified." Conlisk (1996) summarizes a literature
which argues that such behavior can be rationalized in the presence of deliberation costs.
Pingle and Day (1996) provide lab-experimental evidence that empirically links decision cost
to such approximate behavior. See also the summary of these arguments in Kahneman (2002).
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are assigned to the treatment group, in which agents are required to remit
a fixed fee of 25,000 Tanzanian Shillings (approximately $11.40). Agents in
both experimental groups have full discretion over which and how many
customers are served, which geographic areas are targeted, and whether they
choose to participate in the vaccination campaign or not.
The evaluation of this intervention yields three results. First, contrary
to classic economic theory, implementing a fixed fee induces agents to raise
prices. I find that the intervention increases average prices charged by 11%
and induces demand effects that reduce the aggregate quantity of customers
served by 12%. Second, variation in the fixed fee does not affect agents’
participation in the vaccination campaign: I find that implementing a fixed
fee decreases participation by 0.005%, which is statistically insignificant. The
observed increase in prices in response to implementing a fixed fee is thus
not driven by selective participation decisions. Third, the fixed fee only
marginally reduces revenue earned by agents. I find that the intervention
reduces revenue by 3%. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that for
reasonable values of service delivery costs, agents make a larger profit before
remitting the fixed fee in the treatment than in the control group. Taken
together, these results therefore present evidence in support of the hypothesis
that agents are not choosing prices based on marginal costs. Instead, they
appear to base prices on heuristics that are affected by variation in sunk costs,
which means that the fixed fee induces a behavioral response that distorts
prices and quantities compared to the status quo.
The evidence from the field experiment shows that fixed fee contracts
induce distortions. The results are, however, insufficient to provide conclusive
evidence on the underlying mechanisms. To understand the reasons for
the observed response to the introduction of the fixed fee, I implement a
series of lab-in-the-field experiments with a randomly selected subset of field-
experimental participants.4
The design of the experiments is guided by a simple theoretical model
which predicts comparative statics that allow me to distinguish between
three possible pricing strategies. First, I consider a baseline scenario in
which respondents are unconstrained in their profit maximization and chose
prices optimally based on the available information. Second, Liebman and
4The combination of field- with lab-experiments is an increasingly adopted technique to
identify mechanisms while showing the economic significance of effects (e.g. Kessler (2017))
and to provide evidence on the external validity of lab-experimental results (e.g. Rondeau
and List (2008)).
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Zeckhauser (2004) introduce the term "ironing" to refer to a situation in which
individuals perceive a multipart price schedule only as the average price at
the point of consumption. Consistent with this notion, an empirical literature
documents individuals’ confusion between average and marginal prices.5 To
address this possibility, I consider a scenario in which respondents attempt to
optimize prices, but confuse average and marginal costs. Third, a literature in
behavioral economics argues that instead of solving optimization problems,
individuals might resort to intuitive rules-of-thumb to avoid deliberation
costs.6 The design of my experiments allows me to consider and evaluate
whether respondents use a rule-of-thumb that anchors prices on the aggregate
level of profits.
The main lab-in-the-field experiment I consider is a financially incen-
tivized experiment which simulates the task that agents encounter in the
field. Respondents are tasked with providing services to four potential
customers, each of whom has a different marginal service delivery cost. For
each customer, I elicit agents’ perceived reservation price, i.e. the smallest
price at which respondents are willing to serve the customer, using a multiple
price list mechanism.7 The experimental design provides exogenous variation
in fixed fees and revenue for every customer, which allows me to separately
identify their effect on reservation prices.8
If agents chose their reservation prices optimally, they would equal
marginal service delivery cost for every customer, and would thus not be
affected by variation in fixed fees and revenue. In contrast, I find that variation
in both variables affects respondents’ reservation prices: a 1 unit increase
in average costs caused by the introduction of a fixed fee, conditional on
marginal costs, leads to a 0.4 unit increase in reservation prices, while a 1
unit increase in revenue causes reservation prices to decrease by 0.07 units.
Both effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. By comparing those
5See, for example, Feldman, Katuscak, and Kawano (2016) and Ito (2014).
6For example, Simon (1978) introduces the distinction between substantive and
procedural rationality to argue that in complicated environments individuals might use rules
to reduce costly optimization. This notion is supported by empirical evidence (e.g. Pingle
and Day (1996) and Kahneman and Frederick (2002)) and its implications have been evaluated
theoretically both at the micro (e.g. Ellison and Fudenberg (1993), Ellison and Fudenberg
(1995) and Spiegler (2006)) and the macro level (e.g. Sims (2003) and Reis (2006)).
7The mechanism I employ is a simplified and context-adapted version of the one
proposed by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964).
8The lab-experiment is similar in spirit to the one employed in a literature on dynamic
stochastic decision making for saving and investment decisions. See, for example, Hey and
Dardanoni (1988), Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox (2003) and Oprea, Friedman, and S. T.
Anderson (2009).
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comparative statics to the implications of my model, I find that the observed
responses to changes in revenue are inconsistent with marginal and average
cost pricing, but are consistent with a rule-of-thumb which leads respondents
to target an aggregate level of profits and adjust their pricing strategies to
achieve this target. As aggregate profits are a function of sunk costs, the
reliance on rules-of-thumb explains the observed effect of the fixed fee on
prices.
To further support the notion of such rule-of-thumb pricing, I develop
and implement a second lab-in-the-field experiment with the same sample of
respondents. In contrast to the previous experiments, this simulation asks
respondents to determine aggregate quantities of production. To this end,
I implement an experiment in which respondents face increasing marginal
costs and stochastic returns to production and must decide dynamically
whether to continue production. The experimental design again generates
exogenous variation in fixed fees and revenue.
If agents were optimally choosing their production quantities on the mar-
gin, they would continue producing until the expected return of producing
an additional unit equals its marginal cost. Contrary to this assertion, I find
that charging a fixed fee significantly reduces production, while increases in
revenue significantly increase the aggregate quantity produced: introducing
a fixed fee leads to a 16% reduction in the aggregate quantity produced,
while a 1% increase in revenue causes a 7% to 13% increase. Both effects
are statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is again inconsistent
with profit maximization and a confusion of average with marginal costs, but
is consistent with a model in which agents make economic decisions based
on rules-of-thumb that are anchored on aggregate profits.
Taken together, this paper thus provides evidence that agents do not
treat fixed fees as sunk in practice, which reduces the efficiency of fixed fee
contracts. By doing this, this article complements two strands of literature.
First, I add to a literature in behavioral economics that documents sub-optimal
consumer and producer behavior.9 Altomonte, Barattieri, and Basu (2015)
present survey evidence which suggests that firms set prices as mark-ups
over total instead of marginal costs.10 Oprea (2014) provides evidence from a
9Primarily theoretical contributions of the effects of bounded rationality include Sah
and Stiglitz (1986), Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) and De Long et al. (1990) and are
summarized in Conlisk (1996).
10The literature that investigates the optimality of price choices by firms is primarily
descriptive. The finding Altomonte, Barattieri, and Basu (2015) builds on a classical debate on
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lab-experiment to show that when calculating the profit maximizing strategy
is complicated, respondents rely on statistics that are easier to observe but
might lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Ito (2014) studies non-linear electricity
pricing and finds that consumers respond to variation in average instead of
marginal electricity prices. Feldman, Katuscak, and Kawano (2016) show that
taxpayers’ earnings respond to predictable lump-sum changes in tax liability,
which suggests that households misperceive complicated tax schedules. This
paper adds to this literature by providing causal evidence on the mechanisms
underlying sub-optimal price setting behavior.11
Second, this study complements a literature on contract design for public
sector workers. Existing work in this area has focused on the role of
monitoring (e.g. Rasul and Rogger (2016)), team work (e.g. Chan (2015)),
as well as financial (e.g. Ashraf, Bandiera, and Jack (2014), Khan, Khwaja,
and Olken (2016b)) and non-financial (e.g. Khan, Khwaja, and Olken (2016a))
incentives. I add to this stream of literature by evaluating the practical value
of fixed fee contracts in providing incentives and maximizing the returns to
public investment.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2.2
describes the relevant features of the setting in which the study takes place.
Section 2.3 provides a theoretical model to guide the empirical analysis and
derives comparative statics that allow to distinguish between different pricing
strategies. Section 2.4 outlines the design of the field experiment and presents
the results. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 outline the design of the two lab-in-the-field
experiments and present their results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Setting
The setting of this study is the same as that described in chapter 1. I repeat
the key characteristics here for convenience.
This project explores the response to fixed fees in the context of agricul-
tural and livestock extension in Tanzania. Extension services are a publicly
subsidized service delivery program administered by local governments and
coordinated nationally by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fish-
full cost pricing, which started with Hall and Hitch (1939) and was summarized in Faulhaber
and Baumol (1988) and Mongin (1992).
11In a broader sense, the results in this paper appear inconsistent with the "poor but
rational" view which suggests that the poor maximize profits subject to financial constraints
(e.g. Duflo (2006)).
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eries.12 As part of this project I focus on the provision of I-2 vaccines as one
dimension of services. I-2 is a thermotolarent vaccine for poultry that protects
against Newcastle Disease (ND), a viral disease that is transmitted between
birds and leads to almost 100% mortality in affected and unvaccinated
chicken. Estimates from Tanzania suggest that more than 30% of chicken die
from ND every year, leading to an annual cost of up to $78 Million (Msami,
2007).
The vaccine is delivered to farmers by public livestock extension agents.
They have advanced professional qualifications and typically hold a diploma
from specialized training institutes in animal health, animal production or
general agriculture. As part of an I-2 vaccination program, they receive
vaccines from the government and then travel to customers in order to apply
vaccinations to farmers’ livestock. During the study period, vaccine delivery
was the primary task assigned to the agents. They are responsible for 1 to
12 villages, averaging 4 villages per agent, work by themselves and have
their own geographically defined area of responsibility, in which they face
no competition from other public providers. The main organizational unit
of agents at the local level are wards, which are accumulations of roughly 8
villages. There are, on average, two agents per ward. Agents in the same
ward interact on a daily basis and, while maintaining their own geographic
areas, typically coordinate their work. There was no entry or exit of agents
during my study period.
Delivery agents are compensated through a mix between government
wages and user fees. Specifically, agents receive a flat compensation of around
$200 per month.13 In addition, agents can collect user fees from farmers,
which cover delivery costs and provide incentives.14 User fees are necessary
as only around 25% of agents have access to a government motorcycle,
whereas the remainder travels by foot and uses public motorcycle taxis and
buses to reach farmers.15 Local governments have allocated full discretion
12This division of responsibilities is the common organizational form for extension in
Africa (Crowder et al., 2002) and Latin America (Wilson, 1991).
13Wages vary across local government administrations.
14This dual compensation structure is common for agricultural extension, and publicly
subsidized service delivery programs in developing countries in general. See, for example
Rivera and Gustafson, 1991, Dancey, 1993, Haan et al. (2001), J. R. Anderson and Feder (2007)
and Lagarde and Palmer (2008).
15This process of service delivery is the modus operandi for a number of key service
delivery programs in developing countries. For example, Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2016)
study community health workers in Zambia. Community health workers are expected to
devote 80% of their time to household visits and are hence required to incur similar costs as
the agents in my setting.
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over pricing for user fees to the agents.16 As the Tanzanian government is
the only producer and provider of I-2 vaccinations, agents have substantial
market power, which limits the extent to which competition can discipline
agents’ discretion over prices.17 In the status quo, agents are not required to
submit a fixed payment in exchange for the right to sell vaccines.
Given this market structure, prices for user fees are a central choice
variable that determines the allocation of services. The focus of this study
is on understanding how pricing strategies for such user fees are affected by
the addition of a fixed fee component to agents’ contracts.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
This section provides a framework that conceptualizes the implications of
different pricing strategies for the response of prices to the introduction
of a fixed fee component to agents’ contracts. To this end, I extend the
model developed in chapter 1 to derive comparative statics for three possible
pricing strategies. The comparison of the theoretical comparative statics with
empirically estimated elasticities provides indications regarding the pricing
strategies used by agents. Throughout this analysis I focus on deriving three
comparative statics: the response of prices to changes in marginal costs,
average costs and revenue.
I focus on three possible pricing strategies. First, I derive comparative
statics assuming that agents are choosing prices optimally. In this case,
prices respond only to marginal costs. Second, I evaluate the implications
of a situation where agents set prices based on average instead of marginal
costs. In this scenario, I assume that agents solve the profit maximizing
optimization problem but confuse average and marginal costs. Finally, I
investigate a situation of bounded rationality. In this scenario, agents do not
solve an optimization problem but instead rely on simplified heuristics that
approximate the profit maximizing pricing choice. In particular, I consider a
situation in which prices are chosen to target a pre-defined level of aggregate
profits. In this scenario, reductions in the stock of profits can lead agents
to raise prices, as they attempt to realign their aggregate profits with their
16In a separate intervention, discussed in chapter 1, I evaluate the effect of introducing
regulation to reduce the discretion over prices.
17Private provision is widely viewed as sub-optimal to public provision, as effective ND
vaccination requires adequate handling and application of the vaccine as well as the ability
to detect preexisting poultry infections. A central concern is that private market provision
would compromise service quality which risks reducing the acceptance and adoption of I-2
vaccinations.
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targets. This section first presents the general set-up of the model before
considering the three possible scenarios and deriving the corresponding
comparative statics.
2.3.1 Set-Up
I consider a situation where one agent is responsible for supplying a service to
a continuum of customers, the size of which is normalized to 1. Each customer
is indexed with the subscript i. Serving customer i requires the agent to pay
a travel cost ci and a service application cost τ. Travel costs are drawn from
a continuous distribution M (c) defined on [0, cmax]. Denote by c∗ (pi) the
highest cost customer that agents are willing to visit at price pi. In addition,
suppose that market participation requires agents to pay a fixed fee K before
any services are delivered. Customers have an idiosyncratic valuation vi for
the service, which is drawn from a homogeneous distribution F (v).18
The timing of the interaction between agents and service recipients is as
follows. Agents first decide whether to participate in the market and pay the
fixed fee K. They then choose whether to travel to service recipient i. After
paying the travel cost ci, agents meet with the service recipient and propose
a price pi. Customers then decide whether to accept or reject the price offer.
If they accept, agents provide the service at a cost τ. If customers reject, no
transaction takes place and agents move on to the next customer.
For ease of exposition, assume that agents visit customers one after the
other, starting with the customer with the lowest travel cost. Denote by Ri−1
the aggregate revenue earned before deciding whether to visit customer i.
Similarly, denote by Ci−1 the total cost paid by agents before deciding whether
to visit customer i. In the following analysis I will focus on the considerations
the agent takes into account when proposing a price to the customer.
2.3.2 Choosing Prices to Maximize Profits
I begin by considering a situation in which agents choose prices optimally.




[(pi − τ) (1− F (pi))− ci] di− K
Aggregate profits are additively separable for all customers that are visited.
Optimizing agents thus set prices to maximize profits separately for every
18Note that, for simplicity and in contrast to the model presented in chapter 1, I assume
that the elasticity of demand is constant.
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service recipient. Profits at the time when prices are set for customer i are
given by:
pi (pi) = Ri−1 − Ci−1 + (pi − τ) (1− F (pi))− ci
where F (pi) denotes the probability that individual i will accept the price
offer pi. Optimizing profits with respect to prices yields the well known







where η denotes the price elasticity of demand.
The objective of this section is to derive three comparative statics that can











Intuitively, the separability of the objective function assures that prices that
maximize profits are chosen exclusively based on marginal costs. While
variation in travel costs affect whether a customer is served at all, all costs
apart from the service application cost τ are sunk at the time of pricing and
are thus not considered by the agent when proposing prices.
2.3.3 Confusion of Marginal and Average Costs
While choosing prices based on marginal costs maximizes profits, it is not
clear whether agents actually employ this pricing strategy. Liebman and
Zeckhauser (2004) introduce the term "ironing" to refer to a situation in which
individuals perceive a multipart price schedule only as the average price at
the point of consumption. Consistent with this notion, an empirical literature
documents individuals’ confusion between average and marginal prices.19
Consistent with these ideas, it is hence possible that service delivery agents
base their pricing decisions on average instead of marginal costs.20
To formalize this scenario, consider a situation in which, instead of
observing τ, agents perceive marginal costs to be τ˜. Suppose further that
τ˜ is a weighted average between true marginal costs τ and the average of
total costs incurred at the time of visit to customer i: τ˜ = ωτ + (1−ω) aci,
19E.g. Feldman, Katuscak, and Kawano (2016) and Ito (2014).
20This distinction has important implications for equilibrium supply. For example, when
marginal costs are constant an agent choosing prices based on average costs will consistently





γ + τ + ci and γ denotes the historical acceptance rate. Under


















Confusion between average and marginal costs has implications for price
responses to exogenous shocks. In particular, it is straightforward to see that










Intuitively, confusion between average and marginal costs implies that
prices will not only respond positively to changes in marginal costs, but
also to increases in fixed costs K and travel costs incurred before the time
of pricing, both of which are captured in Ci−1. When marginal service
application costs are constant, increasing fixed costs under average cost
pricing will reduce aggregate profits, as it will lead agents to set prices even
further above the profit maximizing level.
2.3.4 Rules-of-Thumb
The previous scenario assumes that agents maximize an objective function,
even though their confusion between average and marginal costs prevents
them from optimizing profits. A large literature in behavioral economics
has, however, pointed out that individuals might rely on simplified heuristics
instead of maximizing utility. To explore the implications of this possibility,
I focus on a specific rule-of-thumb: profit targeting. In this scenario, agents
are unaware of the expected maximum amount of profits they are able to
achieve, but instead have a target aggregate amount in mind that they aspire
to. Prices are then not chosen to maximize an objective function but merely
aim to minimize the distance between the target and the actual amount. I
consider two scenarios of such behavior.
I first consider a simplified situation in which agents are unaware of
demand effects. In this scenario, agents assume a locally linear and increasing
relationship between prices and profits, and prices are chosen to achieve a
target level of profits. Their perceived profit obtained from customer i is thus:
pii = (pi − τ) P (acc)− ci
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where P (acc) denotes the acceptance probability which, in this scenario, is
independent of prices. While agents are thus aware of the stochastic nature of
customers’ acceptance decisions, they fail to internalize that lowering prices
shifts the odds in favor of acceptance. By considering a situation of profit
targeting, this scenario further assumes that agents choose a sequence of
prices P = {p1, .., pi, ...} to achieve a pre-defined aggregate level of profits
piT. This implies a sequence of target profits
{
piT1 (p1) , ...,pi
T
i (pi) , ...
}
which
agents define ex-ante and is used to adapt pricing decisions to the stochastic
realization of customer acceptances. In particular, for every service customer
i agents set prices to solve the following equality:
piTi = Ri−1 − Ci−1 + (pi − τ) P (acc)− ci
This directly defines the prices pROTi chosen by the agent:
pROTi =






An agent who uses rules-of-thumb based on profit targeting thus sets
mark-ups over marginal costs as a function of the target profits, average costs
and average revenue. In contrast to an agent who is merely confused between
average and marginal costs, agents relying on the proposed heuristic thus
also consider their aggregate earnings when making pricing decisions. This
implies that agents lower prices in response to positive shocks to revenues.










Profit targeting behavior also means that it is unclear whether increases
in fixed costs bring prices closer to the true profit maximizing level, as the
implied consideration of average costs raises prices above marginal costs,
but profits that are higher than expected can counteract this increase. The
relationship between profits and marginal increases in fixed-costs is thus
ambiguous.
The comparative statics also apply to situations in which agents are aware
of (and internalize) demand effects. To see this, assume for simplicity that
customers’ valuation is distributed such that their acceptance curve becomes
linear: P (acc|pi) = 1− βpi. Agents then choose prices to satisfy the following
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equation:
piTi = Ri−1 − Ci−1 + (pi − τ) (1− βpi)− ci
= −βp2i + pi (1− τβ) + Ri−1 − Ci−1 − τ − ci






(Ri−1 − Ci−1)− piTt
)
+ β (τ2β− 6τ − 4ci) + 1
−2β (2.7)
In contrast to the simpler exhibition in which agents do not internalize
the demand curve, it is now ambiguous whether increases in the stock of
earnings lead to an increase in prices. This is because agents can choose
to either set low prices to achieve a high acceptance rate or to achieve their
profit target through high prices with a comparatively lower acceptance rate.
If agents choose the former approach, an unexpected decrease in the stock of
already collected revenue leads to an increase in prices. In contrast, if agents
choose the latter approach an unexpected decrease in the stock of already
collected revenue leads to a decrease in prices. To distinguish between the
two approaches, it is useful to note that they also have differing implications
in terms of agents responses to an increase in average costs. In the low-price
case, prices respond positively to increases in average costs whereas in the
high-price case agents lower prices if average costs increase. When agents























2.3.5 Summary of Model Implications
Taken together, this section developed a theoretical framework that investi-
gates pricing behavior under three different scenarios: Profit maximization,
confusion between average and marginal costs, and rule-of-thumb pricing.
The conceptual framework allows me to compare the implied comparative
statics with empirically observable parameters to understand which pricing
strategy is consistent with real world behavior. The conceptual framework
generates the central empirical implication that under profit maximization
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agents’ prices should only respond to variation in marginal costs. In contrast,
if agents confuse marginal and average costs, prices should respond positively
to increases in both marginal costs and fixed fees. Finally, if agents use rules-
of-thumb and thus anchor their pricing strategies on a target level of profits,
prices should also respond to variation in revenue. Table 2.1 summarizes the
implied conclusions. The next sections will present evidence that is consistent
with the latter interpretation but inconsistent with marginal and average cost
pricing.
2.4 Evidence from a Field Experiment
The experiments discussed in this paper are set in the context of the publicly
subsidized provision of I2 Newcastle Disease vaccination in Tanzania. This
section explains the experimental design of a field experiment that assesses
whether introducing a fixed fee into delivery agents’ contracts distorts prices
for user fees in this context.
2.4.1 Experimental Design
This project was carried out during the first I2 vaccination campaign of
2016. The study covers the time period between January and February 2016
and enumerated the population of agents in four of Tanzania’s 30 regions
(Dodoma, Iringa, Morogoro and Tanga).21 In total, 832 agents participated in
the study.
All participants in the field experiment were invited to attend a 90-minute
meeting at the district headquarter at the beginning of the vaccination cam-
paign to collect the vaccine and receive instructions on procedures.22 During
this meeting, agents were informed that, similar to normal procedures, they
were allowed to collect a user fee from farmers which they could keep for
themselves. Agents were specifically encouraged to profit financially from the
transaction, stating that the government viewed user fees as a way to motivate
employees and compensate them for good performance. In addition, it was
reiterated during the meeting that agents were allowed to charge farmers
any price they chose and that it was acceptable to charge different prices to
different farmers.
21All 27 districts in the enumeration regions were included in the study. The study area
was chosen to include a wide variety of agricultural environments while assuring geographic
proximity to the ministry headquarter in Dar Es Salaam.
22Agents who attended this meeting received a show-up fee to cover their transport
expenditure. Payments varied between 10’000 and 50’000 Tanzanian Shillings ($4.50 to $22),
depending on the distance and available transport methods.
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Agents were then informed that the ministry wanted to keep better records
of how many animals were vaccinated and that hence reporting procedures
during this campaign would differ slightly from the status quo. In particular,
a condition of participation in the vaccination campaign was that agents
would issue formal receipts to every farmer served and submit the receipt
information directly to the ministry using a phone based reporting system.
Agents were specifically told that the ministry would contact farmers to
verify that the information provided on receipts was correct. In order to
assure compliance with this reporting system, the ministry offered a bonus
payment of 60 Tanzanian Shillings (approximately $0.025) for every verified
vaccination.
The different treatments were announced to participants only after they
had arrived for vaccine collection at the district headquarters but before
they departed to the field again. I examine an intervention that charges
agents a fixed fee (“fixed fee treatment”). The instructions given to agents
in the fixed fee treatment differed from the ones given to the control group
only with regards to vaccine distribution. In particular, ministry officials
informed participants that, in contrast to normal campaigns, vaccines would
not be provided for free and instead participation in the vaccination campaign
required a fixed payment of 25,000 Tanzanian Shillings (approximately $11.40)
to cover parts of the vaccine production cost. To avoid concerns about
liquidity constraints, the ministry allowed agents to cover this fee through
charges from farmers and collected the funds after the completion of the
vaccination campaign. Agents were explicitly given the choice whether
to accept the cost, perform vaccinations and collect user fees and bonus
payments, or to reject participation without any obligation to pay. The
ministry repeatedly emphasized that there would be no repercussions from
refusing participation.
The fixed fee is comparatively small relative to the expected revenue from
participation, with average revenue in the control group exceeding 70,000
Tanzanian Shillings. However, 25% of total earnings (revenue plus bonus
payments) fall below the fixed fee. For agents with low revenue potential it
may hence make sense to reject this proposal, but for those with sufficient
business potential the expected return from accepting the fixed fee appear
substantial.
I randomly and independently assigned each of the 550 wards in the
study to either the control or the treatment group. Table 2.2 displays the
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basic experimental design. Group allocation was stratified by 108 strata,
where each stratum was defined by a district identifier and two binary
variables, indicating whether all agents in the ward had specialized in general
agriculture and whether only one agent was assigned to the ward.
2.4.2 Data
The main data used to evaluate the field experiment was collected from two
different sources: administrative government receipts and a survey of service
recipients. I designed and conducted the customer survey specifically as part
of this project. In addition, I implemented a new procedure of reporting
service provision receipts via text message to increase accuracy and usability
of the data.
The information provided on official government receipts, and the number
of receipts issued, constitutes my provisional outcome data. The information
on the receipts details the customer’s name, contact number, village, the
date of the visit, the total user fee collected and the number of vaccinations
applied. After issuing the receipt, agents electronically transmitted the receipt
information to a ministry database using a text-message template.23
After the end of the vaccination campaign, I administered a survey to
service recipients. The survey was conducted over a period of 6 weeks,
between March and April 2016, and sampled a randomly selected fraction
of 15% of all receipts submitted, stratified by agent. This led to a total sample
of 4,516 receipts selected for surveying and verification.24 The survey was
able to contact 3,580 farmers which equates to 80% of receipts sampled.25 The
farmer survey collected detailed information on the service provision and
on customer characteristics, thereby verifying that the service was actually
provided and collecting verified information on user fees.
I use the information obtained from this section to construct my main
outcome measures. In order to arrive at a measure of the total number of
farmers served I multiply the number of verifiable receipts per agent with the
agent-specific sampling weight of each receipt. I repeat the same procedure
23In total, agents issued 31,657 valid receipts, accounting for 702,762 animals vaccinated.
24Rounding errors induced by the stratification led to a sample that is slightly smaller than
15% of 31,657.
25Among the farmers not reached, enumerators were unable to reach 42% because of
incorrect or invalid contact details. In total, phone survey procedures therefore were able
to assess the validity of almost 90% of receipts sampled. I treat the remaining receipts as
unverifiable and hence incorrect.
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for the average price, total revenue collected and the total number of chickens
vaccinated.
2.4.3 Estimation and Results
The design of the field experiment allows me to provide evidence that the
introduction of a fixed fee affects prices and distort quantities. To this end, I
estimate equations of the following form:
yiwd = β0 + β1FixedFeeiwd + βX + γd + eiwd (2.10)
where yiwd is the outcome of interest for participant i in ward w and
district d, FixedFee is a binary variable that indicates whether agents’ wards
were required to pay a fixed fee, and Xwd denotes a vector of ward-level
stratification variables.26 The coefficient of interest is β1. I also include district
level fixed-effects (γd), as the assignment lottery was stratified by these strata.
As the treatment is perfectly correlated within wards, every specification
reports robust standard errors clustered at the ward level.
The intervention imposes a fixed fee on agents that is sunk at the
time of service delivery. If agents were fully maximizing profits in the
status quo, imposing a fixed fee should only induce responses on the
extensive participation margin and not affect pricing decisions conditional
on participation. Table 2.3 presents the treatment effect estimates from the
intervention to tests this hypothesis. Column 1 shows that imposing a fixed
fee raises average prices charged by around 11%. Column 2 in table 2.3 shows
that this is not a selection effect, as the fixed fee treatment did not affect
participation in the vaccination campaign. Inconsistent with a theory based
on profit-maximization, agents therefore appear to consider sunk fixed fees
when making pricing decisions.
Column 3 in table 2.3 further shows that the rise in prices induces
demand effects: the total number of customers served is reduced by around
12% as a result of the fixed fee treatment. As column 4 shows, the fixed
fee treatment therefore only reduced collected revenue by 3%, which is
statistically insignificant. Using those point estimates, back-of-the-envelope
26Xwd also contains an indicator for whether a ward was assigned to a cross-cutting
treatment (’Price-Cap Treatment). Note that, as I find no evidence of interaction effects
between the fixed fee and the cross-cutting treatment, I treat both as separate experiments.
Given that the two treatments were assigned as part of a cross-cutting design, treatment
effects of the intervention should therefore be interpreted conditional on 50% of the sample
being assigned to the cross-cutting treatment.
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calculations suggest that as long as the combined travel and vaccination
costs per farmer exceed 366 Tanzanian Shillings (or approximately 20% of
the average per vaccination price), agents’ profits (before deducting the fixed
fee) in the treatment group are higher than in the control group. This
finding suggests that, instead of optimally setting prices, agents either confuse
average with marginal costs or consider a heuristic that is affected by fixed
fees when setting prices.27
2.5 Evidence from Lab-in-the-Field Experiment 1
The preceding section presented an example of a case where the introduction
of a fixed fee affects prices. It is, however, clear that the existing evidence
cannot conclusively show that this is, in fact, driven by agents’ choices, as
the design of the fixed fee treatment could have affected prices through
a different channel. For example, agents might have incorrectly assumed
limited liability, which relieved them from the responsibility of remitting the
fixed fee in case of insufficient revenue collection. This implicit cut-off could
then lead to bunching and similar price and quantity effects as observed, yet
for completely different reasons. Alternatively, the obligation to pay a fixed
fee might have implicitly altered agents’ negotiation strategies in ways that
cannot be captured through the farmer survey.
In addition, the existing evidence is insufficient to understand the un-
derlying mechanisms and considerations that agents take into account. In
particular, agents might choose to set lower prices than optimal in a profit
maximizing sense, for example because they are intrinsically motivated.
Alternatively, they might use simplified heuristics that only approximate
optimal pricing or they might be confused about the appropriate costs to
consider. To conclusively understand agents’ pricing strategies, more direct
evidence is needed. To provide this, I implement a series of lab-in-the-
field experiments with a randomly selected subset of the field-experimental
sample.
27One might be concerned that the fixed fee treatment did not only affect agents’ costs
but also strengthened their bargaining position and therefore allowed them to extract higher
profits from service recipients. To avoid a direct impact on bargaining, the agents were not
given any documentation that formally stated the requirement to remit a fixed fee. Agents
in the treatment group also were not more likely to mention the need to cover vaccine costs
during bargaining with farmers.
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2.5.1 Sample and Implementation
I conduct the lab-in-the-field experiments with a total of 311 agents in 14
districts in Tanzania. The sampled districts represent a randomly selected
subset of all districts covered in the field experiment. All respondents had also
participated in the field experiment. Subjects were individually paired with
one enumerator, moved to visually isolated locations for the implementation
of the experiment and were given a game sheet to make their choices.28 In
order to ensure independence across participants, subjects did not interact
with one another during the experiment and were not informed of other
participants’ choices.
2.5.2 Design
The lab-experimental design aims to simulate a situation that is similar to
the service provision task that agents encounter during the field experiment.
However, to incentivize profit maximization the instructions of the lab
experiment specifically emphasized that the simulation focuses on a “private”
task, therefore framing the exercise as a for-profit interaction with service
recipients. Respondents are told that the activity will simulate the delivery
of cattle castration services, which, in the Tanzanian context, is a non-public
activity typically delivered by livestock extension agents.
As part of the simulation, respondents are informed that they are facing
a situation in which they consider castrating the cattle of four different
customers. Each customer is associated with an idiosyncratic delivery cost
of 1,000, 4,000, 8,000 and 11,000 Experimental Shillings (ES), respectively.
Respondents are told that the delivery cost covers fuel for the motorcycle, and
that some customers live further away than others, which requires a higher
expenditure on fuel. The simulation further assumes that the cost of applying
the service once the delivery cost has been paid is zero.
Agents’ task is to decide dynamically whether they want to serve each
customer and, if so, at what price they are willing to do so. To this end,
respondents are told that they should first make up their mind about what the
smallest possible price is at which they would prefer to deliver the service to
the customer instead of walking away from the business opportunity, starting
with the first customer. They then “call” the customer, who offers them a
payment. If the price offered is larger than the reservation price, respondents
28Figure 2.1 shows a translated version of the game sheet.
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deliver the service at the offered price. If it is not, they move on to the next
customer.
Given this design, participants’ main choice regards their reservation price,
i.e. the smallest price for which they would serve a customer instead of
walking away from the deal. The profit maximizing reservation price for
every customer is the marginal delivery cost, and thus 1,000 ES for the first,
4,000 ES for the second, 8,000 ES for the third, and 11,000 ES for the fourth
customer.
The primary objective of this exercise is to elicit agents’ perception about
the marginal costs associated with delivering services to each customer. Thus,
the primary outcome variable obtained from this simulation is the reservation
price stated by respondents. I employ a multiple price list (MPL) mechanism
to assure that the reservation price stated by agents is equivalent to their
true reservation price.29 As part of the elicitation procedure, respondents
are shown ten hypothetical price offers between 1,000 and 10,000 ES for
every customer. They are then asked to decide, independently for every
offer, whether they would accept the price and pay the delivery cost, or not
serve the customer at the offered price.30 After making the ten choices, a
piece of paper representing each choice is put in a bowl and agents draw
one offer at random. The choice relating to this offer is then implemented.
After the completion of the simulation, participants’ earnings are summarized
on an information sheet for them. Agents were then paid out 20% of
their experimental earnings in cash after the experiment, which further
incentivized profit maximization.31
This design assures that reporting the true reservation price is incentive
compatible. On the one hand, if respondents were to state a higher reservation
price, they would risk foregoing service provision opportunities at prices that
are acceptable to them. On the other hand, stating a lower price than their true
reservation price risks having to serve customers at prices that do not allow
respondents to break even. In addition, due to the random nature of the price
offer agents are unable to increase payments by stating higher reservation
prices. The design of the mechanism thus builds on the same intuition as the
29The explanation protocol for the MPL mechanism is available from the author upon
request.
30Note that, as respondents are only shown potential offers between 1,000 ES and 10,000
ES, it is not optimal to serve the fourth customer at any offered price.
31The average profit obtained was 10,271 ES.
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widely employed Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (Becker, DeGroot,
and Marschak, 1964).
2.5.3 Sources of Variation
The design of the lab experimental generates two sources of variation that,
taken together, provide evidence on the pricing strategies employed by agents.
First, I generate exogenous variation in fixed fees by randomly dividing
participants in two groups. One group acted as a treatment group and
was responsible for paying a fixed fee of 4,000 ES before commencing the
simulation. The narrative of the design framed this cost as having to be
paid to repair the seller’s motorcycle before delivering services. It had to
be remitted regardless of whether any customer was served or not, and is
thus sunk at the time of decision making. Given this structure, the fixed fee
does not affect the profit maximizing choice of reservation prices.
I contrast reservation prices in the treatment group to a control group
without a fixed fee requirement. In particular, respondents assigned to the
control group received exactly the same instructions as the treatment group
but were not required to remit 4,000 ES before commencing the simulation.
Every participant played two rounds of this experiment, one with and one
without the fixed fee. The order of the two rounds was randomized.
The second source of variation that allows me to identify agents’ pricing
strategies is generated by the random nature of price offer draws. This
generates exogenous variation on the extensive margin, i.e. in whether
an agent delivers a service conditional on reservation prices, and on the
intensive margin, i.e. in prices paid conditional on delivering a service.
Taken together, the random offer draws exogenously vary agents’ stock of
revenue and average costs at the time of choosing a reservation price for the
second, third and fourth customer. The sign of reservation prices’ response to
increases in price offers can then be combined with the sign of the response to
the experimental variation in fixed fees to understand whether agents choose
mark-ups over marginal or average costs, or respond to variation in fixed fees
through their effect on profits.
2.5.4 Reduced Form Effects
I begin by investigating the reduced form effect of the fixed fee treatment on
respondents’ choice of indifference points. To this end, I estimate variants of
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the following model:
yir = β0 + β1FixedFeeir + γr + αi + eir (2.11)
where yir denotes the outcome variable of interest for individual i in round
r, FixedFeeir is a binary variable indicating whether agents had to remit a
fixed fee in a specific round and γr denotes round fixed effects. In addition,
as each respondent plays the simulation twice I can control for individual
level fixed effects, denoted by αi. The primary outcome variable of interest
during the first part of the analysis will be respondents’ chosen indifference
point for each of the four customers. As randomization was performed
at the individual level, I report robust standard errors clustered for every
participant. Given the inclusion of round fixed-effects, the model employs
within round-variation. As the allocation to the treatment was randomized
within rounds, this specification therefore causally estimates its effect on the
outcome variables of interest.
A complication arises because respondents did not only have to choose
indifference points for every customer, but were initially required to decide
whether they would theoretically be willing to serve customers for any
possible offer between 1,000 and 10,000 ES. There is thus no data available for
possible indifference points exceeding 10,000 ES, as in such cases respondents
decided not to serve a given customer. I employ two different methods to
address this. First, in most of the specifications I assume that agents who
decided not to serve a given customer would have chosen an indifference
point of 11,000 ES. As this is the smallest possible indifference point for which
respondents would have chosen not to serve a given customer, any findings
of a positive treatment effect thus represent a lower bound on the true effects.
Second, in a subset of specifications I also estimate effects conditional on
agreement to serve a given customer.
The results from the estimation of equation 2.11 directly replicate the
effects found in the field experiment. Consider the reduced form treatment
effects of the fixed fee treatment on indifference points first. Table 2.4 presents
the results, with each column representing one of the four customers.
Note first that average reservation prices in the control group correlate
with marginal costs, but fall below marginal costs for the third and fourth
customer whose marginal costs are highest. The treatment significantly
increases participants’ reservation prices for all customers. The incidence of
this increase falls primarily on the first and the second customer who have the
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lowest marginal cost. The indifference point for serving the first and second
customer increase by 116% and 23% on average, respectively. Both increases
are significant at the 1% level. The treatment also significantly increases
reservation prices for the two customers with the highest marginal costs. The
increases of 3.3% and 6.3% for customers 3 and 4, respectively, are, however,
substantially more modest.
The responses to the fixed fee shown in table 2.4 are inconsistent with
profit maximization. Instead, the results suggest that agents indeed base
their choice of indifference point on a statistic different to marginal costs.
To understand whether agents respond to variation in revenue, I use the
variation generated by the random price-offer draws to estimate the effect of
revenue collected from previous customers on the indifference point choices.
I begin by showing the reduced form impact of price offer draws on
indifference points. Formally, I estimate the following model separately for
customers 2, 3 and 4:
yir = β0 + β1PreviousO f f ersir + γr + αi + eir (2.12)
where yir again denotes the indifference point chosen by individual i in round
r and PreviousO f f ersir denotes the cumulative value of offers (irrespective of
whether service was performed or not) before having reached the respective
customer. In addition, γr and αi denote round and respondent fixed
effects, respectively. As previous price-offers were assigned randomly, this
specification consistently estimates the causal effect of receiving a higher price
offer on respondents’ reservation price.
Table 2.5 presents the estimation results of equation 2.12. The results
show that respondents lower their reservation prices for customers 2 and 3
in response to higher price offers, but do not adjust their indifference points
for customer 4. Column 1 shows that increasing the price offered by the first
customer by 1,000 ES reduces reservation prices by 3%. Similarly, column
2 shows that increasing the price offered either by the first or the second
customer by 1,000 ES reduces reservation prices by 0.8%. Both of those effects
are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. In contrast,
reservation prices for the fourth customer are not affected by changes to the
price offers received. Indeed, column 3 shows that there is no statistically
significant association between price offers and indifference points. Taken
together, the results presented in table 2.5 provide evidence that agents lower
their reservation prices in response to positive shocks to price offers.
85
2.5.5 Effects of Average Costs and Revenue
The evidence presented so far is insufficient to understand whether agents
anchor on average costs or profits, as variation in price offers affects both
of those statistics: On the one hand, higher offers increase the likelihood
of providing services to a specific customer, which increases average costs.
On the other hand, higher offers increase revenue conditional on providing
services, which directly affects profits.
To identify the pricing strategies, I turn to estimating my preferred
specification which jointly estimates the effect of average costs and revenue
on profits. If agents confuse average and marginal costs, changes to revenue
should not affect indifference points conditional on average costs. However,
the exhibition in section 2.3 shows that if agents target a certain level of profits
they will raise reservation prices in response to positive shocks to average
costs, conditional on revenue. In addition, respondents will lower reservation
prices in response to positive shocks to revenue, conditional on average costs.
Endogeneity concerns make using OLS regression unsuitable to estimate
the relationship between indifference points and variation in average costs
and revenue.32 To address this endogeneity concern, I estimate a 2-stage-
least-squares model. In the first stage, I project the explanatory variables of
interest, average costs and revenue, on an indicator for the fixed fee treatment
and a continuous variable for the cumulative price offers received. Formally,
the first stage estimates the following two equations:
AverageCostsicr = µ0 + µ1FixedFeeir + µ2PreviousO f f ersicr +γr + αi + θc + eicr
(2.13)
and
Revenueicr = µ0 + µ1FixedFeeir + µ2PreviousO f f ersicr + γr + αi + θc + eicr
(2.14)
AverageCostsicr and Revenueicr denote the average costs and revenue accu-
mulated when respondent i decides whether to serve customer c in round
r. In addition, specifications 2.13 and 2.14 control for round, respondent and
customer level fixed effects.
32A primary concern is reverse causality, as the respondents’ choice of indifference points
directly influences both average costs and revenue. The sign of the resulting bias will depend
on the relationship between indifference point choices and average costs as well as revenue,
respectively. As an exogenous increase in indifference points reduces the likelihood of offer
acceptance, it causes a reduction in average costs and revenue. The OLS estimate is thus
likely to be downward biased.
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In the second stage, I employ the predicted values obtained from the first
stage to estimate the following model:
yicr = β0 + β1 ˆAverageCostsicr + β2 ˆRevenueicr + γr + αi + θc + eir (2.15)
where yicr denotes respondent i’s reservation price for customer c in round r.
The parameters of interest are β1 and β2. The null hypothesis for marginal
cost pricing versus average cost pricing is β1 = 0 and β2 = 0, whereas the
null hypothesis for average cost pricing against profit targeting is β2 = 0.
The fixed fee treatment and the random price offer draws thus act as
instrumental variables for average costs and revenue. Given the random
assignment of the instrumental variables, the underlying assumption for
this specification to produce consistent estimates is that the instrumental
variables do not affect respondents’ reservation prices through any channel
different from average costs and revenue. The structure of the experiment
makes this unlikely. First, assignment to the fixed fee treatment directly
increases average costs, while leaving all other conditions of the experiment
unchanged compared to the control group. Second, random price offer draws
affect revenue as well as the likelihood of service provision conditional on
indifference points. Through its effect on service provision, random price
offer draws thus affect revenue and average costs, but no other factors
that might affect respondents’ choices of indifference points. The empirical
strategy thus produces estimates of the partial causal effect of average cost
increases and revenue on prices. The proposed specification pools customers
two to four and includes customer fixed-effects. Note that, due to the absence
of previous profits, customer 1 is excluded from this analysis.
Table 2.6 presents the results of the 2-stage-least-squares estimation.
Columns 1 and 2 show that, in addition to being valid instrumental variables,
the indicator for the treatment and the price offer draws are also relevant
instrumental variables. Column 1 shows that the fixed fee treatment increases
agents’ average costs by approximately 48%. Similarly, increasing the price
offered by the previous customers by 1,000 ES increases average costs by 4%.
At the same time, column 2 shows that the fixed fee treatment, through its
effect on average costs, reduces revenue by 17%. Similarly, increasing the
price offered by the previous customers by 1,000 ES increases revenue by 16%.
Those results are statistically significant at the 1% level, and a test of joint
significance of the instruments in the first stages produces a p-value smaller
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than 0.01. Taken together, those results suggest that the fixed fee treatment
and the cumulative offers are relevant instrumental variables.
Turning next to the relationship of interest, column 3 first presents an
OLS regression that captures the correlation between respondents’ chosen
indifference point and average costs as well as revenue. The results show that
there is a statistically significant relation between both explanatory variables
and reservation prices: a 1,000 ES increase in average costs is associated
with a 292 ES, or 5% over the control group mean, increase in respondents’
reservation price. Similarly, a 1,000 ES increase in revenue is associated with
a 77 ES, or 1.4% decrease in reservation prices. Both of those statistics are
significantly different from zero at a 1% level of confidence.
Column 4 then presents the results from the 2-stage-least squares estima-
tion. The estimates show that a 1,000 ES increase in average costs causes
agents to adjust their indifference point upwards by 351 ES. This equals an
increase of 6% over the control group average. Similarly, a 1,000 ES increase
in revenue causes agents to adjust their indifference point downwards by 70
ES, or by 1.3% when compared to the control group average.
Columns 5 and 6 present a robustness check to show that the results
are not driven by the imputation of indifference points for customers who
agents had decided not to serve. In particular, columns 5 and 6 present the
same estimates as in columns 3 and 4, respectively, but exclude observations
from customers who respondents had decided not to serve. The results
are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the results that include the
imputation.
Two aspects are worth noting about the interpretation of the results. First,
the 2SLS estimates are larger than the OLS estimates, which confirms the
notion that the OLS estimates are biased downwards. Second, the results
present direct evidence that agents indeed use rules-of-thumb when setting
prices. Contrary to a model based on profit-maximizing marginal cost
pricing, experimental participants adjust their reservation prices in response
to changes in average costs, holding marginal costs constant. In addition,
the results also present evidence to contradict the notion that agents confuse
average and marginal costs. This is because indifference points do not only
respond to average costs, but are also adjusted downwards in response to
increases in revenue, holding average costs constant. The results presented
are instead consistent with a model of profit targeting as presented in section
2.3: agents target an aggregate level of profits and adjust their reservation
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prices to reach that level. As such, agents will lower their indifference points
in response to a positive shock to revenues. At the same time, increases in
average costs will lead agents to increase their indifference points.
2.5.6 Effects on Profits
The preceding results have shown that respondents do not maximize profits
but instead rely on simplified heuristics. It is possible that in such circum-
stances increases in costs can increase profits, as they nudge agents to adjust
prices towards the profit-maximizing optimum. Table 2.7 presents results that
investigate this possibility.
Columns 1 and 2 investigate how increasing average costs by introducing
the fixed fee affects agents’ propensity to serve the fourth customer. Recall
that this customer is associated with a marginal delivery cost of 11,000 ES,
which exceeds the highest possible price offer of 10,000 ES. As such, agreeing
to serve the fourth customer is not a profitable decision. Yet, as column 1
shows, 76% of respondents in the control group agree to serve customer 4
for one of the prices offered and, as shown in column 2, 34% of respondents
receive a price draw that eventually requires them to serve this customer. The
results from the experiment provide evidence that, indeed, increasing fixed
fees can assist agents in overcoming behavioral biases. In particular, column
1 shows that the fixed fee treatment reduces the likelihood of agreeing to
serve the unprofitable fourth customer by 18.9 percentage points. Similarly,
the proportion of all agents who end up serving the unprofitable customer is
reduced by 11.6 percentage points as a result of the fixed fee treatment. Both
results are statistically significant at the 1% level.
While it appears as if increasing fixed fees can nudge participants towards
avoiding unprofitable behavior, table 2.7 also shows that the specific treatment
employed in the experiment is unable to increase agents’ profits. In particular,
column 3 shows that increasing fixed fees reduces profits by 20%. Similarly,
column 4 illustrates that the absolute value of deviations from the profit
maximizing indifference point increases by 48% in response to the fixed fee
treatment. Taken together, those results suggest that even though individual
biases can be overcome by increasing fixed fees, variation in fixed fees affects
average costs which can create further deviations in agents’ pricing strategies.
2.6 Evidence from Lab-in-the-Field Experiment 2
To provide further evidence that respondents anchor their supply decisions
on the stock of profits instead of choosing prices based on marginal costs,
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I design and implement an additional lab-in-the-field experiment with the
sample described in section 2.5.1. This experiment investigates whether the
behavior observed in the previous experiment is unique to prices, or whether
agents’ behavioral biases also carry through to other areas of economic
decision making. To investigate this, I evaluate to what extent production
quantity decisions are affected by changes in fixed fees and revenue. To
this end, I implement an experiment in which respondents face increasing
marginal costs and stochastic returns to production and must decide what
aggregate quantity to produce.
2.6.1 Design
The experiment simulates the production decisions of a tailor who produces
t-shirts. Production happens upon customer demand, and customers offer
either 5,000, 10,000 or 15,000 Experimental Shillings (ES) for a t-shirt. Before
accepting to produce an additional t-shirt, respondents are unaware of the
actual price offer but only know that each of them can occur with equal
probability. As part of this experiment, this is simulated by receiving random
price offer draws.
The cost of producing a t-shirt is not constant but increases in the total
amount produced. After every customer interaction, respondents decide
whether to continue or stop. If they continue, respondents receive an
additional price offer draw but are also obliged to remit the cost associated
with producing an additional t-shirt. If they decide to stop, the simulation
ends and earnings are calculated. The main outcome variable of interest is
thus the total quantity of t-shirts produced by every respondent.
Respondents participate in two versions of this simulation and face a
different cost schedule in each version. Table 2.8 shows the cost scheduled
faced by agents in the first and second version of the simulation. Respondents
play two iterations for every version of the game, once without the obligation
to pay an initial fixed fee and once with the requirement to remit 10,000 ES
before the game commences. Respondents thus play a total of four rounds
of the game. Within each version, the order of the iterations is randomized.
In addition, I also randomly assigned whether respondents commence the
simulation with the first or second version of the cost schedule.
2.6.2 Sources of Variation
Similar to the first experiment, this design allows me to exploit two sources
of exogenous variation to understand agents’ considerations when making
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economic decisions. First, the random assignment of the two iterations within
each version of the simulation induces exogenous variation in fixed fees. In
particular, during the first round of the simulation the group that is assigned
the fixed fee acts as a treatment group, whereas the group without a fixed
fee acts as a control group. During the second round of the game, the
treatment assignment changes, so that the initial control group then turns
into the treatment group. Due to the random assignment of the order of
iterations, the difference between the groups in every round of the simulation
causally identifies the effect of increasing fixed fees on respondents’ quantity
decisions.
Second, the random price offer draws generate exogenous variation in
revenue. For example, agents who draw a higher proportion of offers that
equal 15,000 ES have, for a given quantity of production, higher revenue (and
profits) than respondents who primarily received price offers of 5,000 ES. As
price offers are drawn randomly by the respondent, revenue is orthogonal
to respondent characteristics. Variation in revenue caused by price offer
draws thus causally identifies the effect of increased revenue on quantity
choices. Notice that, in contrast to simulation 1, the variation generated by
the price offer draws only affects revenue and does not simultaneously raise
respondents’ average cost. The effect thus complements the findings from
simulation 1 to causally identify the effect of shocks to revenue on quantity
choices.
2.6.3 Adjustment to the Conceptual Framework
The notion of the agent targeting a certain level of profits, and thus sticking
to rules-of-thumb, can easily be extended to the stopping game played in
simulation 2. The task here is to dynamically choose a level of quantities
when prices are uncertain. In particular, respondents are given a schedule
of (increasing) production costs and are told that customers will offer
one of three possible prices for the product, each with equal probability.
Respondents’ task is then to decide when to stop accepting new price offers
and finish production. I will again investigate the three different scenarios
presented previously: Rational profit maximization, confusion of average and
marginal costs, and reliance on simplified heuristics.
The set-up of the slightly amended model is as follows. Suppose agents
faces a cost schedule C (Q) + K with C′ (Q) > 0 and C′′ (Q) > 0, where Q
denotes the aggregate quantity of output produced and K denotes a fixed cost
that is sunk at the time of pricing. Agents face a continuum of customers,
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each of whom demands exactly one unit, and decide dynamically whether
to produce another unit or not. The marginal cost of producing one unit
of output for customer i is denoted by ci. Suppose further that the agent is
uncertain about the prices offered by potential customers, but has a (rational)
expectation about receiving a price of E (p) from customer i. Denote by Ri−1
the revenue collected before reaching customer i and by Qi the aggregate
quantity produced after having served customer i. Finally, suppose for
simplicity that agents are risk neutral. If the agent decides to serve customer
i, they receive a payoff of:
piSi = E (p) + Ri−1 − C (Qi)− K
If, instead, they decide not to serve to serve the customer, they receive:
piNSi = Ri−1 − C (Qi−1)− K
Consider first the choices made by an agent who is rationally maximizing
profits. It is straightforward to see that such agents serve a given customer as
long as the expected payoff exceeds the marginal cost of serving an additional
customer:
E (p) > C (Qi)− C (Qi−1)
The total quantity produced will then be such that:
C (Qi)− C (Qi−1) = ci = E (p) (2.16)
It is straightforward to see that the comparative statics for the perfectly










Suppose now that agents confuse average and marginal costs. In particular,
suppose they perceive marginal costs for customer i to be:
c˜i = ωci + (1−ω) C (Qi) + KQi
where ω denotes an arbitrary weight between 0 and 1 which measures the
extent of agents’ confusion between average and marginal costs. The total
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quantity produced will then be such that:
c˜i = ωci + (1−ω) C (Qi) + KQi = E (p) (2.18)










Finally, consider an agent who, instead of maximizing profits, chooses
quantities based on a simplified heuristic. Suppose the agent’s heuristic is,
as before, a simple stopping rule which is anchored on profits. In particular,
suppose the agent’s rule implies to continue producing until profits drop
below a customer-specific emergency level of piTi . Formally, when deciding
whether to serve customer i, agents consider whether their current stock of
profits exceeds the emergency amount. They thus serve customer i if:
Ri−1 − C (Qi−1)− K > piTi
Denote by ε j price-draw deviations from the expected value for customer j
and denote their cumulative distribution function by F (ε). The price received
from customer j is pj = E (p) + ε j. The ex-ante likelihood of serving customer
i is then:
Prob (Qi) = Prob
(


















+ K + cj − E (p)
)
where R0 and C (Q0) equal 0 by definition.
To derive the comparative statics of interest, consider what happens if
fixed cost and revenues increase exogenously. First, an exogenous increase in
K reduced the probability that any of the i − 1 draws of ε exceed the target
profits which, in turn, reduces the probability of reaching the ith customer.
Similarly, an exogenous increase to revenues increases the probability of











Taken together, this section proposes another test to differentiate between
the three possible decision strategies employed by agents. First, if agents
rationally maximize profits, their quantity choices are not affected by changes
to revenue or fixed costs. In contrast, if agents confuse average and marginal
costs, then an exogenous shock to fixed costs decreases quantities, but changes
to revenue leave quantities unaffected. Finally, if, instead of solving a
maximization problem, agents use rules-of-thumb to determine their quantity
choices, quantities respond to increases in fixed costs as well as changes to
revenues.
2.6.4 Estimation and Results
I begin the analysis by evaluating how the fixed fee treatment affects
respondents’ quantity choices. To this end, I estimate the following model
separately for version 1 and version 2 of the simulation:
Qir = β0 + β1FixedFeeir + γr + αi + eir (2.21)
Qir denotes the aggregate quantity produced by individual i in round r,
FixedFeeir is a binary variable indicating whether agents had to remit a fixed
fee, γr denotes round fixed effects and αi again denotes individual level fixed
effects. As the treatment was randomly assigned, the parameter β1 causally
identifies its effect on respondents’ quantity choices.
Table 2.9 presents the results of the estimation of equation 2.21. Column 1
in table 2.9 shows that while agents in the control group produce on average
5.14 units of output in the first version of the game, this figured is reduced
by 23% because of the fixed fee treatment. Similarly, in version 2 of the game
agents produce on average 4 units of output in the control group, which is
reduced by 17% in response to the fixed fee treatment. This again provides
evidence of the fact that agents do not make choices on the margin. If they did,
changes to fixed fees should not affect their production decisions. Instead,
they appear to be anchoring their production decisions on a heuristic that is
affected by variation in average costs.
As suggested by the theoretical exposition in section 2.6.3, distinguishing
between profit targeting and a confusion between average and marginal
costs requires understanding whether agents respond to variation in revenue
conditional on average costs or not. A lack of a response to revenue is
consistent with confusion between average and marginal costs, whereas a
negative response to revenue is consistent with anchoring quantity decisions
94
on target profits. Estimating an OLS regression that regresses quantities on
an indicator for the fixed fee treatment and a variable capturing revenue
earned is challenging because quantity choices in themselves affect revenue
positively, thus causing reverse causality and a possible positive bias of the
OLS estimates.
To address this, I employ an instrumental variable strategy that leverages
the relationship between random price offer draws and revenue. I first
estimate the following first stage regression:
Revenueir = µ0 + µ1AverageDrawir + γr + αi + eir (2.22)
Revenueir denotes the aggregate revenue collected by individual i in round
r, AverageDrawir is a continuous variable that measures the average price
draw received by individual i in round r, and γr as well as αi are round
and individual level fixed effects, respectively. I then estimate the following
second stage equation:
Qir = β0 + β1FixedFeeir + β2 ˆRevenueir + γr + αi + eir (2.23)
where ˆRevenueir denotes the fitted value obtained from the first stage
regression.
Given this estimation approach, the value of the average price offer draw
obtained by individual i acts as an instrumental variable for revenue. This
approach will provide consistent estimates of the causal effect of revenues on
quantity choices if the validity condition on the instrumental variable holds.
On the one hand, price offers are drawn at random, and any variation in
price offers received is thus by definition exogenous to the model. On the
other hand, validity also requires that there is no channel other than revenues
through which price offer draws affect quantities. Given the design and
controlled environment of the lab-in-the-field experiment, this is likely to
be satisfied. In particular, price offer draws directly and saliently affect the
respondent’s revenue but no other relevant statistics.
The average price offer draws are also relevant instrumental variables:
The coefficient on the offer draws is statistically significant at the 1% level of
significance in the first stage regressions of both versions of the game, leading
to the first stage regressions providing significant explanatory power
Columns 3 and 4 in table 2.9 present the results of the instrumental
variable estimation. Column 3 shows the results for the first version of the
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game and column 4 shows the results for the second version. Consistent
with the results presented previously, increasing fixed fees by 10,000 ES
reduces the aggregate quantity produced by participants by 16% and 14%,
respectively. However, in addition to average costs, quantity choices are also
affected by revenue. In particular, an increase of 1,000 ES in revenue increases
the quantity produced by 0.5% and 0.4%, respectively. This provides direct
evidence that instead of confusing average and marginal costs, participants
are anchoring their production decisions on profits and thus use rules-of-
thumb when making economic choices.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether agents treat fixed fees as sunk, and thus
evaluates the practical effectiveness of fixed fee contracts. I first present
evidence from a field experiment to show that, in contrast to classical
economic theory, livestock extension agents’ pricing choices respond to the
introduction of a fixed fee component in their contracts. I then implement
a series of lab-in-the-field experiments to estimate the response of prices to
changes in marginal costs, average costs and revenue, which allows me to
identify their decisional heuristics. I find that instead of optimally choosing
prices as mark-ups over marginal costs, agents rely on rules-of-thumb that
anchor their pricing decisions on their aggregate stock of profits. Taken
together, the results of this study show that while fixed fee contracts are
popular in practice, they do not necessarily maximize incentives.
Beyond its implication for contractual design in the public sector, this
paper highlights that, for a fairly generalizable context in a developing
country, when faced with complex tasks, economic agents do not make
optimal decisions. This finding implies that traditionally non-distortionary
policy instruments can become suboptimal. In particular, fixed fees, taxes and
transfers are a central component of economic policies aimed at redistributing
economic surplus.33 Such policy instruments are attractive because they allow
for redistribution without inducing behavioral distortions if individuals and
firms behave optimally. The results of my paper suggest, however, that
non-marginal policy instruments can affect choice variables in practice, thus
33For example, most income tax systems contain tax credits that are independent of
taxpayers’ income and tax liability, such as the Child Tax Credit in the United States. The
solution to optimal taxation problems as proposed by Mirrlees (1971) typically combines
a lump-sum subsidy with a progressive marginal tax rate (Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan,
2009). In addition to redistribute policy contexts, two-part tariffs regularly contain a flat
charge in addition to usage-based prices to extract surplus (see, for example, Tirole (1988)).
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suggesting that central implications of the theoretical optimal tax literature
are not applicable to a real-world context in which agents rely on rules-of-
thumb.
More broadly, the findings of this paper suggests that small business
growth in developing countries might be constrained by sub-optimal pricing
that prevents entrepreneurs from maximizing profits and obtaining the
liquidity necessary to invest in growing their business. It therefore provides
evidence on managerial capacity constraints in developing countries and
suggests potentially high returns to business training programs that improve
entrepreneurs pricing choices.34
34See, for example, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), Bloom, Eifert, et al. (2013), McKenzie
and Woodruff (2015) and Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2017).
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Tables
Table 2.1: Summary of Theoretical Predictions (Simulation 1)
Profit Maximization Confusion Rules-of-thumb 1 Rules-of-thumb 2 Rules-of-thumb 3
∂pi
∂τ > 0 > 0 > 0 ≶ 0 ≶ 0
∂pi
∂Ci−1 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
∂pi
∂Ri−1 = 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 > 0
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Table 2.2: Treatment Groups (Field Experiment)
Fixed Fee
No Yes
277 wards (422 agents) 273 wards (410 agents)
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Table 2.3: Fixed Fee Treatment Effects on Prices, Quantities and Revenue
Outcome: Price Participation # Farmers Served Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Fee Treatment 7.155** -0.00405 -5.915* -2,167
(3.106) (0.0267) (3.551) (6,526)
Observations 679 832 832 832
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 66.16 0.82 50.54 70’701.75
Control St. Dev. 36.03 0.38 56.54 90’531.76
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10)
percent level. Column 1 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the average price per chicken on
an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control
variables. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the total number of farmers served on
an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control
variables. Columns 3 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the revenue collected on an indicator
variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables.
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Table 2.4: Reduced Form Effect of Fixed Fee on Indifference Points
(Simulation 1)
Indifference Point for: Customer 1 Customer 2 Customer 3 Customer 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Fee Treatment 2,551*** 1,013*** 243.9** 508.5***
(98.38) (115.4) (117.9) (121.9)
Observations 622 622 622 622
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 2199 4479 7302 8100
Control St. Dev. 1282 1763 2744 3044
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the individual level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at
the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 to 4 present coefficient estimates of a regression of the
individual indifference points chosen for customers 1 to 4, respectively, on a treatment indicator
and round fixed effects. All specifications control for respondent level fixed effects.
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Table 2.5: Reduced Form Effect of Random Price Draws on Indifference Points
(Simulation 1)
Indifference Point for: Customer 2 Customer 3 Customer 4
(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative Previous Offers -0.145*** -0.0557*** 0.000101
(0.0361) (0.0204) (0.0209)
Observations 622 622 622
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Ind. Variable 4986 7424 8355
St. Dev. of Ind. Variable 2263 2793 3117
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the individual level. *** (**) (*) indicates
significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 to 4 present coefficient
estimates of a regression of the individual indifference points chosen for customers
1 to 4, respectively, on a continuous variable for the cumulative price draws received
before reaching the respective customer and round fixed effects. All specifications
control for respondent level fixed effects.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Average Costs and Revenue on Indifference Points
(Simulation 1)
Outcome: Average Costs Revenue Indifference Points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fixed Fee Treatment 1,373*** -1,229***
(34.15) (156.0)
Cumulative Offers 0.109*** 1.176***
(0.00557) (0.0231)
Average Costs 0.292*** 0.351*** 0.184*** 0.198***
(0.0470) (0.0590) (0.0478) (0.0558)
Revenue -0.0769*** -0.0702*** -0.0618*** -0.0527***
(0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0114) (0.0121)
Observations 1,866 1,866 1,866 1,866 1,595 1,595
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Conditional on Agreement No No No No Yes Yes
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 2863 7395 5520 5520 5113 5113
Control St. Dev. 1378 6804 3296 3296 3045 3045
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the individual level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10)
percent level. Columns 1 and 2 present first stage regressions. In particular, column 1 presents coefficient
estimates of an OLS regression of the average costs faced by the agent on a treatment indicator for the
fixed-cost treatment and a continuous variable for the cumulative price draws received before reaching the
respective customer as well as respondent, customer and round fixed effects. Column 2 presents coefficient
estimates of an OLS regression of the revenue collected by the agent on a treatment indicator for the fixed-cost
treatment and a continuous variable for the cumulative price draws received before reaching the respective
customer as well as respondent, customer and round fixed effects. Columns 3 and 5 present OLS estimates of
the relationship of interest. In particular, columns 3 and 5 present coefficient estimates of an OLS regression
of the respondent’s stated indifference point on a continuous variable for the average cost before serving
the respective customer and a continuous variable for the cumulative revenue before reaching the respective
customer as well as respondent, customer and round fixed effects. Column 3 employs all data, whereas
column 5 restricts its attention to responses for which the respondent agreed to serve the customer. Columns
4 and 6 present 2-Stage-Least-Squares estimates of the relationship of interest. In particular, columns 4
and 6 presents coefficient estimates of an 2SLS regression of the respondent’s stated indifference point on a
continuous variable for the average cost before serving the respective customer and a continuous variable for
the cumulative revenue before reaching the respective customer as well as respondent, customer and round
fixed effects. Average costs and revenue are instrumented for using a treatment indicator for the fixed-cost
treatment and a continuous variable for the cumulative price draws received before reaching the respective
customer. Column 4 employs all data, whereas column 6 restricts its attention to responses for which the
respondent agreed to serve the customer.
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Table 2.7: Effect on Profits (Simulation 1)
Outcome: Agreement Served Profit |mc− p|
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Fee Treatment -0.189*** -0.116*** -1,226*** 1,069***
(0.0248) (0.0302) (373.9) (59.12)
Observations 622 622 622 2,488
Customer 4 4 All All
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Control Mean 0.76 0.34 6190 2248
Control St. Dev. 0.43 0.48 4843 2375
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the individual level. *** (**) (*) indicates
significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Column 1 presents coefficient estimates
of an OLS regression of a binary variable indicating whether a respondent agreed
to serve customer 4 for any of the prices offered on a treatment indicator and round
fixed effects. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of an OLS regression of a
binary variable indicating whether customer 4 was actually served in the simulation
on a treatment indicator and round fixed effects. Column 3 presents coefficient
estimates of an OLS regression of respondents’ total profit per round on a treatment
indicator and round fixed effects. Column 4 presents coefficient estimates of an OLS
regression of the absolute distance between respondents’ chosen indifference point
and the customer’s marginal costs on a treatment indicator as well as customer and
round fixed effects. All specifications control for respondent level fixed effects.
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Table 2.8: Cost Schedule (Simulation 2)
Quantity Total Cost

















Table 2.9: Effect of Costs and Revenues on Quantities Produced (Simulation
2)
Outcome: Quantity Produced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed Fee Treatment -1.163*** -0.665*** -0.814*** -0.558***
(0.157) (0.109) (0.136) (0.0916)
Revenue x 1000 0.0269*** 0.0169**
(0.00843) (0.00839)
Observations 622 622 622 622
Simulation Variety 1 2 1 2
Estimation Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 5.14 4.00 5.14 4.00
Control St. Dev. 2.49 1.75 2.49 1.75
First-Stage F-Stat. N.A. N.A. 47.24 27.67
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the individual level. *** (**) (*) indicates
significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient
estimates of an OLS regression of the quantity chosen to produce by the agent
on a treatment indicator for the fixed-cost treatment as well as respondent and
round fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 present coefficient estimates of an 2SLS
regression of the respondent’s chosen quantity on a treatment indicator for the
fixed-cost treatment and a continuous variable for the aggregate revenue collected
as well as respondent and round fixed effects. Revenue is instrumented for using
a continuous variable for the average price offer draw received. The coefficient on



































Priming the Pump - Irrigation,
Nutrition and Agricultural
Productivity
Attempts to improve agricultural production technology are a common response to
undernutrition. In India, groundwater irrigation using tube wells has long been
promoted as a means to reduce rainfall-dependence and enhance food security. The
merits of adopting tube wells have been debated widely, however, with opponents
fearing a deprivation of smaller farmers and impoverishment of rural laborers.
To evaluate the causal effects of tube well adoption on nutrition, I employ an
instrumental variable framework that exploits variation in land suitability for deep
groundwater irrigation caused by differences in hydrogeological structures. I find that
groundwater irrigation significantly improves nutrition across the income spectrum:
a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of cropped area irrigated with tube
wells increases calorie intake by 770 to 915 calories per day. In addition, groundwater
irrigation generates positive spillovers on the calorie intake of urban populations and
households not employed in agriculture. I present additional evidence which suggests
that these effects are driven by increases in agricultural productivity that reduce staple
prices and raise wage rates. The findings thus highlight the value of groundwater
irrigation in fighting undernutrition and promoting agricultural development.
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3.1 Introduction
Undernutrition remains a global challenge. India in particular has been faced
with concerns about hunger for decades. Having experienced droughts and
a series of severe food crises after independence, undernutrition remains a
problem today. For example, 42.5% of children under the age of five were
underweight in 2005, compared to only 21% in Africa, with figures even
higher in rural areas.1 Understanding which factors underlie nutritional
status, and which policy tools can be used to reduce undernutrition, is thus
of utmost importance.
A key response to undernutrition has traditionally been the imple-
mentation of policies aimed at increasing food production and raising
agricultural productivity (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations, 2003). To overcome the food crises after Indian independence,
governments and donors invested in a package of modern agricultural
production inputs coupled with investments in research and infrastructure,
which fundamentally transformed agriculture (Spielman and Pandya-Lorch,
2009). A central component of this "Green Revolution" was the promotion
of modern irrigation technology, which led to a 500% increase in the area
irrigated from groundwater between 1960 and 2010 (Garduño and Foster,
2010). The hope was that this technology would reduce the rain-dependence
of agricultural production, increase food security and ultimately improve
nutrition.
The merits of adopting groundwater irrigation have been debated widely,
with opponents fearing a deprivation of smallholders and impoverishment
of agricultural laborers when benefits from adoption accrue exclusively to
large landowners. With high fixed costs of up to $3000 per well, coupled
with the absence of significant public subsidies, small-scale farmers are
unlikely to invest in groundwater irrigation (Sekhri (2011), Postel (1999)).2
It has been feared that this would result in a competitive advantage for
richer farmers while depressing output prices and depressing wages for
small-scale producers and agricultural laborers (Patniak, 2004). Fears are
fuelled by the observation that India appears to suffer from an "agricultural
disconnect", where improvements to agricultural productivity are generally
1See Deaton and Drèze (2009) for a detailed discussion of how nutrition and calorie intake
in India has evolved over the last thirty years. A report by the World Bank (2006) as well as
one by the Economist (2015) provides an overview of undernutrition in Indian.
2The development of water markets does not imply that small-scale farmers are excluded
from groundwater. See, for example, Banerji, Meenakshi, and Khanna (2012)
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not accompanied by improved nutritional status of populations (Gillespie,
Harris, and Kadiyala, 2012).
Given these countervailing arguments, understanding whether ground-
water irrigation indeed improves nutrition across the income spectrum is
ultimately an empirical question. Yet, despite a long-lasting debate only
limited systematic evidence exists. By focusing on understanding how the
adoption of tube wells, the primary type of well used to extract groundwater
in India, affects calorie intake, this paper aims to fill this gap.
Studying tube well adoption to investigate potential trade-offs associated
with groundwater irrigation is beneficial for two reasons. First, tube wells
are the primary type of well used to extract deep groundwater for irrigation
purposes in India, with 92% of groundwater extracted through wells used
for irrigation (Sekhri, 2014). Second, tube wells penetrate deep underground
aquifers, so that their construction is associated with significant drilling and
other adoption costs. Third, drilling tube wells is a primarily private activity
in India (Sekhri, 2011). Studying tube wells is thus likely to capture the key
benefits from groundwater irrigation as well as the potential threats from
increased inequality.
One methodological challenge that arises when identifying the causal ef-
fect of tube wells on calorie intake is that adoption is not random. Comparing
outcomes between adopting and non-adopting regions is therefore unlikely
to yield consistent estimates, as adoption decisions are likely to be correlated
with other determinants of nutrition, such as agricultural productivity.3
To overcome this challenge, I propose an empirical strategy that employs
variation in hydrogeological structures as a source of exogenous variation
in tube well adoption. In particular, I exploit the fact, well documented
in the hydrogeological literature on well construction, that the adoption of
tube wells in areas that are serviced by aquifers with a hard rock shell is
substantially more costly than the adoption in alluvial or sedimentary areas.
This heterogeneity in costs generates differential introduction patterns of tube
wells between hard and soft rock areas, which I leverage in my empirical
strategy. In particular, I focus my analysis on the administrative unit below
an Indian state, a district, and exploit the variation generated by the time-
varying effect of hard rock aquifers on tube well adoption. This allows me to
3Similarly, the efficiency wage literature suggests that nutrition influences productivity
and hence wages, which can create a reverse causality between calorie intake and tube well
adoption. See Dasgupta and Ray (1987).
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use district and time fixed effects that control for level differences in outcomes
between districts and years.
My analysis proceeds in three steps. I first show that while there has
been a substantial increase in the share of land irrigated using tube wells,
the adoption of this technology has primarily occurred in areas where the
aquifer was not surrounded by hard rock material: while the proportion
of land irrigated using tube wells in soft rock areas had increased by 12.4
percentage points between 1987 and 2004, adoption in hard rock areas only
increased by 5 percentage points over the same time period. Moreover, the
negative effect of hard rock structures on tube well adoption has increased
over time, with hard rock areas having a 7 percentage points smaller share
in land irrigated from tube wells in the 1980s, compared to a 16 percentage
points difference in the 2000s. This suggests that the time-varying effect of
hydrogeological formations does indeed provide a source of variation in tube
well adoption.
My main set of results then investigates the effect of tube well adoption
on a district’s median calorie intake. I find strong evidence that groundwater
irrigation improves nutrition: a one standard deviation increase in the fraction
of area sown irrigated using tube wells causes an increase in median calorie
intake of between 770 and 915 calories per day. This effect is stable across the
within-district calorie intake distribution. In particular, I find comparable
results when considering the effect of tube well adoption on the 10th to
40th percentile of the within-district calorie intake distribution. While the
effect of tube well adoption on calorie intake is largest for households whose
main income earner is self-employed in agriculture, I also find that tube well
adoption generates spillovers to sectors not directly affected by agricultural
productivity improvements: median calorie intake for urban populations and
rural households not employed in agriculture rises by 486 and 596 calories,
respectively, in response to a one standard deviation increase in the share
of area sown irrigated using tube wells. The observed increase in calorie
intake in response to tube well adoption is accompanied by a change to
expenditure patterns. I find suggestive evidence that groundwater irrigation
relaxes calorie constraints and thus allow households to switch to a diet that
is richer in more expensive but less nutritious food items. As such, tube well
adoption causes households to spend a larger share of their food budget on
animal products, while reducing their expenditure on vegetables.
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The results presented previously show that improvements to agricultural
technology generate inclusive enhancements to the nutritional status of both
richer and poorer, as well as urban and rural populations. To understand
the mechanisms underlying these results, I investigate how groundwater
irrigation affects agricultural productivity as well as food and labor markets.
I first show that tube well adoption induces significant direct and indirect
improvements to agricultural productivity: rice and wheat yields increase
by 0.43 and 1.2 tons per hectare in response to a one standard deviation
increase in the share of area sown irrigated using tube wells. The direct
productivity enhancement through improved irrigation is complemented by
an increased adoption of high-yielding-variety seeds and investments in
agricultural machinery.
The improvements to agricultural productivity generate general equilib-
rium effects on labor and food markets that can account for the observed
effects of groundwater irrigation on calorie intake. On the one hand, tube
well adoption raises the wage rate of male agricultural workers. The apparent
complementarity between groundwater irrigation technology and human
labor provides a potential explanation for the observed strong nutrition
improvements for households in the agricultural sector. At the same time,
spillovers to sectors not directly affected by tube well adoption can occur as
groundwater irrigation lowers prices of staple foods: a one standard deviation
increase in the share of area sown irrigated using tube wells decreases wheat
prices by 21% compared to the sample average. The analysis therefore
suggests that a possible driver of the observed increase in calorie intake, and
the observed spillovers, is that tube wells increase agricultural productivity.
This in turn augments labor input and decreases market prices for staple
foods, which makes calories more affordable and leads to improvements in
nutritional outcomes.
This paper provides evidence on the relationship between groundwater
irrigation and nutrition.4 By doing this, it complements a small but growing
literature that evaluates improvements to irrigation systems.5 Duflo and
4Additional work has also considered the role of water for uses other than nutrition. For
example, Rud (2012) exploits that groundwater availability encouraged rural electrification in
India. Devoto et al. (2012) show that connecting private dwellings to water mains in Morocco
can induce significant quality of life improvements.
5In a more general sense, this paper also relates to a literature that investigates the
effects of agricultural productivity improvements. For example, Andersen, P. S. Jensen,
and Skovsgaard (2016) investigate the effect of adopting the heavy plow on agricultural
development in Medieval Europe. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) investigate the effect of
providing subsidized seeds and fertilizer on farm productivity in West Bengal.
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Pande (2007) study the effect of dam construction in India and find that
while dams enhance agricultural productivity in downstream districts, they
increase poverty in the districts where they are located. Hornbeck and
Keskin (2014) investigate the dynamic effect of groundwater irrigation in the
southwestern United States and find that while initially irrigation reduced
drought sensitivity, it also induced a shift towards more rainfall-sensitive
crops.6 Bardhan, Mookherjee, and Kumar (2012) find that investments in
minor irrigation in West Bengal led to growth in farm productivity. The
article closest related to this paper is by Sekhri (2014), who shows that
groundwater irrigation can reduce rural poverty headcounts.7 I complement
this literature by providing systematic nationally-representative evidence for
tube well adoption in India that focuses on nutrition as the key outcome
considered when designing agricultural development programs.
More broadly, this paper complements a literature that investigates the
determinants of nutrition choices. R. T. Jensen and Miller (2008) provide
evidence for Giffen behavior which is driven by subsistence constraints.8
Atkin (2013) considers how food consumption habits affect the relation
between food prices and nutrition. Dubois, Griffith, and Nevo (2014)
structurally estimate a demand system for food and find that prices can
explain a substantial share of the difference in calorie intake between Europe
and the United States. Eli and Li (2017) investigate how calorie requirements
affect food consumption choices and calorie intake. The existing literature
thus focuses primarily on the determinants of calorie demand. I complement
this literature by highlighting how factors relating to food supply can shape
calorie intake and households’ food consumption baskets.9
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides
additional details on groundwater irrigation and tube wells in India. Section
6Related, Fishman (2012) finds that irrigation can reduce the impact of rainfall volatility
on yields in India.
7A more distantly related literature investigates the optimal management of groundwater
resources. Sekhri (2011) evaluates whether public or private provision of wells is more
effective in conserving groundwater, and finds that public wells can crowd out private wells,
which leads to reduced water wastage. See also Banerji, Meenakshi, and Khanna (2012).
8Calories are not only needed to meet subsistence constraints but can also enhance labor
productivity. Schofield (2014) estimates that an additional calorie intake of 700 calories per
day can increase earnings by around 10%. Relatedly, a classical literature has estimated
Calorie-Engel curves to understand how calorie intake varies with income. See Subramanian
and Deaton (1996).
9A related literature investigates policy interventions aimed at enhancing nutrition.
Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) evaluate the consumption impact of the Food Stamp
Program in the United States, and Afridi (2010) evaluates a mandated school meal program
in India.
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3.3 explains the identification strategy employed in this paper and section 3.4
describes the construction of the data set used in this analysis. Section 3.5
discusses and interprets the results, and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Groundwater Irrigation and Tube Wells
Since the 1960s, agriculture in India has undergone an unprecedented
transformation. Driven by recurring droughts that caused food crises and
famine, a coalition between the Ford Foundation and the Indian government
initiated a process that combined the development of improved seed varieties
with an expansion of fertilizer use and investments in irrigation infrastructure
(International Food Policy Research Institure, 2002). The swift adoption
process of new high-yielding-varieties (HYV) seeds and the subsequent rise in
agricultural productivity is often referred to as the "Green Revolution". The
revolution’s effect on agricultural productivity was significant: simulations
conducted by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
suggest that in the absence of this development food production would have
been 20% lower than today’s levels (Pingali, 2012).
A central objective of India’s agricultural development agenda was to
reduce the reliance of agricultural production on monsoon-related rainfall
by replacing rainfed agriculture with agricultural production irrigated from
groundwater sources (Sekhri, 2011). This was successful: the total area
irrigated using groundwater sources increased by approximately 500% be-
tween 1960 and 2010 (Garduño and Foster, 2010). Today, around 60% of
Indian agriculture is irrigated from groundwater sources (Sekhri, 2014). While
gravity irrigation was the main technology used to replace rainfed agriculture
until the 1970s, groundwater irrigation is more prevalent today (Sekhri,
2011).10
Most groundwater irrigation systems rely on so called tube wells, the
number of which has increased from approximately 1 million in 1960 to
19 million in 2000 (International Water Management Institute, 2002). Tube
wells consist of a steel tube that is bored into a deep underground aquifer
and an electric or diesel-fuelled engine that powers a pump responsible for
lifting the water from the aquifers.11 Compared to other forms of irrigation,
especially tank, canal or dug well irrigation, tube wells provide a richer and
10Gravity irrigation employs water from tanks or canals.
11Aquifers are rock strata which hold and transmit groundwater.
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more reliable source of water as the water table levels in the extracted aquifers
are higher and less sensitive to weather conditions.
Tube wells were, however, not adopted uniformly across India. As I show
in section 3.5, a central factor that determines the installation of groundwater
irrigation devices is the rock structure surrounding the aquifer. Adoption
costs are lowest in alluvial areas, such as the Indo-Gangetic plain, which
account for the largest proportion of area irrigated using tube wells. In
contrast, adoption costs are significantly higher in hard rock and mountainous
areas. Section 3.3 outlines how I leverage this variation to obtain a causal
identification of the effect of tube well adoption on calorie intake.
Despite the seeming success of the "Green Revolution", critics have pointed
to its adverse side effects. In particular, it has been argued that the benefits
of the increase in irrigation, mechanization and productivity would accrue
primarily to richer farmers. The "Green Revolution" has often been linked
with putting small producers and agricultural laborers at risk, as lower
output and higher input prices reduce earnings from agricultural production,
and mechanization reduces wages and employment for agricultural laborers
(International Food Policy Research Institure, 2002). Some have even linked
the "Green Revolution" to erupting social conflict (Unger, 2014). In this
paper I provide systematic evidence to assess the inclusiveness of nutrition
improvements induced by the "Green Revolution".
3.3 Identification
Causal identification of the effect of tube well adoption on calorie intake relies
on a source of exogenous variation in tube well adoption. This is because
OLS estimates that relate tube well adoption to calorie intake might result in
spurious correlations, either because of omitted variables or reverse causality.
For example, adoption might be more prevalent in areas more dependent on
agriculture and less economically developed where calorie intake is lower,
leading to a spurious negative correlation between tube well adoption and
calorie intake. Similarly, exogenous positive shocks to food supply can
reduce incentives to enhance food security through the adoption of tube wells,
leading to (negative) reverse causality. In both cases, OLS estimates would
understate the true effect of tube well adoption on calorie intake.
In order to causally identify the effect of tube well adoption on calorie
intake, I employ differences in hydrogeological structures as a source of
exogenous variation. I begin by classifying the rock structure of the aquifers
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underlying districts in India into two categories: hard rock and soft rock areas.
In particular, I define a district as being covered by a hard rock aquifer if the
rock structure is predominantly igneous, i.e. consisting of basalt, intrusives,
charnokite, granite or banded-gneissic complex (BGC) rocks. In contrast,
districts whose aquifers are predominantly metamorphic or sedimentary
are defined as soft rock. This classification follows standard definitions in
geology.12
I then exploit the heterogeneous adoption patterns of tube wells across the
two types of aquifers. Since tube wells penetrate deep aquifers, the structure
of the rock formation around the aquifer is an important determinant of
adoption costs. As such, the adoption of tube wells in areas covered by hard
rock aquifers is substantially more costly than the adoption in soft rock areas.
This heterogeneity in costs generates differential introduction patterns of tube
wells between hard and soft rock areas.
To exploit this variation, the estimation proceeds in two steps. I first use a
difference-in-difference approach to predict the effect of hard rock aquifers on
tube well adoption patterns over time. In particular, my first stage regression
projects the share of total area sown that is irrigated from tube wells in district
d and time period t, TubewellSharedt, on an indicator variable for whether
a district is covered by hard rock aquifers, HardRockd, interacted with an
indicator for time period t:




αs (HardRockd × lst) + γt + µd + νdt (3.1)
where γt and µd denote time and district fixed effects and lst denotes a
dummy for year s. Under the assumption that tube well adoption had evolved
similarly in hard and soft rock areas if they had similar aquifer structures, the
coefficient αt provides an estimate of the causal effect of being located in a
hard rock area on tube well adoption in time period t.
This first stage regression provides predicted values of tube well adoption
based on heterogeneous adoption caused by differential aquifer structures. In
the second stage of the estimation procedure, I employ the projected values
from the first stage to estimate the causal effect of tube well adoption on
calorie intake and various other outcome measures:
ydt = β0 + β1 ˆTubewellSharedt + γt + µd + εdt (3.2)
12See, for example, Park (2010).
116
ydt measures the outcome of interest in district d at time t, ˆTubewellSharedt
denotes the predicted value of the share of area sown irrigated using tube
wells obtained through the estimation of equation 3.1.
Similar to a difference-in-difference approach, the identifying assumption
necessary to interpret β1 as measuring the causal effect of tube well adoption
is that outcome variables would have evolved similarly in hard and soft rock
areas if aquifer structures were similar. While the inclusion of district level
fixed effects allows me to control for level differences in outcomes between
districts, my identifying assumptions is thus that outcome trends between
hard and soft rock areas are comparable with the exception of the effect of
aquifers on tube well adoption.
Two caveats to this identification strategy exist. First, the possibility
for ground water irrigation may trigger other developments that affect
nutrition. For example, Rud (2012) links ground water availability to rural
electrification. As I am unable to control for such effects, my estimates
should be understood as reduced form in the sense that they combine
the direct effect of tube well adoption as well as the indirect effects it
triggers. Second, differential pre-trends between hard and soft rock areas
that are either exogenous or driven by a spurious third factor would yield
inconsistent estimates. In section 3.6 I show that while my point estimates
are qualitatively robust to controlling for state specific trends, the associated
reduction in identifying variation reduces the precision of my estimates and
makes them insignificant. Thus, I cannot conclusively rule out the possibility
that trends in outcome variables prior to my data period determine their
future development and thus affect my estimates.
The main outcome variables I consider measure median calorie intake and
household expenditure patterns per district. In addition, I also investigate
how tube well adoption affects agricultural productivity, prices, wages and
the distribution of farm sizes. The construction of those variables, as well as
the data needed to implement the described analysis, is laid out in the next
section.
3.4 Data
To carry out the analysis described in the previous section I combine a
number of different data sources. First, detailed micro-level consumption
data is required to obtain measures of calorie intake. I obtain this information
from the Indian National Sample Survey. Second, identification requires
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information on hydrogeological structures, which I obtain by digitizing and
geoprocessing aquifer maps provided by the Indian Central Ground Water
Board. Third, I obtain information on tube well adoption from the Indian
Agricultural Statistics. Finally, in order to understand the mechanisms driving
the observed effect of tube well adoption on calorie intake, I employ the
ICRISAT data set to investigate how tube well adoption affects yields, prices
and the farm size distribution.
Merging district level data sets in India can be complicated because of the
creation and carving out of new districts, as well as the separation of existing
districts. As part of this project, I employ the universe of districts in 2011, as
provided by the 2011 census, as a reference list. I then match all districts from
other data sets and earlier years to this list that have the same geographic
boundaries as the district provided in the 2011 list. Finally, if districts have
been merged I combine the information from earlier years to reflect one data
point in the 2011 list.
3.4.1 Calorie Intake Data
To measure calorie intake, I employ the Indian National Sample Survey
(NSS). The NSS survey is an annually conducted large-scale cross-sectional
household expenditure and labor survey. For the present analysis I employ
data from 3 rounds of the NSS, spanning the years 1987, 1999, 2004. The
data used correspond to three of the quinquennial "thick" rounds of the NSS,
namely the 43rd, 55th, and 61st round. As opposed to the annual NSS
surveys, the "thick" rounds cover the whole of India, have a substantially
larger sample and a more extensive questionnaire. The 43rd, 55th and 61st
round have 126,910, 120,309, and 110,521 observations, respectively.13
The NSS data contains detailed information on a large number of
household expenditure items, including a detailed breakdown of food items.
As food purchase quantities are recorded at a detailed level, this data can
be converted into a measure of calorie expenditure using the conversion
factors provided by Gopalan, Shastri, and Balasubramanian (2004). To convert
13Despite the large sample size, the sampling procedures employed by the National
Sample Survey Organization do not necessarily guarantee its representativeness at the
district level, which is my main unit of analysis. Note, however, that the objective of this
paper is not to accurately estimate district-wise trends, but rather to identify the causal
relationship between district level outcomes and tube well adoption. As such, as long as
differences between the observed district-wise statistics and its true district level counterpart
is uncorrelated to differential tube well adoptions patterns caused by aquifer structures, the
lack of representativeness at the district level does not threaten my statistical analysis and
identification strategy.
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the expenditure data into calorie intake data, the main outcome variable
considered in this paper, two adjustments are necessary. First, the expenditure
data needs to be transformed to take into account the calorie content of meals
provided to guests and meals taken outside of the household. As the NSS
surveys contain information on the number of meals given to guests and taken
outside of the house, as well as the average number of meals per day, I assume
a constant calorie content of every meal to adjust the expenditure figures for
this. Second, expenditure data is collected at the household level. In order
to arrive at a measure of calorie intake at the per-capital level, an assumption
about the intra-household allocation of calories is required. I assume that
household members receive a fixed share of the total calories purchased and
calculate a weighted average within the household to arrive at a per-capita
figure.14
After converting the expenditure figures into calorie intake data, I collapse
the data at the district level. The main outcome variable I consider measures
the median calorie intake per district. To trace the effect of tube well adoption
for different wealth groups, I also measure the impact of tube well adoption
on various district level percentiles of the calorie intake distribution. In
addition, I calculate the district level median calorie intake for various sub-
populations depending on whether respondents live in urban or rural areas,
and their sectoral employment. Collapsing the data at the district level allows
me to merge the NSS data set with three other data sets that are crucial for
this analysis.
3.4.2 Hydrogeological Data
To causally identify the effect of tube well adoption on calorie intake, I
require data on the hydrogeological structure of aquifer systems in India.
To this end, I digitize and geoprocess aquifer maps provided by the Indian
Central Ground Water Board. In 2012, the Government of India’s Ministry of
Water Resources published an atlas of the Indian aquifer system. This atlas
was produced as part of an on-going effort to improve the management of
deep groundwater resources and to prevent conflict over rapidly depleting
water sources for irrigation (Central Ground Water Board, 2012). As part of
this publication, the Central Ground Water Board published various maps
14I assume that children between the ages 0 and 3 consume 15%, children between the
ages 4 and 7 consume 33%, children between the ages 8 and 11 consume 50%, and children
between the ages 12 and 15 consume 75% of an adult equivalent in calories
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that highlight the location of major aquifers and classify the aquifer systems
underlying the different parts of India.
The central map I use for this paper shows the distribution of principal
aquifer systems across India and is shown in figure 3.1. This map provides
color-coded information on 14 principal aquifer systems.15 To obtain
information on the principal aquifer system underlying a given district, I
merge the information from the map with a geocoded administrative map
of India that contains information on cities and districts based on the 2011
census.16 I first integrate the map in figure 3.1 into a coordinate system by
employing information on city locations as control points to georeference the
map. I then digitize the color-coded information on aquifer systems using
a supervised maximum likelihood classification routine in which I drill the
training sample to the legend provided in figure 3.1. Finally, I collapse the
information on hydrogeological structures at the district level by assigning
each district to the aquifer systems which is most prevalent in it.
The described routine produces the map output shown in figure 3.2. As
can be seen from the map, there is substantial variation in hydrogeological
structures across India. Aquifers are predominantly alluvial in northern
India’s Indo-Gangetic plain. In contrast, basalt aquifers are more prevalent in
western and central India, especially in Maharashtra. Using the information
in figure 3.2, I can calculate the aforementioned indicator variable for hard
rock areas as taking the value 1 if the majority of the district is underlain
by basalt, intrusives, charnokite, granite or banded-gneissic complex (BGC)
rocks, and 0 otherwise.
3.4.3 Tube Well and Supplementary Data
To measure tube well adoption, I employ two separate data sources. First,
I obtain data from the Indian Agricultural Statistics. This data is reported
by district administrations and collected annually by the Directorate of
Economics and Statistics of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers
Welfare. It provides annual information on the total cropped area for each
district. In addition, the data provides source-wise information on the
irrigation area for each district and year as well as explicit information on
cultivated area and cropping patterns. The sources of irrigation in the data
15These include alluvial, laterite, basalt, sandstone, shale, limestone, granite, schist,
quartzite, charnockite, khondalite, gneiss, intrusives and bgc.
16The geocoded map on districts is sourced from the Global Administrative Areas data
set, developed by Hijmans (2009). The geocoded map on Indian cities is sourced from the
Natural Earth Data Set.
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are broken down into private and public canals as well as between dug wells
and tube wells. Using this data, I calculate the right-hand-side variable of
interest as the proportion of the net area sown that is irrigated by tube wells.
I use the total area sown in the initial data period as a base to eliminate the
endogeneity of the total area sown.
While the advantage of the Indian Agricultural Statistics Data is that it
covers all of India, it provides limited information on yields, prices and
other outcomes related to agricultural and rural development. To obtain
information on this, I also merge my data with the ICRISAT meso data set
(International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, 2017). This
data set provides, among others, information on productivity, irrigation, land
use, wages, prices and input use. In addition, it also contains information
from the decennial censuses. The data covers 19 Indian states and up to 305
districts as well as the time period between 1966 and today.
Three challenges arise when merging the ICRISAT data with my existing
data set. First, the ICRISAT data only covers a subset of Indian districts.
In particular, while my original full data set contains complete information
for around 329 districts per year, the ICRISAT data only contains such
information for 238 districts. To address concerns that the ICRISAT sample
of districts might be selected, I provide evidence for my main specifications
that the results obtained with the full data set are robust to only focusing on
the sample of districts available in the ICRISAT data set. Second, the ICRISAT
data covers a longer time series than is available for the NSS data. For the
main analysis that employs the ICRISAT data, I opt to use its full time series,
spanning the years 1970 to 2009. I provide a robustness check to show that the
productivity results are robust to limiting my attention to the years 1987 to
2004 which are available in my constructed sample. Third, while the ICRISAT
sample technically spans the years from 1966 until today, the data has gaps.
As such, data availability varies between different data series and between
districts. As part of this analysis, power considerations lead me to not balance
the sample and instead rely on the full sample of district-year pairs that are
available in the different series of the ICRISAT data set. This does, however,
result in variation in sample size between the different specifications.
Taken together, I use two different data sets and samples for my analysis.
First, my main results, in which I relate tube well adoption to calorie intake,
are based on the "constructed sample", which combines NSS data with the
hydrogeological data and the data from the Indian Agricultural Statistics. This
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data set covers the years 1987, 1999 and 2004 and the full sample of districts
in India. Second, for the agricultural productivity results I employ a merged
data set that combines the ICRISAT data with my hydrogeological data. This
data set covers the years 1970 to 2009 and a subset of Indian districts. I will
refer to this as the "ICRISAT sample". The robustness checks presented in
section 3.6 suggest that results from the two samples can be compared.
3.4.4 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the data sets. Panel A provides
information on the constructed sample which combines NSS, aquifer and
India Agricultural Statistics data. Panel B provides information on the sample
available in the ICRISAT Meso Data. The table shows that while on aggregate
19% of area sown was irrigated using tube wells over the sample period of
the constructed sample, this differs substantially between soft and hard rock
areas. In particular, 26% of the total area sown was irrigated using tube wells
in soft rock areas and only 5% of area sown was irrigated using tube wells in
hard rock areas. 30% of the sample is classified as a hard rock area, whereas
70% of districts are underlain by soft rock aquifers. Panel A also provides
information on the calorie consumption and food expenditure. The average
median per capital calorie intake per district in the sample is 2707 calories per
day. In addition, individuals spend 58% of their total expenditure on food.
Panel B shows that the prevalence of tube well irrigation is slightly lower
in the ICRISAT sample compared to my constructed sample, with only 13%
of area sown irrigated using tube wells in the ICRISAT sample. While this
can be partially explained by a higher proportion of hard rock districts in
the ICRISAT sample (41% compared to 30% in the constructed sample), the
ICRISAT data also goes back to 1970 when tube well adoption was very low
in both hard and soft rock areas. Panel B further shows that agricultural
productivity is substantially higher in soft than in hard rock areas: Soft rock
areas have a higher adoption of high-yielding variety seeds, a larger number
of tractors and higher rice as well as wheat yields. This provides a first
indication that the aquifer structure affects irrigation, which in turn affects
agricultural productivity and nutrition. The next section provides causally
identified econometric evidence to further emphasize this point.
3.5 Results
This section presents the estimation results using the empirical methodology
outlined in section 3.3. The presentation of the results proceeds in four
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steps. I first investigate how variation in aquifer structures affects the
adoption patterns of tube wells in subsection 3.5.1. Subsections 3.5.2 and
3.5.3 then use the variation generated by aquifer structures to instrument
for tube well adoption and investigate its effect on calorie intake and food
expenditure patterns. To investigate the mechanisms underlying this result,
subsection 3.5.4 investigates through which channels tube well adoption
affects agricultural productivity and rural development.
3.5.1 First Stage Results
I begin the evaluation by showing that variation in aquifer structures indeed
leads to heterogeneous adoption patterns of tube wells. For illustration
purposes, consider figure 3.3 first. The figure plots the coefficients α1 to
αT from equation 3.1 as well as 95% and 99% confidence intervals, using
ICRISAT data. The coefficients measure the differential adoption of tube
wells between hard and soft rock areas relative to 1970 for every year from
1971 to 2009, controlling for district fixed effects. Confidence intervals are
constructed using robust standard errors clustered at the district level. Two
results are worth noting. First, hydrogeological structures do indeed cause
heterogeneous adoption patterns between hard and soft rock areas. For
example, the share of area sown irrigated using tube wells was approximately
17 percentage points lower in hard rock than in soft rock areas in 2009.
Second, hydrogeological structures affect tube well adoption differentially
over time. This is crucial, as it provides the identifying variation employed
in this paper. As such, the figure shows that tube well adoption is not only
lower in hard rock areas than in soft rock areas in 2009, but the difference
in the area irrigated using tube wells between hard and soft rock areas has
increased by approximately 16 percentage points compared to 1970.
Table 3.2 presents the first stage regression results which employ variation
in hydrogeological structures to predict tube well adoption. Panel A shows
the estimates of heterogeneous adoption patterns obtained when using data
from the three years available in my constructed sample, namely 1987, 1999
and 2004. Panel B uses the full ICRISAT sample which contains district-year
observations from 1970 to 2009. Throughout this analysis I report robust
standard errors which are clustered at the district level.
Column 1 in table 3.2 first shows that tube well adoption in soft rock areas
has increased significantly since 1987. Compared to 1987, the share of area
sown irrigated using tube wells in soft rock areas increased by 10 percentage
point in 1999 and by 12.4 percentage points in 2004. Compared to 1987, all
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increases are statistically significant at the 1% level. In contrast, tube well
adoption in hard rock areas had only increased by 4.23 percentage points in
1999 and 5.08 percentage points in 2004, which is significantly smaller from a
statistical perspective than the increase in soft rock areas over the same time
period. The first stage regression presented in column 1 has an F-Statistic
of 37.55, highlighting that the variation in rock structures has significant
explanatory power for the adoption of tube wells.
Column 2 in table 3.2 shows that this result is robust to limiting the sample
of districts to those available in the ICRISAT data set. In particular, while
limiting the sample districts to those available in the ICRISAT data set reduces
the sample size by approximately 28%, the coefficients from the estimation
of equation 3.1 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained
when employing the constructed sample of districts.
The results presented in panel B in table 3.2 were obtained from a similar
analysis as those presented in panel A, but employ longer panel data from
the ICRISAT data set. As opposed to the results presented in panel A, which
employ information for 1987, 1999 and 2004, results presented in panel B
were obtained from annual district level data spanning the years 1970 to
2009. Column 3 in table 3.2 presents coefficient estimates obtained from the
following equation:




αe (HardRockd × le) + γt + µd + νdet (3.3)
where le denote decade dummies. As opposed to equation 3.1, equation 3.3
thus allows the effect of hard rock aquifers on tube wells to vary by decades
and not by year of observation.
Column 3 in table 3.2 again shows, using the longer time period available
through the ICRISAT data set, that aquifer structures caused heterogeneous
adoption patterns of tube wells. In particular, throughout the 1980s the total
area sown irrigated using tube wells was 7.13 percentage points lower in hard
than in soft rock areas. This difference had increased to 9.8 percentage points
and 15.8 percentage points in the 1990s and the 2000s, respectively. With
an F-Statistic of 37.90, variation in the effect of aquifer structures explains a
statistically significant share of the variance in tube well adoption patterns.
Taken together, the results presented in panel A and panel B suggest that the
rock structure of the aquifer does indeed cause differential tube well adoption
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patters which provides identifying variation to estimate the effect of tube well
adoption on calorie intake.
3.5.2 Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Calorie Intake
The previous subsection has shown that variation in hydrogeological struc-
tures affects tube well adoptions patterns. I now employ this source of
variation to investigate how the adoption of tube wells affects calorie intake.
Table 3.3 presents the results from the estimation of equation 3.2, using
median calorie intake per district as an outcome variable. All specifications
are estimated using the constructed sample and thus cover the years 1987,
1999 and 2004. All specifications contain year and district level fixed effects. I
report robust standard errors which are clustered at the district level.
Consider first columns 1 and 2 in table 3.3, which show the result from
an OLS regression of a district’s median calorie intake on the fraction of land
irrigated with tube wells. Column 1 employs the full set of districts, whereas
column 2 restricts attention to the districts available in the ICRISAT data set.
The results show that on average a one standard deviation increase in the
fraction of area sown irrigated with tube wells (0.27) is associated with a 197
to 224 calories increase in calorie intake. This is equivalent to a 7% to 8%
increase over the sample average. This result is statistically significant at the
1% level and thus documents a correlation between tube well adoption and
calorie intake.17
Omitted variables and reverse causality make a causal interpretation of
the results in columns 1 and 2 challenging. In particular, reverse causality is
likely to bias OLS estimates downwards if exogenous positive shocks to food
supply reduce the need to enhance food security through the adoption of
improved agricultural technology. Furthermore, if tube wells are more likely
to be adopted in economically less developed areas, which simultaneously
also have lower calorie intake, OLS is again likely to understate the true effect
of tube well adoption on calorie intake.
To address this concern, I now employ the variation generated by
hydrogeological structures to estimate the causal effect of tube well adoption
on calorie intake. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the corresponding
two-stage-least-squares regressions. Column 3 employs the full district
sample, whereas column 4 restricts the sample to only those districts available
17Table 3.3 also documents what is often referred to as the "India Calorie Puzzle", which
states that median calorie intake has declined significantly across India since the 1980s
(Deaton and Drèze, 2009).
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in the ICRISAT data set. The results show that tube well adoption does indeed
cause calorie intake to increase: a one standard deviation increase in the
fraction of area sown irrigated using tube wells causes an increase in calorie
intake of between 770 and 915 calories. This corresponds to a 28% to 34%
increase over the sample average. These results are different from zero at a 1%
level of statistical significance. Furthermore, the comparison between column
3 and 4 shows that restricting attention to the sample of districts available
in the ICRISAT data set leads to results that are comparable to the output
from the constructed sample of districts. The results presented in column 3
plus 4 thus present direct evidence that adopting deep groundwater irrigation
technology can improve nutrition. Furthermore, the results are consistent
with the notion that OLS estimates are downward biased.
The results presented in table 3.3 show that tube well adoption has
increased median calorie intake per district. Tube well adoption does,
however, not necessarily affect calorie intake uniformly across the within-
district distribution. To understand its distributional effects, and to obtain
evidence on the mechanisms through which tube wells increase nutrition,
it is thus instructive to investigate the effect of tube well adoption on the
calorie intake of various sub-populations. The results presented in table 3.4
therefore break down the effect of tube well adoption on median calorie intake
of urban versus rural populations, and between various rural occupational
groups.18 Two results presented in table 3.4 are worth noting. First, tube well
adoption has increased calorie intake significantly for both rural and urban
populations. On the one hand, the estimates thus show that improvements
to agricultural technology generate significant spillovers to urban areas, even
though they do not benefit directly from the technology. On the other hand,
however, the magnitudes of the point estimates confirm that the benefits of
tube well adoption accrue primarily to rural populations who benefit directly
from the technology: the comparison between columns 1 and 2 reveals that
the effect of tube well adoption is approximately 42%, or 202 calories in
response to a one standard deviation increase, larger in rural than in urban
areas.
The second result worth noting in table 3.4 is presented in columns 3 to 5.
The results show that while tube well adoption generates positive spillovers
for occupational groups who do not directly benefit from it, the primary
18In order to estimate the effect on urban and rural populations for a comparable sample,
some districts that contained only urban or rural populations were dropped from this
analysis. This leads to a slightly smaller sample size when compared to table 3.3.
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benefits of adoption accrue to independent farmers. In particular, column
3 in table 3.4 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the share of area
sown irrigated using tube wells leads to an increase of 596 calories among
rural populations not employed in agriculture. In contrast, column 5 shows
that the comparable effect on the median calorie intake of those self-employed
in agriculture is 731 calories per day. In addition, I find no evidence tube well
adoption has impoverished agricultural laborers by substituting labor from
workers to machines. In contrast, column 4 in table 3.4 shows that tube well
adoption has significantly increased the calorie intake of agricultural laborers
to an extent that is comparable to other rural populations. Taken together,
tube well adoption thus generated significant spillovers while still primarily
improving the nutritional status of rural farmers.
To further investigate the distributional implications of tube well adop-
tions, table 3.5 investigates whether its effect differs by households’ prosperity
status. To this end I estimate how tube well adoptions affects different
percentiles of the within-district calorie distribution. Column 1 in table 3.5
shows that a one standard deviation increase in the share of area sown
irrigated using tube wells increases the calorie intake of households at the
10th percentile of the within-district calorie intake distribution by 688 calories.
Columns 2 to 4 in table 3.5 further show that while the point estimates
increase slightly for higher percentiles of the calorie intake distribution,
consistent with the notion that the tube well adoption has produced larger
benefits for wealthier households, the difference between estimates is not
statistically significant. I thus find no evidence that tube well adoption has
lead to impoverishment and increased nutritional inequality within districts.
Column 5 in table 3.5 shows how tube well adoption affects average calorie
intake per district.19 Consistent with the results presented previously, column
5 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the share of land irrigated
using tube wells increases average calorie intake per district by approximately
791 calories.
3.5.3 Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Expenditure Patterns
The results presented previously have shown that tube well adoption in-
creases calorie intake. To further characterize households’ behavioral re-
sponse, I now investigate the associated changes in food expenditure patterns.
For example, it is possible that households increase their expenditure share
19To reduce noise in the measures of calorie intake, the data series that was used to
calculate average calorie intake per district was winsorized at the 95th percentile.
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on staples in response to tube well adoption. This could arise in a situation
where households are deprived of calories and thus benefit from tube well
adoption because it allows them to increase their expenditure on key food
items so that they can meet their calorie requirements. Alternatively, tube
well adoption could relax calorie constraints and thus allow households to
switch to a diet that is richer in more expensive but less nutritious food items.
For example, tube wells can reduce manual labor effort and thus negatively
affect the need for calorie intake, which allows households to increase their
expenditure share on more luxurious food products.
I find supportive evidence for the latter mechanisms. Table 3.6 shows how
tube well adoption affects the share of food in total expenditure, and the
distribution of food expenditure between various food categories. Column 1
shows that tube well adoption significantly increases food expenditure’s share
in total expenditure: a one standard deviation increase in the share of area
sown that is irrigated using tube wells leads households to increase their food
expenditure share by approximately 16 percentage points, which corresponds
to a 28% increase when compared to the sample average. The estimate
is statistically significant at the 5% level. Columns 2 to 7 show that this
increase in expenditure share is accompanied by a shift in food consumption
priorities. In particular, column 4 shows that the share of total expenditure on
animal products increases significantly. In contrast, households reduce their
expenditure share on vegetables and sugar-based food products in response
to tube well adoption (see columns 5 and 7). This suggests that tube well
adoption causes a change to expenditure patterns by allowing households
to shift consumption towards more luxurious food sources, such as animal
products.
3.5.4 Mechanism
The previous section has shown that ground water irrigation can have positive
effects on nutrition by increasing calorie intake across the income spectrum
and allowing households to shift their expenditure towards animal food
products. To understand the mechanisms underlying this development, this
section investigates how tube well adoption affects agricultural production
practices, prices, wages and land usage. To this end, I employ the ICRISAT
meso data set, therefore extending the study period to 1970 to 2009, and
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reducing the district coverage to the subset available through the ICRISAT
sample.20
Agricultural Production
Consider first table 3.7, which employs ICRISAT data to investigate how tube
well adoption affects agricultural productivity and production practices. All
specifications use the constructed sample of districts available in the ICRISAT
data set and, if available, employ annual data from 1970 to 2009. Every
regression controls for year and district fixed effects and standard errors are
again clustered at the district level.
Columns 1 and 2 show that tube well adoption significantly increases
agricultural productivity, especially for wheat: a one standard deviation in
the share of area sown irrigated using tube wells leads to an increase of yields
to the magnitude of 0.43 tons per hectare for rice, and 1.2 tons per hectare
for wheat. Both results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 3.7
further shows that this productivity increase combines the direct effect of tube
well adoption through improved irrigation with knock-on effects through
changes in agricultural production practices induced by tube well adoption.
In particular, columns 3 and 4 highlight that tube well adoption caused
the adoption of high-yielding-variety (HYV) seeds. HYV seeds have been
developed as part of the Indian Green Revolution since the 1960s and have
higher yields, but also higher irrigation and fertilizer requirements compared
to normal seeds. The results suggest that a one standard deviation increase
in the share of area sown irrigated using tube wells increases the total area
sown using HYV seeds by 83,900 hectares for rice and 128,925 hectares for
wheat. This exceeds the increases in total area sown induced by tube well
adoption as shown in columns 5 and 6 of table 3.7. Tube well adoption has
thus induced farmers to shift from traditional seeds to HYV seeds, which in
turn increased agricultural productivity.
In addition to HYV seeds, the improvements to irrigation associated
with tube well adoption can also act as a complement to improve the
productivity of other agricultural investments. In particular, tube well adop-
tion can increase farmers’ return on investments in agricultural machinery,
thus leading to increased agricultural mechanization. To investigate this
possibility, I estimate how tube well adoption affects the total number of
tractors and power tillers, two common agricultural mechanization devices,
20In the appendix I show that the results are robust to limiting the sample to the years
1987 to 2004.
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in a given district. Columns 7 and 8 in table 3.7 show that a one standard
deviation increase in the share of area sown irrigated using tube wells
leads to a district-wide increase of approximately 12,840 tractors and 1,380
power tillers.21 This suggests that tube well adoption did indeed increase
agricultural mechanization. As tractors and power tillers increase yields
independently of tube wells, this further complements their positive direct
impact on productivity.
Wages and Prices
The previous section has shown that tube well adoption increases agricultural
productivity. To understand the mechanisms underlying the effect of tube
well adoption on calorie intake, it is crucial to understand which general
equilibrium effects they induce. First, general equilibrium effects induced
by tube wells can affect calorie intake through households’ income. This
effect can be either positive or negative, depending on whether tube wells
complement or substitute human labor. Second, tube wells might affect
calorie intake through food prices. As shown in the previous section, tube
well adoption significantly alters agricultural production practices which can
affect prices of staple food products. To evaluate whether possible general
equilibrium effects of tube well adoption exists, I now investigate how tube
well adoption affects wages and prices.
Consider first the results presented in columns 1 and 2 in table 3.8,
which investigate the effect of tube well adoption on wages, separated by
gender. The wage data is obtained from the ICRISAT data set and measures
hourly field labor wages in nominal Indian rupees. Two results are worth
noting. First, tube wells appear to complement human labor input into
agricultural production: a one standard deviation increase in the share of
area sown irrigated using tube wells increases hourly male and female wages
by approximately 27 and 16.2 rupees (approx. $0.42 and $0.25), respectively.
Second, the wage effect is substantially larger for male wages than for female
wages. This is consistent with the notion that tube wells complement labor
input if men are more likely to work in agricultural activities that are in direct
contact with, or affected by, groundwater irrigation. The wage results thus
support the theory that the observed increase in calorie intake is partially
21The sample size is smaller for the results on mechanization than for the data on yields
and area sown because information on the number of tractors and the number of power tillers
in India is only available for an subset of years (and for a subset of districts for some of the
years) through the ICRISAT data set. The years for which data is available are 1972, 1982,
1987, 1992 and 2003.
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driven by general equilibrium effects, as tube well adoption raises workers’
wages and thus enhances their ability to purchase calories. Furthermore, in
contrast to arguments brought forward by critics of the "Green Revolution",
I find no evidence that improvements to agricultural productivity reduces
wages and thus impoverished agricultural laborers.
I now turn to investigating how tube well adoption affects equilibrium
prices of food staples. To this end, I employ information on farm harvest
prices from the ICRISAT data set.22 Farm harvest prices measure the price
at which farmers sell their output to traders on the village market in units of
Indian Rupees per 100 kg of output.23 As part of this evaluation, I focus on
investigating how tube well adoption affects the equilibrium prices of India’s
two primary staples: rice and wheat. Columns 3 and 4 in table 3.8 show
that staple prices decrease in response to tube well adoption. While the point
estimate for rice prices is negative, it is not statistically significant. In contrast,
wheat prices decrease significantly in response to tube well adoption. This
result is consistent with the notion that increased agricultural productivity
caused by tube well adoption, reduced output prices. In particular, the results
presented in table 3.7 show that wheat yields respond significantly more than
rice yields in to tube well adoption. This in turn implies a more negative price
response, which is consistent with the results presented here. This analysis
therefore suggests that a possible driver of the observed increase in calorie
intake is that tube wells increase agricultural productivity and thus decrease
market prices for staple foods, which in turn improves the affordability of
calories. This effect also provides a potential mechanism to explain the
observed spillovers, as calorie demand of populations not directly affected
by tube well adoption increases in response to lower prices.
Long-Term Effects
Given the observed strong effects on yields, equilibrium prices and wages, it is
possible that tube well adoption has long term effects on the structure of rural
economies. For example, changing production practices might affect the farm
size distribution if mechanization generates economies of scale that enhance
the profitability of larger farms. To investigate this possibility, I estimate the
22This data was originally collected by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and Farmer
Welfare and formated by ICRISAT.
23Formally, the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and Farmer Welfare defines farm harvest
prices as follows: "Farm Harvest prices of a commodity [...] is defined as the average wholesale
price, at which the commodity is disposed of by the producer to the trader at the village site during
the specified marketing period after the commencement of harvest." (Ministry of Agriculture and
Farmers Welfare, 2017)
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effect of tube well adoption on the number of plots in a given district as well
as the distribution of plot sizes. To this end, I employ ICRISAT data on the
number of plots of various sizes in a given district.24
The results of this exercise are presented in table 3.9. Column 1 highlights
that tube well adoption indeed leads to a consolidation of plots: a one
standard deviation increase in the share of area sown irrigated using tube
wells reduces the number of plots in a given district by approximately 135,657
plots. As columns 4 to 6 highlight, this decrease is driven primarily by
a reduction in the number of marginal, small and semi-medium plots. In
contrast, the number of large and medium plots has increased significantly in
response to tube well adoption: a one standard deviation increase in the share
of area sown irrigated using tube wells causes an increase of approximately
19,500 large and medium plots.
The results highlight that improvements to agricultural productivity can
have lasting impacts on the structure of rural economies by inducing a
consolidation of farms into larger farms at the expense of smaller plots.
Table B.1 in the appendix shows that, in addition to a changing farm size
distribution, tube well adoption also increases rural populations. While I am
unable to evaluate whether the population increase is caused by migration or
increased birth rates, the results presented in tables 3.9 and B.1 nevertheless
highlight that the adoption of tube wells has induced long-term structural
and demographic changes in rural India.
3.6 Robustness
I present four checks to evaluate the robustness of my empirical result. First,
the identifying assumption underlying my empirical strategy is that outcome
variables, in particular calorie intake, would have evolved in parallel in hard
and soft rock districts if aquifer structures were similar. This assumption
is violated if trends differ between hard and soft rock areas. While it is
impossible to control for diverging trends at the district level, the inclusion
of state-year fixed effects or state specific linear trends allow to control for
differences in trends between states.
A challenge with controlling for state specific trends is that it substantially
reduces statistical power. This is because the identifying variation from my
instrumental variable strategy exploits the time varying effect of hard rock
24In contrast to other ICRISAT data series, data on land use is only available on a
quinquennial instead of an annual basis. The reduces the sample size compared to the
previous analysis.
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aquifers on tube well adoption. Controlling for state specific trends reduces
statistical power as in that case the identifying variation only comes from
deviations from the state specific trends, rather than differential trends in
themselves.
Columns 2 and 3 in table B.2 show that while qualitatively the point
estimates are robust to the inclusion of state specific trends, they are no longer
statistically significant. In column 2 of table B.2 I control for state-year fixed
effects, whereas column 3 controls for state specific linear trends. Consistent
with the notion that the inclusion of state specific trends reduces statistical
power, the F-statistics for the first stage of the specifications estimated in
columns 2 and 3 suggest that the explanatory power of the first stage
regressions is no longer statistically different from zero at the 10% level.
However, while the results are not statistically robust to including state
specific time trends, the fact that the sign of the point estimates remains
robust is indicative that differential pre-trends do not qualitatively affect the
subsequent pattern of calorie intake.
Second, I investigate whether the effect of tube well adoption on calorie
intake is robust to the inclusion of control variables. In particular, it is
possible that systematic differences in hard and soft rock areas exist which
simultaneously affect calorie intake, thus leading to a spurious estimated
relationship between tube well adoption and calorie intake. To address
this, I again estimate specification 3.2, but control for potential heterogeneity
between hard and soft rock areas by including control variables for the total
area sown, the average price per calorie paid, per capita total expenditure
as a proxy for income and district population. The results of this exercise
are presented in column 1 of table B.2, which suggests that the estimates are
robust to including the aforementioned control variables. In particular, while
the original point estimate without controls was 2,851 (presented in column 3
in table 3.3), including controls slightly lowers the point estimate but neither
substantially affects its magnitude nor its statistical significance.
Third, I show that the effects of tube well adoption on expenditure patterns
presented in table 3.6 are robust to restricting attention to only the districts
available in the ICRISAT data set. Table B.3 replicates the analysis presented
in table 3.6, but restricts attention to the districts that are represented in the
ICRISAT data set. Consistent with the results obtained from the constructed
sample, table B.3 shows that tube well adoption causes an increase in the
expenditure share on food which is accompanied by an increased expenditure
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share on animal products and reduced expenditure on vegetables and sugar-
based products. These results are thus indicative that the estimates obtained
using the ICRISAT sample are also informative about estimates that were
obtained using my constructed sample.
Fourth, to further support the notion that results obtained using the
ICRISAT data and my constructed sample are comparable, I show that
the results of tube well adoption on agricultural productivity are robust to
restricting attention to the time period between 1987 and 2004, which is the
sample period of my constructed sample. Columns 1 and 2 in table B.4 first
show that the estimates of the effect of tube well adoption on yields are
qualitatively robust to restricting the analysis period. In particular, similar
to the unrestricted results presented in table 3.7, the point estimates for rice
and wheat yields have a similar magnitude. While the point estimate for rice
yields is no longer significant, I still find a large and statistically significant
effect of tube well adoption on wheat yields. Columns 3 and 4 further show
that tube well adoption still affects the introduction of HYV seeds, although
to a lesser extent than when using the constructed sample. Nevertheless, I still
find a positive and statistically significant effect of tube well adoption on the
total area sown with HYV seeds for wheat. Taken together, the results thus
suggest that the estimates obtained using all ICRISAT time periods are robust
to restricting attention to only the time periods available in my constructed
sample.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I argue that investment in groundwater irrigation can signif-
icantly improve nutrition in India. Exploiting the fact that the adoption of
groundwater irrigation devices was slower in areas where the rock structure
of aquifers is igneous, I study how tube well adoption affects calorie intake,
agricultural productivity, staple prices and wages. I find that groundwater
irrigation significantly improves nutrition across the income spectrum and
allows households to switch from consuming vegetables to animal based
produce. In addition, I find that groundwater irrigation generates positive
spillovers on the calorie intake of urban populations and households not
employed in agriculture. I present additional evidence which suggests that
these effects are driven by increases in agricultural productivity that reduce
staple prices and raise wage rates.
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By highlighting the potential value of promoting agricultural technology
to improve nutritional outcomes, the results presented in this paper have
implications for public policy and development programming. In particular,
I show that the adoption of groundwater irrigation technology can break In-
dia’s "agricultural disconnect", raising agricultural productivity and nutrition
outcomes at the same time. Furthermore, I find no support for the notion that
the productivity improvements associated with the Indian "Green Revolution"
left smaller farmers and agricultural laborer impoverished. In contrast, a
complementarity between the technology improvements and labor inputs
appear to have raised wage rates. This development, together with falling
staple prices, has improved nutrition across the income spectrum. Taken
together, the results thus highlight that policies which encourage and facilitate
groundwater irrigation are likely to effectively combat undernutrition.
While my paper estimates the reduced form relationship between tube
well adoption and calorie intake, I am unable to distinguish between the
extent to which tube wells directly affect calorie intake, for example by
changing rural work practices, and indirectly affect the supply of calories
through changes to production patterns. Similarly, my results on the effect of
groundwater irrigation on agricultural productivity are unable to distinguish
between the direct effect of tube well adoption and the productivity improve-
ments caused by adopting HYV seeds and mechanization devices in response
to tube well adoption. Distinguishing those effects is left for future work.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full Constructed Sample Total Hard Rock Soft Rock
Share of Land Irrigated using Tube Wells 0.19 0.05 0.26
(0.27) (0.09) (0.29)
Median District Calorie Intake 2707 2605 2750
(344) (312) (348)
Food Expenditure Share 0.58 0.57 0.58
(0.12) (0.09) (0.13)
Observations 987 293 694
Panel B: ICRISAT Meso Data Sample
Share of Land Irrigated using Tube Wells 0.13 0.01 0.20
(0.22) (0.04) (0.26)
Population (in 1,000s) 2188 1964 2373
(1463) (1068) (1703)
Share of Land using HYV Seeds 0.38 0.24 0.48
(0.35) (0.18) (0.40)
Number of Tractors (in 1,000s) 3.81 1.43 5.47
(9.25) (2.04) (11.65)
Rice Yield (tons per hectare) 1.38 1.24 1.48
(0.86) (0.76) (0.91)
Wheat Yield (tons per hectare) 1.57 1.15 1.85
(0.94) (0.60) (1.02)
Observations 6,147 2,490 3,657
Notes: The full sample includes the years 1987, 1999 and 2004. With the exception
of the population and the tractor series, the ICRISAT sample contains unbalanced
annual district data for the years 1970 to 2009. The population data origins from the
decennial census spanning the years 1971 to 2001. The tractor data covers a subset
of Indian districts for the years 1972, 1982, 1987, 1992, 2003.
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Table 3.2: Differential Adoption of Tube Wells across Hard and Soft Rock
Areas
Outcome: % of Land irrigated using Tube Wells
(1) (2) (3)





1999 × Hard Rock -0.0577*** -0.0513***
(0.0133) (0.0147)
2004 × Hard Rock -0.0732*** -0.0696***
(0.0148) (0.0163)
Panel B: Years in ICRISAT sample
1980s × Hard Rock -0.0713***
(0.00717)
1990s × Hard Rock -0.0980***
(0.0144)
2000s × Hard Rock -0.158***
(0.0245)
Observations 987 714 6,147
Data Source Constr. Constr. ICRISAT
District Sample Full ICRISAT ICRISAT
Reference Year 1987 1987 1970
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic 37.55 32.90 37.90
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at
the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient estimates of a regression of
the proportion of cropped land irrigated using tube wells on district and year fixed effects
and an interaction term of years and an indicator variable for areas covered by hard rock
aquifers. Column 1 uses all Indian districts, whereas column 2 restricts its attention to
the districts available in the ICRISAT data set. Columns 3 presents coefficient estimates
of a regression of the proportion of cropped land irrigated using tube wells on district
and year fixed effects and an interaction term of the decade that the data was collected
in and an indicator variable for areas covered by hard rock aquifers. Column 3 employs
the ICRISAT data set, whereas columns 1 and 2 use the NSS/Indian Agricultural Statistics
sample.
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Table 3.3: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Median Calorie Intake
Median Calorie Intake
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tube Well Share 728.4*** 827.9*** 2,851*** 3,390***
(115.9) (157.9) (871.3) (1,095)
1999 60.33* 66.44* -112.7 -135.7
(32.40) (37.08) (74.15) (89.05)
2004 -115.3*** -106.3*** -332.1*** -367.7***
(30.30) (36.20) (88.82) (109.4)
Observations 987 714 987 714
Data Source Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr.
District Sample Full ICRISAT Full ICRISAT
Estimation Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates
significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient
estimates of an OLS regression of daily per capita calorie intake on a
continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube
wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Column 1 uses all Indian
districts, whereas column 2 only uses data from districts that are available
in the ICRISAT data set. Columns 3 and 4 present coefficient estimates of
a two-stage-least-squares regression of daily per capita calorie intake on a
continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube
wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Column 1 uses all Indian
districts, whereas column 2 only uses data from districts that are available in
the ICRISAT data set. In columns 3 and 4 the share of cropped land irrigated
using tube wells is instrumented for using variation in hydrogeological
structures.
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Total Total Non-ag. self-employed Ag. laborer Self-employed in ag.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tube Well Share 1,800** 2,549*** 2,206** 2,482*** 2,707***
(760.2) (801.1) (954.9) (951.9) (1,041)
Observations 887 887 887 887 887
Data Source Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr.
District Sample Full Full Full Full Full
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at
the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Column 1 presents coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares
regression of the calorie intake of the median urban inhabitant of a district on a continuous
variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district
and year fixed effects. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares
regression of the calorie intake of the median rural inhabitant of a district on a continuous
variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and
year fixed effects. Column 3 presents coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares regression
of the calorie intake of the median rural self-employed outside of agriculture inhabitant of a
district on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells
as well as district and year fixed effects. Column 4 presents coefficient estimates of a two-stage-
least-squares regression of the calorie intake of the median rural agricultural laborer of a district
on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as
well as district and year fixed effects. Column 5 presents coefficient estimates of a two-stage-
least-squares regression of the calorie intake of the median rural self-employed in agriculture
inhabitant of a district on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated
using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Estimates are obtained through a two-
stage-least-squares regression in which tube well adoption is instrumented for using variation
in hydrogeological structures.
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Table 3.5: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Calorie Intake, by Percentile
Calorie intake of ...
10th percentile 20th percentile 30th percentile 40th percentile Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tube Well Share 2,547*** 2,413*** 2,572*** 2,848*** 2,928***
(949.6) (833.2) (790.7) (831.0) (949.3)
Observations 987 987 987 987 987
Data Source Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr.
District Sample Full Full Full Full Full
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the
1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 to 5 present coefficient estimates of a regression of the daily
per capita calorie intake by an inhabitant in the 10th, 20th, 30th and 40th percentile as well as
the average of the calorie intake distribution of a district on a continuous variable measuring
the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects.
Estimates are obtained through a two-stage-least-squares regression in which tube well adoption
is instrumented for using variation in hydrogeological structures.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Food Expenditure
Share of food expenditure on ...
Food exp. share Staples Cereals Animal Prd. Veg. Fruit Sugar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tube Well Share 0.592** 0.143 0.220* 0.684*** -0.170** 0.0381 -0.148***
(0.270) (0.163) (0.114) (0.184) (0.0743) (0.0341) (0.0523)
Observations 987 987 987 987 987 987 987
Data Source Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr.
District Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
Reference Year 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5)
(10) percent level. Columns 1 to 8 present coefficient estimates of a regression of the average share, as
part of monthly household expenditure, of various food items on a continuous variable measuring the
share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Column
1 uses food expenditure as an outcome variable, whereas column 2 uses expenditure on staples,
column 3 uses expenditure on non-staple cereals, column 4 uses expenditure on animal products,
column 5 uses expenditure on vegetables, column 6 uses expenditure on fruits, and column 7 uses
expenditure on sugar and sugar-related food items. Estimates are obtained through a two-stage-least-
squares regression in which tube well adoption is instrumented for using variation in hydrogeological
structures.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Agricultural Production
Yield HYV Area Mechanization
Rice Wheat Rice Wheat Rice Wheat Tractor Power Tiller
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tube Well Share 1.592*** 4.446*** 310.9*** 477.5*** 268.3*** 378.1*** 47.54*** 5.127***
(0.521) (0.783) (85.80) (91.51) (77.19) (75.57) (8.037) (1.477)
Observations 6,147 6,147 6,147 6,147 6,147 6,147 1,977 1,393
Data Source ICR. ICR. ICR. ICR. ICR. ICR. ICR. ICR.
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent
level. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares regression of rice and wheat yields,
respectively, on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as
district and year fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 present coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares regression
of the total area cropped with HYV rice and wheat seeds, respectively, on a continuous variable measuring the
share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Columns 5 and 6 present
coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares regression of the total area cropped with rice and wheat seeds,
respectively, on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as
district and year fixed effects. Columns 7 and 8 present coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares regression
of the total number of tractors and power tillers in a given district (in 1000s), respectively, on a continuous variable
measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. All
specifications employ ICRISAT data and cover the years 1970 to 2009. The share of cropped land irrigated using
tube wells is instrumented for using variation in hydrogeological structures.
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Table 3.8: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Wages and Prices
Wages Prices
Male Female Rice Wheat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tube Well Share 100.3** 59.99 -83.79 -315.7***
(42.30) (46.35) (1,272) (81.85)
Observations 7,778 6,146 2,438 7,217
Data Source ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates
significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient
estimates of a two-stage-least-squares regression of male and female wages,
respectively, on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land
irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Columns 3
and 4 present coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares regression of
rice and wheat prices, respectively, on a continuous variable measuring the
share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year
fixed effects. All specifications employ ICRISAT data and cover the years 1970
to 2009. The share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells is instrumented
for using variation in hydrogeological structures.
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Table 3.9: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Farm Size Distribution
Number of Plots
Total Large Medium Semi-Medium Small Marginal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tube Well Share -502.5*** 44.83*** 27.41** -156.9*** -329.4*** -88.13
(136.2) (8.506) (12.37) (30.30) (58.16) (111.9)
Observations 2,063 2,063 2,063 2,063 2,063 2,063
Data Source ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the
1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns 1 presents coefficient estimates of the total number of plots in a
given district on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using tube
wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 6 present coefficient estimates of
a two-stage-least-squares regression of the total number of large, medium, semi-medium, small
and marginal plots on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated
using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. All specifications employ ICRISAT




Figure 3.1: Aquifer Map of India
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A.1 Derivation of price discrimination formula
Recall that social welfare is given by:
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− gac′∗ (p) c∗ (p)m (p)
The number of low elasticity types served is given by: NL(p) = M (c∗ (p))DL (p).
Using the definition of c∗ (p) as well as the definition of the elasticites and
























The project proceeded as follows. From July to August 2015, the ministry
collected background data on agents’ work environment and activities.
During this exercise, I conducted a pilot of the experiment. During November
2016 a workshop with senior central and local government officials introduced
the experiment, finalized the design and secured political support at all
administrative levels.
The intervention was then implemented in January and February 2016
by a mixed team of ministry staff and private enumerators. Both jointly
communicated the campaign instructions to participants. To assure data
confidentiality, the private enumerators then independently conducted the
baseline survey with participants. After the survey, ministry staff was
responsible for the distribution of the vaccine and the communication of
final technical instructions relating to the correct application and handling
of the vaccine. Agents started the vaccination campaign immediately after
receiving the vaccines, and were given three weeks from vaccine distribution
to complete the task. The last day of vaccination was February 24, 2016.
I then conducted a phone based follow-up survey with service recipients
during March and April 2016. Finally, I conducted an in-person follow-up
interview with 311 randomly selected experiment participants during May
2016.
A.2.2 Impact on Remote Farmers in Need
I provide an additional piece of evidence on the trade-offs generated by
price-caps by focusing on the availability of I-2 substitutes in villages as a
dimension of heterogeneity. In my sample, approximately 11% of farmers
have access to an imperfect substitute for I-2 provided through private
markets. Table 1.5 shows that while the price-cap was effective in reducing
prices by roughly 15 Tanzanian Shillings, this effect is driven exclusively
by transactions with farmers who don’t have access to this substitute. In
contrast, the treatment effect for farmers with access to the substitute is
positive, small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests
that competition induced by the substitute reduces the surplus available to
agents, hence driving prices to a level where the price-cap does not bind.
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Price-caps therefore only affect the surplus available to the agent in areas
where the substitute is unavailable.
As the substitute is also more likely to be absent in remote areas, this
reduction in available surplus resulting from the price-cap substantially
reduces agents’ incentives to target villages without access to the substitute.
To assess this intuition, column 2 in table A.1 investigates how price-caps
affect the likelihood that a farmer with no access to the substitute will be
served. The results show that the price-cap treatment reduces the likelihood
that farmers without access to the substitute are served by 3% to 4%. Taken
together, these results further highlight the aforementioned tension: price-
caps make services accessible to farmers in need. But when those farmers live
far away, price-caps can be counter-productive, as caps reduce the likelihood




The baseline survey was administered to every participant during the
vaccination distribution and was completed before any vaccinations occurred.
The survey included detailed questions on agents’ demographics, education,
work history and alternative income sources. It also collected data on
agents’ work environment, including information on travel times to villages,
transport methods, private providers of veterinary services and agents’
interaction with their supervisors.
As part of this survey I also administered two questions aimed at eliciting
an incentive-compatible measure of pro-social motivation toward animal
health causes. First, I designed a contextualized dictator game. Agents
were told that they would receive a lunch allowance of 10’000 Tanzanian
Shillings (approximately $4.50), which they could keep for themselves or
donate, in part or in full, to TVLA to purchase subsidized vaccines for the
next vaccination campaign. The amount donated is taken as a proxy for the
agents’ motivation for the cause. The median donation in the dictator game
was 1000 Tanzanian Shillings.
Second, agents were given a map with 9 fields, each detailing a possible
motivation for why they chose to work as a livestock field officer. Some stated
motivations were intrinsic (e.g. "my job allows me to help farmers when their
animals are sick") while others reflected extrinsic sources of motivation (e.g.
"my job offers a stable income"). Enumerators then gave participants 50 maize
grains and asked them to distribute the grains between the different fields
according to how important each reason was when they were making their
career choice. The relative amount of beans allocated to fields that reflect
intrinsic motivations then acts as a proxy for the agents’ motivation for the
cause.
Both measures were designed to increase the likelihood of being rank-
preserving in order to assure that measures remain valid even if agents
exaggerate their donation or grain allocation because of social pressure.
A.3.2 How accurate is the receipt data?
When assessing the validity of the receipt data it is important to remember
that accurate reporting was financially incentivized, as verified receipts at-
tracted a bonus payment of 60 Tanzanian Shillings per vaccination. Crucially,
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I don’t consider receipts that were submitted without a contact phone number
for farmers to be complete and therefore don’t count them towards the total
number of farmers served. Receipts without phone numbers are therefore also
ineligible for the bonus payment. Agents were made aware of this rule during
the roll-out and were encouraged to identify alternative contact numbers for
farmers should they not own a phone, for example by providing the number
of their neighbor or of the village leader. While this requirement might have
incentivized employees to target farmers more likely to own cellphones, the
need to provide phone numbers was present for all treatment groups and
is therefore unlikely to challenge the internal validity of the experiment. In
addition, identifying farmers’ contact numbers does not appear to have been
a problem: Less than 4% of receipts were submitted without phone numbers
and ministry staff tasked with supervising the campaign did not receive any
complaints about challenges with identifying cellphone owners.
A.3.3 Farmer Survey Procedures
For cost reasons, the follow-up survey with farmers was implemented as a
phone survey. The phone survey procedures were designed to maximize the
likelihood of reaching service recipients. Enumerators were instructed to call
each number on three different days, once in the morning and once in the
afternoon. After every unsuccessful attempt, enumerators sent a text message
to recipients informing them about the objective of the call and asking for an
appointment to administer the survey.
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A.4 Supplementary Tables
Table A.1: Effect of Treatment on Likelihood of Serving Remote Farmers in
Need
Outcome Variable: Price No substitute
available
(1) (2)




Price-Cap × No Substitute -20.07**
(8.520)
Observations 3,044 3,097
Data Source Farmer Survey Farmer Survey
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Agent Controls Yes Yes
Farmer Controls Yes Yes
Control Mean 76 0.89
Control St. Dev. 50 0.31
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates
significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Column 1 presents coefficient
estimates of the transaction price on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables
and an interaction with whether a recipient has access to a private substitute
for I-2. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of a binary
variable indicating whether a recipient has access to a substitute for ND
vaccines on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as
well as ward-level stratification and control variables.
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Table A.2: Effects on Participation
Outcome Var. Training Att. Participation Overall Part. % Verified % Price Correct
Treatment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price-Cap 0.0130 0.0166 0.0224 0.00476 -0.0358*
(0.0275) (0.0265) (0.0320) (0.0219) (0.0188)
Observations 990 832 990 740 675
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 0.83 0.82 0.68 0.69 0.83
Control St. Dev. 0.38 0.38 0.47 0.30 0.25
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent
level. All specifications control for stratification variables and district fixed-effects. The sample for columns 1 and 3
contains the population of agents in all sample districts. The sample for columns 2 are all agents who attended the
training and who performed vaccinations, respectively. "Overall Participation" refers to the likelihood of attending
training and performing vaccinations after training. % Verified refers to the fraction of transactions reported through
receipts that could be verified to have taken place. % Price Correct refers to the fractions of receipts that reported a
price that could be verified through follow-ups with farmers.
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Table A.3: Robustness - Replication of Price-Cap Treatment Effects excluding
Cattle Owners
Outcome: % of Farmers or Transactions with given Characteristic
Characterstic: Owns Cattle Price Main Livelihood Village has no
is Agriculture Private Provider
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price-Cap 0.00526 -15.61*** 0.0535** -0.0421**
(0.0222) (3.711) (0.0266) (0.0205)
Observations 3,098 2,165 2,204 2,204
Observation Level Transaction Transaction Transaction Transaction
Data Source Farmer Survey Farmer Survey Farmer Survey Farmer Survey
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Agent Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Farmer Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Mean 0.29 79.57 0.76 0.89
Control St. Dev. 0.45 53.69 0.43 0.30
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the individual level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5)
(10) percent level. All regressions apart from column 1 exclude cattle owners from the sample. Column 1
presents coefficient estimates of a regression of a binary variable indicating whether a farmer owns cattle
or not on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification
and control variables. Column 2 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of the transaction price on
an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control
variables. Column 3 presents coefficient estimates of a regression of a binary variable indicating whether
the recipient’s main livelihood is from agriculture on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed
effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Column 4 presents coefficient estimates of a
regression of a binary variable indicating whether the recipient’s village has a private provider of veterinary
services on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and
control variables.
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Table A.4: Robustness - Treatment Effects on Leakage and Transaction
Behavior





Data Source Farmer Survey Farmer Survey
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Control Mean 0.96 0.65
Control St. Dev. 1.45 0.47
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the ward level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1
(5) (10) percent level. Column 1 presents coefficient estimates of the fraction between confirmed
vaccinations and the number of vaccine doses collected on an indicator variable for the treatment,
district fixed effects as well as ward-level stratification and control variables. Column 2 presents
coefficient estimates of a binary variable indicating whether agents mentioned the vaccine cost
during the service delivery process on an indicator variable for the treatment, district fixed




Figure A.1: Receipt Format








Total Price Charged: TSh
Number of Chickens 
Vaccinated:
We certify that this receipt is truthful and accurate:
Livestock Officer Signature Client Signature
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Tube Well Share 1,948* 2,733*** -785.6
(1,001) (644.2) (787.9)
Observations 1,029 1,029 1,029
Data Source ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. ***
(**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level.
Columns 1 presents coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-
squares regression of the total population in a given district
on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land
irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year fixed
effects. Columns 2 presents coefficient estimates of a two-
stage-least-squares regression of the rural population in a given
district on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped
land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year
fixed effects. Columns 3 presents coefficient estimates of a
two-stage-least-squares regression of the urban population in
a given district on a continuous variable measuring the share
of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district
and year fixed effects. All specifications employ ICRISAT data,
which is based on the 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001 census. The
share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells is instrumented
for using variation in hydrogeological structures.
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Table B.2: Robustness: Effect of Tube Wells on Calorie Intake with Controls
and Heterogeneous Time Trends
Median Calorie Intake
(1) (2) (3)
Tube Well Share 2,521*** 1,002 3,662
(900.2) (671.2) (2,476)
Observations 977 987 987
Data Source Constr. Constr. Constr.
District Sample Full Full Full
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects No Yes No
State Specific Linear Trend No No Yes
Controls Yes No No
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. ***
(**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level.
Columns 1 to 3 present coefficient estimates of a two-stage-
least-squares regression of median daily per capita calorie intake
on a continuous variable measuring the share of cropped land
irrigated using tube wells. Column 1 controls for calorie prices,
area sown, total per capita expenditure in the district, district
population and district fixed effects. Column 2 controls for state-
year fixed effects and district fixed effects. Column 3 controls
for state specific linear time trends, district as well as year fixed
effects. The share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells is
instrumented for using variation in hydrogeological structures.
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Table B.3: Robustness: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Food Expenditure,
ICRISAT Districts
Share of food expenditure on ...
Food Exp. Share Staples Cereals Animal Prd. Veg. Fruit Sugar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tube Well Share 0.890** 0.222 0.306** 0.721*** -0.232** 0.0357 -0.173***
(0.344) (0.176) (0.150) (0.231) (0.0926) (0.0373) (0.0653)
Observations 987 987 987 987 987 987 987
Data Source Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr. Constr.
District Sample ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT ICRISAT
Reference Year 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1 (5)
(10) percent level. Columns 1 to 8 present coefficient estimates of a regression of the average share, as
part of monthly household expenditure, of various food items on a continuous variable measuring the
share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Column
1 uses food expenditure as an outcome variable, whereas column 2 uses expenditure on staples,
column 3 uses expenditure on non-staple cereals, column 4 uses expenditure on animal products,
column 5 uses expenditure on vegetables, column 6 uses expenditure on fruits, and column 7 uses
expenditure on sugar and sugar-related food items. Estimates are obtained through a two-stage-least-
squares regression in which tube well adoption is instrumented for using variation in hydrogeological
structures.
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Table B.4: Robustness: Effect of Tube Well Adoption on Productivity, 1987 to
2004
Yield HYV
Rice Wheat Rice Wheat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tube Well Share 1.165 3.096*** 170.1 401.2**
(0.840) (0.718) (202.0) (169.2)
Observations 4,639 4,187 3,121 3,111
Data Source ICR. ICR. ICR. ICR.
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Base Year 1987 1987 1987 1987
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at the district level. *** (**)
(*) indicates significance at the 1 (5) (10) percent level. Columns
1 and 2 present coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares
regression of rice and wheat yields, respectively, on a continuous
variable measuring the share of cropped land irrigated using
tube wells as well as district and year fixed effects. Columns 3
and 4 present coefficient estimates of a two-stage-least-squares
regression of the total area cropped with HYV rice and wheat
seeds, respectively, on a continuous variable measuring the
share of cropped land irrigated using tube wells as well as
district and year fixed effects. All specifications employ ICRISAT
data and cover the years 1987 to 2004. The share of cropped land
irrigated using tube wells is instrumented for using variation in
hydrogeological structures.
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